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Abstract 
In market economies, firms are the main drivers of job creation and job 
destruction. This thesis focuses on two crucial stages in the life-cycle of firms that 
involve a large amount of job reallocation: the early years after startup and the 
period when two firms merge into a single company. The first stage is believed to 
be a major source of job creation. The second is associated with massive job loss. 
I investigate whether these common perceptions are supported by empirical 
evidence, and show that the employment outcomes differ strongly depending on 
the firm’s individual characteristics. To analyze these questions we need data that 
accurately reflect the dynamics of firms and employment in the economy. This 
issue is addressed first. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 1  
 
General introduction 
In market economies, firms are the major source of job creation and job 
destruction. New firms start up, expand, restructure or contract, and eventually 
exit the market. At each stage they create new employment positions for workers 
or destroy existing jobs. The magnitude of this job reallocation is enormous. In 
western economies, about 10 percent of all existing jobs disappear every year and 
about the same amount of new jobs are created.  
The ongoing process of job creation and job destruction is partly driven by 
macroeconomic changes affecting many firms in similar ways. Technological 
progress has caused agricultural employment to disappear and has recently 
driven the rise of service jobs. Aggregate shocks, such as changes in energy prices 
or a global crisis, lead to recessions with overall job losses across firms, followed 
by periods of economic recovery in which many firms create new employment 
opportunities. 
But macroeconomic evolutions are only half of the story. A growing body of 
microeconomic research has documented that aggregate changes explain only 
part, and in fact very little of the ongoing process of job creation and job 
destruction. Even within the same sector and in the same period, expanding firms 
and new firms emerging coexist with contracting firms and firms that fail. During 
the internet rise in the late 90s, many dot-com companies started and some like 
Google or Amazon expanded tremendously, but millions of others stayed small or 
failed. In the once flourishing Belgian textile industry, most firms have declined 
and eventually disappeared, yet others like Picanol or Van de Velde have 
restructured their production and are today successful firms providing jobs for 
many workers around the world. 
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Individual firm characteristics  
The magnitude of dynamism within sectors brings to the fore that firm-specific 
features are a key element to understand why some firms survive and create jobs, 
and others destroy jobs or fail. Firms differ in managerial ability, the competences 
of their workers, the way they invest in new technologies or interact with foreign 
markets. Each of these elements determine how ‘efficient’ firms are and how well 
they are able to successfully compete in the market.  
Microeconomic models have developed the frameworks to understand how 
these differences in efficiency drive a continuous selection process among firms 
(Jovanovic 1982; Hopenhayn 1992). Even if firms face unforeseeable events they 
have no control over, efficient firms are more likely to survive and expand than 
their less efficient counterparts because they are able to produce the same 
product or provide the same service at a lower cost. This leads to ongoing 
reallocation of jobs, workers and capital from less to more efficient firms. At the 
level of the total economy, this selection process is an important source of average 
productivity increases and welfare growth. 
A growing body of empirical studies tries to understand the drivers and 
implications of this dynamic process by analyzing patterns observed in actual 
firm-level data. Particular areas of this research investigate dimensions such as 
the entry and exit of firms, the importance of innovation, the role of market 
distortions and institutions, and the effects on aggregate output, productivity and 
employment. In thesis, I focus on two crucial stages in the life-cycle of firms that 
involve a large amount of job reallocation: the entry of new firms (chapter 3), and 
the merger of two firms into a single company (chapter 4). The first stage is 
believed to be a major source of job creation; the second is associated with 
massive job destruction. I investigate to what extent these common perceptions 
hold, and how different firm characteristics at these stages lead to different 
employment outcomes. A prerequisite for analyzing these questions is the 
availability of good data with reliable information on firm and employment 
dynamics. Chapter 2 addresses this issue.  
This first chapter provides a general introduction to the three topics. It 
explains why it is important to address these questions and outlines the research 
background to the subjects. It gives a brief overview of the insights reached so far 
and of the contributions of my research to previous literature. The specific 
theoretical and empirical frameworks are discussed in the introductory sections 
of each chapter.  
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The three chapters of this thesis are written as stand-alone papers. Since each 
of them is self-contained and may be read independently, there is inevitable some 
repetition across the chapters regarding the data and methodological approach.  
Main concepts 
Before we start, let us briefly clarify the main concepts that we use throughout this 
thesis.  
Firm dynamics is a general term that embraces three processes (Caves 1998): 
the births and deaths of firms (entry and exit), changes in the size of continuing 
firms (expansion and contraction), and shifts between enterprises in the control 
of business units (restructurings). 
A job denotes an employment position filled by an employee within a firm 
(Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996a). A job can be filled by the same person for 
a certain period, but when he or she leaves the firm and is replaced by another 
employee, it is considered as the same job.  
One concept remains to be explained. What is a firm? This is the question we 
turn to next. 
Finding the firm  
Chapter 2: Empirical measurement of firm dynamics 
Firms in economic analysis are generally thought of as profit maximizing 
organizations that use input factors, such as labor and capital, to produce a certain 
amount of output, which can be goods or services. Yet unlike individuals, which 
have a distinct shape and an unambiguous moment of birth and death, the 
boundaries of a firm, both in space and in time, are less clearly defined. 
In a short paper that revolutionized our understanding of the firm, Ronald 
Coase (1937) defined it as an organization in which market transactions, typically 
regulated by prices, are eliminated and substituted by the coordination of the 
entrepreneur. Firms arise when these market transactions can be organized at a 
lower cost inside a formal organization, i.e. by establishing a long-term contract 
between economic agents. In the real world, Coase suggested, these contracts are 
best approached by the legal relationship between an employer and an employee. 
In this view, the concept of an employer enterprise is a good starting point for the 
analysis of firm dynamics. 
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The property rights approach takes a different view of the firm (Grossman and 
Hart 1986). It defines the firm’s boundaries in terms of the ownership of assets 
(e.g. machines, buildings). When it becomes too costly for two owners, for example 
a buyer and a supplier, to enforce all the details of the contract, it may be optimal 
for one party to purchase the other firm and gain control over its assets. The 
implication of this definition is that the firm can be ultimately traced back to its 
shareholders. 
Williamson (1979) refined the concept of vertical integration of firms by 
arguing that contractual relationships between economic agents are not that 
unidimensional. They vary across a set of key characteristics, such as frequency, 
uncertainty, and required investments. The cost of the transaction along these 
dimensions will eventually determine whether the contract is governed in a 
hierarchical relationship within the firm, or by the market. According to this view, 
firms are best described as governance structures.  
Modern firm theory emphasizes that a sharp distinction between intrafirm and 
interfirm transactions cannot be drawn. Many intermediate forms of 
organizational structure exists in a continuum between the market and the fully 
integrated firm, such as franchising, subcontracting, or interfirm networks 
(Holmström and Roberts 1998). So, where do we start to analyze the firm? 
Who creates jobs? 
Different research questions require different definitions of the firm. When café 
Kaminsky changed owner but continued with the same infrastructure, the same 
employees, and the same relations with its suppliers, should the old and new 
Kaminsky be considered as a two firms, an exit and a startup, or as one continuing 
firm? Another example is when Dreambaby was established as an independent 
legal enterprise but remained under corporate control of Colruyt Group. Was it to 
be considered as a new entrant in the market of baby articles and as an example 
of the increasing vertical disintegration of firms, or should it be regarded as the 
continuing unit of a large corporation diversifying its activities in different 
product markets?  
If our research question is to investigate the impact of firm dynamics on the 
creation and destruction of jobs, the answer is rather straightforward. It is clearly 
wrong to define the old Kaminsky as a failing firm that caused job loss for all its 
workers, and the new Kaminsky as a startup that created new jobs. Since all 
employees kept their jobs in the bar, we could best approach Kaminsky as a 
continuing firm. Similarly, the newly established Dreambaby was not a real 
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entrant creating new employment positions, neither was Colruyt a shrinking 
employer that destroyed all Dreambaby jobs. If any changes in employment 
occurred at all, it would be best to consider these at the level of Colruyt Group.  
The next and more difficult question the researcher faces is, which data can be 
used to empirically investigate the amount of job creation and destruction that is 
going on in the real world? While theories of the firm have made major progress 
in the past 80 years, the datasets researchers can rely on have not. Current 
empirical research on firm and employment dynamics is mostly based on 
administrative datasets such as official business registers or social security data. 
These data are a highly attractive source for analyzing firm-level determinants of 
entry, exit and growth (Caves 1998) and patterns of job creation and destruction 
(Davis et al. 1996a). However, the administrative notion of the firm employed in 
these sources is often at odds with the economic reality. Firms can change 
administrative ID-code, or legal entities can be separated or merged into one unit, 
leading to missing links in firm histories over time. Researchers have indicated 
that this provides us with a distorted picture of firm and employment dynamics 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda 2013) and that it hampers comparative 
analysis (Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi 2005).  
Employer-employee relations 
The first paper of this thesis addresses the question how to transform 
administrative datasets into a reliable source for the analysis of firm and job 
dynamics. Reflecting the real-world firm suggested by Coase, I argue that the 
employer-employee relationship is a key element to identify the firm and its 
impact on job creation and destruction. A so-called employee-flow method is 
developed, pioneered by Baldwin, Dupuy and Penner (1992), to trace each firm’s 
individual history. The method follows one main input factor of the firm, its 
workforce, to identify the firm’s point of entry, exit, and its changing structure 
over time. I contrast this approach with another method commonly used in 
Europe and the US, which uses a complex set of characteristics to identify firm 
histories (Eurostat-OECD 2007; Clayton and Spletzer 2009). I conclude that this 
traditional method leaves the researcher with an obscure definition of the firm 
and its boundaries in time and space.  
Turning to actual statistics, I show that the employee-flow method is generally 
more effective for obtaining reliable estimates of job creation and destruction and 
of firm-level dynamics. The method is preferable on other grounds as well. It is 
based on algorithms that can be standardized across countries and enhance 
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international comparability of results. It is also a powerful tool for identifying 
changes in the firm structure which researchers often want to study as events of 
economic importance, such as mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, and other 
changes in the control structure of firms. 
Expanding the firm  
Chapter 3: Post-entry dynamics of de novo entrants 
New and young companies are often considered as the primary source of job 
creation and growth. As an ‘answer to challenges brought by the gravest economic 
crisis in the last 50 years’, the European Commission declares that ‘to bring 
Europe back to growth and create new jobs, we need more entrepreneurs’ 
(European Commission 2013). 
The idea that new entrepreneurial activity provides a fundamental impulse to 
economic growth is commonly attributed to the Austrian-born economist Joseph 
Schumpeter. In his view, technological innovation, as the driving force of economic 
growth, is accompanied at the micro level by a process of creative destruction. 
With this term, he denoted the disruptive process of transformation that 
‘revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old 
one, incessantly creating a new one’. For Schumpeter the ‘innovative 
entrepreneur’ is the disruptive force. As opposed to the ‘imitator’, it is the ‘leader’, 
who ensures ‘fundamental improvement, is able to break away from routine and 
destroy existing structures’ (Schumpeter 1942). 
With the passage of time, Schumpeter’s distinctive attribute innovative has 
faded, and the view that new entrepreneurs are a major driver of employment 
growth has gained popularity. Empirical analysis for various countries, however, 
shows mixed evidence. New firms may stimulate efficient reallocation of 
production factors across firms and thus increase aggregate productivity (Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan 2001). But the displacement of less productive jobs in 
other firms may lead to a negative impact on net employment growth, albeit in the 
short run (Fritsch and Mueller 2004). Moreover, ample evidence shows that most 
new firms fail short after entry or stay very small, hardly contributing to job 
creation at all (Geroski 1995). Recently, research attention has therefore shifted 
towards the heterogeneous characteristics of new firms. One finding of these 
studies which has received major public attention, is that a small set of rapidly 
growing young firms contribute disproportionally to job creation (Haltiwanger 
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et al. 2013). Stretching this conclusion, some now argue that policy should not try 
to encourage as many startups as possible, but to stimulate those high-potential 
entrants that are most likely to become the next Apple or Amazon. In short, do we 
need more mice or gazelles? 
How many new jobs young firms create will ultimately depend on the 
characteristics of the individual firms both at startup and post entry. It depends 
on their absolute importance, reflected in the initial firm size distribution, and on 
changes in the distribution over time, captured by firm exit and growth patterns. 
The second paper of this thesis reassesses some facts about these two patterns. 
How do firms enter? 
Two distinct theoretical views on the firm size distribution at entry prevail. The 
first tries to explain heterogeneity among firm size at startup as observed in many 
empirical studies. Lucas (1978) features a dispersion of managerial skill in the 
population. High-skilled individuals self-select into entrepreneurship and choose 
their firm size optimally upon entry. Another explanation is given by Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) who take into account that entrants may face liquidity 
constraints. Heterogeneity in entry size reflects that some firms are more 
financially constrained. In the second view, there is no difference in size at entry. 
The passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) assumes that new firms enter 
with an innate efficiency level which they only discover from operating in the 
market. Initially, they have the same beliefs about this and all enter at the same 
size. 
Remarkably, and in contrast to most previous studies, our results are very 
much in line with the passive learning model. Focusing on de novo entrants, we 
find that the size distribution of new firms is confined to very narrow range of 
small size classes. We show that this result strongly depends on the identification 
of truly new firms in the data, as explained in the previous chapter. Studies that 
cover a sample with many large firms already at entry, are most probably 
including established firms that are misclassified as entrants. 
Although this seems a trivial data problem, it is not. The narrow size range we 
observe at entry has two important implications. First, after removing 
misclassified entrants from the data, we find that the initial contribution of new 
firms to job creation is actually very low. In Belgium, they represent a mere 
1.5 percent of total employment, in contrast to a multiple of this share reported in 
many other studies. The second implication concerns the post-entry growth 
patterns. Do small young firms grow faster than larger ones, supporting the view 
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that policy should focus on the wide set of micro-firms to stimulate job creation? 
Or do larger young firms have higher growth rates?  
How do young firms expand? 
Empirical evidence has long supported the first view. Evans (1987a) suggested 
that growth rates of young firms of the same age are negatively related to size. 
Theoretical models have tried to explain this empirical observation by 
rationalizing how heterogeneity among firm size at startup leads to 
heterogeneous firm growth paths. In Evans and Jovanovic (1989), for example, 
liquidity constraints force some firms to enter below their optimal size. Relying on 
retained earnings to expand, the smaller, constrained entrants would then grow 
faster and to some extent catch up in size with larger entrants.  
Recently, however, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) concluded that there is no 
systematic relationship between firm size and growth, and that the observed 
relation depends on the size methodology. Using their preferred methodology 
even would suggest a positive growth-size relationship among firms of the same 
age. Our results strongly confirm the latter. We find that among young firms of the 
same entry cohort, larger ones grow faster than smaller ones. Moreover, we show 
that this pattern is robust to alternative measurement methods.  
Both the narrow initial size distribution and the positive size-growth 
relationship we find are supportive of constraints affecting firms following their 
entry decision rather than before. The reasoning of the passive learning model 
(Jovanovic 1982) is that firms gradually discover their own efficiency level by 
operating in the market. Firms that learn they are more efficient grow and survive, 
while the inefficient decline and exit. In the model, these size adjustments are 
made instantaneously. In the real world, however, young firms may face severe 
credit, hiring, or regulatory constraints (Cabral and Mata 2003). For more efficient 
firms wanting to expand, this limits growth in the first years. Their current size 
will be below their desired size and they will need several years to grow into their 
optimal size. This leads to higher growth rates for larger firms, until adjustment is 
complete and growth becomes independent of firm size. 
Mice and gazelles 
How do these firm-level patterns translate into aggregate numbers of job 
creation? For Belgium, we find that de novo entrants of a given year represent 
about 30 000 new jobs, which is 1.5 percent of total private employment. Five 
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years after entry, only 1 percent of them have expanded beyond 20 employees. 
About half of all entrants have already failed by that age and most others have 
remained very small. Does this imply that job creation by young firms is mainly 
driven by a limited set of rapidly growing companies? As long as the new Apple or 
Amazon is not among them, it is probably not. Total employment of an entry 
cohort has dropped below its initial level of 30 000 jobs by age 5 and is still mainly 
located among the smallest firms. Fast-growing firms that expanded beyond 20 
employees represent 20 percent of these jobs, which is a disproportionate, but 
after all a modest share. 
A straightforward conclusion could be that small young firms create more jobs. 
A more provocative one is that the next Apple or Amazon may have failed. In global 
markets, innovative entrants often have only a narrow window of opportunity to 
occupy a market niche. If, as we described, constraints limit their growth in the 
first years and scaling-up happens too slowly, a firm risks coming too late and be 
shut out of the market by early movers. Recent evidence has indeed suggested that 
fast-growing firms experience the greatest constraints to growth (Brown, Earle 
and Morgulis 2015). If this is the case, policy could play a role in fostering job 
creation by making sure that adjustments to firm size after entry are easy to make. 
Understanding the implications of such constraints on early growth is a promising 
area for future research. 
Restructuring the firm  
Chapter 4: Employment impact of takeovers 
Firms usually expand gradually by hiring one or a few additional employees at a 
time. Yet at some point, they may increase drastically in size by taking over or 
merging with another firm. Mergers and takeovers are driven by such motivations 
as increasing market power, acquiring innovative technology, or creating gains to 
shareholders. But when Inbev took over Hoegaarden, Concentra and Corelia were 
merged, or IJsboerke was acquired by Glacio, one question fascinated the public: 
how many jobs will be lost? 
Every year, more than 6 percent of all employees in the Belgian private sector 
are working in a company that is involved in a takeover.1 If takeovers do 
                                                 
1 This number even refers to domestic takeovers only. 
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significantly reduce the firm’s demand for labor, the consequences for aggregate 
employment may be considerable. 
Expected employment outcomes 
From a theoretical perspective, the fear of job loss can readily be justified. A purely 
anti-competitive merger reduces output and thus employment. An important 
strand of the literature has focused on such oligopoly behavior of firms (Shapiro 
1989). By eliminating competition between the two companies, the integrated 
firm may exploit its market power and substantially increase the price of its 
product at the same time reducing its output.  
A merger or takeover that increases labor productivity without changing the 
level of output, will reduce employment as well. Theory provides ample reason to 
assume that the vertical integration of firms leads to gains in labor productivity 
(Lafontaine and Slade 2007). Productivity increases can for instance be realized 
by production cost savings, arising from economies of scale or from efficiently 
reallocating production and workers across the integrated firm.  
An additional motivation for employment reductions following takeovers is 
presented by Shleifer and Summers (1988). The authors argue that if a new 
management is appointed with less ties to the workforce of the acquired firm, it 
will be less reluctant to renegotiate existing labor contracts. This ‘breach of trust’ 
between the management and the employees may lead to substantial layoffs.  
Despite the insights offered by merger theory, empirical research has not 
found clear evidence that mergers and takeovers, as a general rule, reduce output 
or enhance productivity. Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner (2003), for 
example, analyzing the effects of mergers and takeovers around the world over 
the past 15 years, find that 29 percent of the firms increase efficiency post-merger, 
but that an equal proportion decrease efficiency. They also find that output-
reducing mergers account for about half of the population, while the other half 
increases output. These results suggest that the outcomes for employment will be 
highly ambiguous. Moreover, certain types of takeovers may increase productivity 
without saving in labor costs. One example are acquisitions targeted at small 
innovative firms, creating synergy gains for both parties. The takeover creates an 
opportunity for the acquirer to incorporate new technologies and highly 
specialized personnel, while it provides new resources for the target to finance its 
technological developments. 
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What complicates the prediction of merger outcomes even more, is that actual 
takeovers are often driven by other motivations, which do not fit into the model 
of a profit-maximizing firm. The free cash flow theory, for example, describes why 
managers who aim at increasing the resources they control, may choose to expand 
the firm beyond its optimal size, with detrimental impacts on the firm’s 
performance (Jensen 1986).  
Observed employment outcomes 
Given the lack of strong predictions that can be derived from the literature, does 
empirical research provide more explicit support for the alleged job loss 
associated with mergers and takeovers? The evidence so far is rather weak. 
Quantitative studies have mainly focused on small subsets of takeovers, such as 
foreign acquisitions or takeovers by listed firms. Even within these specific 
populations, the employment effects strongly differ. 
One set of studies investigate the employment impact on the target firm only, 
and mainly focus on domestic firms that are acquired by a foreign owner. Overall, 
the results indicate that foreign acquisitions have no or small negative effects on 
employment growth of the domestic plant, and that the impact varies greatly 
across sectors (Girma and Görg 2003; Lehto and Böckerman 2008).  
However, looking at employment changes in the target plant is only half the 
picture. Takeovers may also affect employment in the acquiring firm, and jobs may 
be relocated across the integrated company after the merger. When Inbev took 
over Hoegaarden, the entire production was replaced to Jupille. New investments 
were made in this plant and new jobs were created. Merely taking into account the 
jobs that were lost in Hoegaarden, would underestimate the employment impact 
of the takeover.2  
A more consistent approach, therefore, is to consider employment changes in 
both the target and the acquirer. Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002) 
and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) have adopted this by estimating the employment 
impact at the level of the combined entity. These studies, which exclusively focus 
on takeovers by listed companies, find that takeovers in European countries lead 
to significant workforce reductions, but they observe no adverse effects in the U.S.  
                                                 
2 Only two years later, Inbev moved production back to Hoegaarden because the customers 
disliked the taste of ‘de Witte’ brewed Jupille. 
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Mixing different colors 
A drawback of the combined-entity approach is that it disregards that takeovers 
are combinations of two firms with different characteristics before the merger. A 
large pharmaceutical company taking over a small high-growth IT firm, will reflect 
a different merger motivation and presumably have a different employment 
impact than when a medium publishing company merges with a medium retail 
bookseller. Adding a touch of green to blue is unlikely to produce the same result 
as mixing red and yellow. Yet the combined-entity method treats them as similar 
events. 
In the third paper of this thesis, we refine the combined-entity approach by 
taking into account that the characteristics of both the target and the acquirer, and 
the specific combination between the two may affect the decision to engage in a 
takeover and subsequent employment growth. In particular, we consider such 
features as pre-merger size, previous growth, industry, and the corporate 
structure of the two firms. As a counterfactual for the takeovers, we use pairs of 
firms with the same combined pre-merger characteristics. 
We also use a more comprehensive set of takeovers than previous studies. Our 
sample consists of 2200 domestic takeovers in the Belgian private sector, which 
are identified as two independent employer firms that merge into a single legal 
unit. This setting enables us to explicitly concentrate on the employment effects of 
merging separate workforces into a larger entity.  
Our results indicate that takeovers have a small negative impact on 
employment growth of the merged entity, which is mainly attributed to takeovers 
undertaken by small acquirers. For large acquirers we find substantial variation 
in post-merger employment growth suggesting that workforce rationalizations 
are not the dominant motivation for takeover activity. In particular, we find 
suggestive evidence that takeovers targeted at high-growth firms have a positive 
impact on firm employment growth. 
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Longitudinal firm-level data:  
problems and solutions 
Abstract 
Empirical measures of firm and employment dynamics based on 
administrative datasets are biased due to missing links in the longitudinal 
observation of firms. This paper presents a systematic overview of the 
problems and evaluates two prevailing solutions. We quantify the biases in a 
set of widely used empirical measures and show which estimates are most 
sensitive to missing linkages. The biases are found to be especially large in the 
size distribution of entrants and exits, in firm-level growth estimates for 
medium and large firms, and in job reallocation measures. We show that an 
employee-flow linkage method is more effective in reducing bias than a 
traditional link method often used by statistical agencies. A consistent 
approach is developed for imputing firm-level growth measures of linked 
firms. The analysis is carried out using a longitudinal dataset for Belgium and 
discussed from an international perspective.  
JEL Codes: C81, J23, L11 
Keywords: Firm dynamics; Job creation and job destruction; Firm microdata; 
Linked employer-employee data; Firm linkage 
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2.1 Introduction 
Large-scale administrative datasets in which individual firms or establishments 
are observed over a long period of time are increasingly used in empirical research 
on firm and employment dynamics. The data are an attractive source for 
investigating firm-level determinants of entry, exit and growth (Caves 1998; 
Dunne et al. 1988, 1989; Wagner 2007) and patterns of job creation and 
destruction (Davis et al. 1996a). A well-known but major problem with these data 
is that missing links in individual firm histories lead to bias in the measurement of 
firm turnover and job reallocation (Haltiwanger et al. 2013). When, for example, 
the administrative ID number of a firm is changed, the firm is observed as an exit 
and a new entrant instead of as a continuing firm. Changes in the firm’s structure, 
such as mergers or split-ups, create additional difficulties in identifying firm 
histories over time. In response to these concerns, statistical agencies have 
invested in the development of record linking methods to improve the data for 
research. In the absence of comparison, the reliability of the revised datasets is 
generally taken for granted by users. Moreover, it is often unclear to researchers 
which empirical measures are especially sensitive to linkages problems and 
require good longitudinal data to be consistently estimated. 
This paper aims at providing guidance to researchers that use administrative 
datasets to investigate firm and employment dynamics. It contributes to previous 
studies by presenting a systematic overview of both the linkage problems and the 
solutions. First, it evaluates the size and the direction of the biases created by 
missing firm linkages in a series of widely-used empirical measures. We consider 
entry and exit indicators, firm-level growth estimates, and the mean and annual 
variance of job creation and destruction rates. Second, it compares the 
performance of two prevailing linkage methods in reducing these biases. A novel 
approach is adopted to address these questions by using reference measurements 
based on a benchmark dataset. The empirical analysis is carried out using a 
longitudinal dataset of Belgian firms. The methods and findings are discussed 
from an international perspective. While this study focuses on the firm level, it 
provides insights that can also be useful for establishment-level analysis, which is 
sensitive to similar measurement problems. 
Statistical agencies in Europe and the U.S. often apply traditional record linking 
methods to address longitudinal linkage problems in administrative data 
(Eurostat-OECD 2007; Clayton and Spletzer 2009). Missing firm linkages are 
identified with probabilistic matching techniques and supplementary data 
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sources such as surveys or other administrative registers. An alternative 
approach, which in this paper is called the employee-flow method, was pioneered 
by Baldwin et al. (1992) for Canada and has been adopted in some other countries. 
The method relies on linked employer-employee data and traces one key input 
factor of the firm, the stock of individual employees, to track changes in firm ID 
numbers and in firm structure. This paper discusses the general strengths and 
weaknesses of both linkage methods, and applies them to a longitudinal dataset of 
Belgian employer firms in order to evaluate how well they perform in improving 
empirical estimates. The methods for Belgium have been developed in line with 
current international practice and can be considered as illustrative examples of 
the two linkage approaches. A third linkage method, adopted by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, is not evaluated in this paper. It takes the traditional method one step 
further and uses also firm-establishment links to improve longitudinal linkages 
(Jarmin and Miranda 2002). 
The impact analysis of missing linkages on empirical measures of firm and 
employment dynamics is carried out as follows. Starting from an administrative 
register of Belgian employer firms from 2003-2012, two improved versions of the 
dataset are obtained by applying the traditional and employee-flow linkage 
methods separately, and a third version is constructed by using all linkage 
information provided by the two methods combined. The latter serves as a 
benchmark for evaluation. Comparing empirical estimates based on different 
versions of the dataset, we first investigate which measures are especially 
sensitive to missing linkages and quantify the size of the biases. Second, it is 
evaluated how well each of the two linkage methods perform in reducing these 
biases.  
The analysis reveals that missing linkages are strongly increasing in firm size. 
The implication for aggregate measures is that they lead to large overestimations 
of job flows and a relatively small bias in firm turnover. This result is consistent 
with fragmented evidence for other countries. The impact is most obvious for 
entry and exit measures, where the analysis reveals that most medium and large 
entrants and exits are actually continuing firms that are misclassified after an ID 
change or firm restructuring. Using improved firm linkages almost completely 
shifts the mass of employment at entry and exit towards the smallest firms and 
reduces total job creation by entry and job destruction by exit by about half. 
Missing links in individual firm histories further have disturbing consequences for 
firm-level estimates by age and size, since they lead to misclassifications of older 
as younger firms and of successful firms as exits. As an example, we show that 
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firm-level growth estimates based on unedited data are strongly underestimated, 
especially for larger firms.  
An optimal firm-level research dataset with reliable longitudinal information 
is obviously obtained by exploiting information from different linkage methods. If 
only one method is used, we find that the employee-flow method is generally more 
effective. Empirical measures based on data improved by this method are close to 
the benchmark results, while the traditional method reduces most biases by only 
half. The traditional method is however more appropriate for the study of the 
smallest firm size classes, where employee-flow linkages are absent by 
construction. This paper further argues that the employee-flow method is 
preferable on other grounds as well, such as its use of an economically meaningful 
definition of firm continuity, its potential for international comparability, and its 
wider application in the field of firm dynamics.  
Section 2.2 discusses the longitudinal linkage problems and the solutions 
offered so far. Section 2.3 describes the data used in this paper and provides the 
technical background on the two linkage methods that are evaluated. It also 
explains how linked firms are reclassified, and proposes a consistent approach for 
imputing employment growth of these firms. Section 2.4 provides background 
statistics on linked firms to facilitate interpretation of the results. Section 2.5 
presents the results of the impact analysis of linkage errors on empirical 
measures. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Longitudinal linkage problems and solutions 
It is well-recognized that firm-level administrative datasets suffer from 
longitudinal linkage problems which have disturbing consequences for the 
empirical analysis of firm and employment dynamics (Baldwin et al. 1992; 
Vilhuber 2008; Haltiwanger et al. 2013). The problems stem from the fact that the 
data reflect firm entry and exit, and firm expansion and contraction, from an 
administrative viewpoint which often does not correspond to the economic reality 
one wants to investigate. A first linkage problem is created by changes in the 
administrative firm identification number. A new ID number may be assigned 
when the ownership or legal form changes, or firms may re-register as a new 
company after an internal restructuring, for tax optimization or liability 
avoidance. The firm will then be observed twice, once as an entrant and once as 
an exit, even if it simply continues its activities with a new ID number. Such 
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‘spurious’ entrants and exits introduce an upward bias in measures of firm and 
employment turnover (Davis et al. 1996a). Changes in the firm’s structure brought 
about by mergers, takeovers or split-offs create additional longitudinal linkage 
problems. They lead to creations and closures of firm identification numbers that 
are clearly different from de novo firm entry and exit by failure (Dunne et al. 1988; 
Baldwin and Gorecki 1987). They also lead to administrative transfers of 
employees between firm ID numbers which appear as shocks to firm-level 
employment in the raw data. This further inflates job reallocation measures 
(Pinkston and Spletzer 2002). Overestimation of aggregate measures of firm 
turnover and job reallocation is one empirical problem. Several authors have 
pointed out that missing longitudinal linkages also cause distortions in firm-level 
measurements. They introduce a size bias in firm-level estimates of entry, exit and 
growth (Geurts and Van Biesebroeck 2014), lead to misclassifications of the firm 
age (Haltiwanger et al. 2013), and hamper comparative analysis of firm 
demographics (Bartelsman et al. 2005; Vilhuber 2008). 
To improve the data for statistical and research purposes, statistical agencies 
have invested in the development of longitudinal business databases. Traditional 
record linking techniques are often used to identify missing links between firm 
identification numbers (Abowd et al. 1999; Bycroft 2003; Eurostat-OECD 2007; 
Clayton and Spletzer 2009).1 These methods primarily rely on supplementary 
data sources such as surveys and other administrative registers with information 
on firm demography, ownership changes or M&A activity. Although such sources 
provide valuable additional information, firm changes that are not registered 
remain out of scope. Therefore, the link procedures are usually complemented by 
probabilistic matching techniques which exploit similarities in partial firm 
identifiers, such as name, address, or industry code to establish links between ID 
numbers of the same firm.  
At the same time, several countries have developed an employee-flow method 
for the improvement of longitudinal firm linkages (Baldwin et al. 1992; Benedetto 
et al. 2007).2 This method takes an entirely different approach to identify missing 
                                                 
1 Abowd et al. (1999) present a linkage method for France; Bycroft (2003) for New Zealand, 
and Clayton and Spletzer (2009) describe the longitudinal linkage method applied by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. In Europe, linkage methods adopted by national statistical 
agencies have led to general Eurostat-OECD recommendations on firm record linking 
(Eurostat-OECD 2007). 
2 One of the first institutes to implement an employee-flow method has been Statistics 
Canada (Baldwin et al. 1992), where it is still used for the construction of the National 
Accounts Longitudinal Microdata File (Dixon and Rollin 2012). Employee-flow methods are 
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linkages. While traditional methods retrieve information on firm continuity from 
a complex set of partial firm characteristics, the employee-flow method uses one 
key input factor of the firm, the workforce, to trace the firm’s individual history 
and changing structure over time. The reasoning is as follows. When a firm 
changes ID number but continues its operations, one of the main production 
factors, the stock of individual employees, is likely to remain largely the same. 
Continuity of the workforce from one period to the next can thus be used to detect 
changes in firm ID numbers. Similarly, mergers, takeovers or split-offs of firms will 
be reflected in a merge or division of workforces. Employee-flow methods make 
use of linked employer-employee data to implement this workforce-based 
characteristic of firm continuity. Large clusters of employees that appear to ‘move’ 
from one firm ID number to another are used to signal changes in ID numbers or 
in the firm structure.  
A third linkage approach is adopted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the creation 
of a longitudinal establishment and enterprise database (Acs and Armington 
1998; Jarmin and Miranda 2002). A similar method does not exist for Belgium and 
is therefore not evaluated in this paper. In addition to using surveys and 
probabilistic matching, as in the traditional approach, the U.S. Census Bureau also 
exploits information provided by the link between the firm and the establishment 
ID. One of the advantages of this method is that the longitudinal histories of 
establishments can be used to identify true entry and exit of the controlling firm 
as well as changes in the firm’s structure. Establishments that change ID number 
are in turn linked by a probabilistic matching procedure. Haltiwanger et al. (2013) 
highlight that this approach allows for measuring job creation and destruction at 
the firm level that abstracts from establishments whose parent firm changes. In 
the same spirit, Mata et al. (1995) and Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) use the 
longitudinal identifier of the parent firm to distinguish between de novo plant 
entry and new plants created by established firms.  
Although this paper focuses on the firm level, it provides useful insights for 
establishment analysis as well. Establishment data equally suffer from missing 
links in the longitudinal registration of units due to ID changes, split-ups or 
mergers of establishments, which give rise to similar biases in turnover and job 
                                                 
also used for the construction of longitudinal employer databases in Denmark (Albaeck and 
Sorensen 1998), Finland (Korkeamäki and Kyyrä 2000), Sweden (Persson 2004), Italy 
(Contini et al. 2007), Belgium (Geurts et al. 2009); and Germany (Hethey and Schmieder 
2013). 
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flow measures at the establishment level. The problems are often addressed with 
similar linkage methods as the ones discussed in this paper.3  
From a methodological viewpoint, both the traditional and employee-flow 
linkage methods have strengths and weaknesses. The main disadvantage of the 
employee-flow method is that it is unsuited to capture links among the smallest 
firms, while the traditional method covers all size classes. The employee-flow 
method, however, has several features that make it an attractive method for 
research on job flows and firm dynamics. First, it directly implements an 
economically meaningful definition of firm continuity, and by extension of firm 
entry and exit. Continuity of one of the firm’s key production factors, the stock of 
employees, is used to identify firms that operate continuously but change 
identification number or firm structure. The traditional method deduces 
information on longitudinal firm histories from a complex set of partial firm 
characteristics. It partly depends on the specific notions of firm continuity that are 
used in supplementary surveys or administrative registers. Moreover, ID changes 
induced by firms themselves for tax evasion or other reasons are unlikely to be 
reported in other sources. Probabilistic matching helps to identify additional 
linkages, but major changes in discriminating identifiers, e.g. name or telephone 
number, strongly reduce the probability of a positive match. Second, the 
employee-flow method effectively captures changes in the firm’s structure, such 
as mergers, take-overs or split-offs. Researchers often do not simply want to 
neutralize these events, as we do in this paper, but to study them as events of 
economic importance.4 A third advantage lies in international comparability. 
Traditional link methods make use of supplementary data sources which differ 
widely between countries. The employee-flow method, by contrast, is based on 
linkage algorithms that follow general rules and can be standardized across 
countries.  
From an empirical viewpoint, the strengths and weaknesses of the two 
methods are less obvious. Both traditional and employee-flow methods are found 
to remove a substantial amount of ‘spurious’ firm and employment turnover from 
the data (see for example Pinkston and Spletzer 2002; Benedetto et al. 2007). 
Empirical dynamics measures based on improved longitudinal data thus more 
                                                 
3 See for example Abowd et al. (1999) who describe a traditional link method for French 
establishment data, and Hethey and Schmieder (2013) who use an employee-flow method 
for German establishment data. 
4 Linked employer-employee data have further been used to analyze a wide variety of labor 
market issues. For a comprehensive overview see Abowd and Kramarz (1999). 
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accurately reflect the true dynamics in the economy. However, to our knowledge, 
no serious attempt has been undertaken so far to evaluate bias in empirical 
measures after implementation of the record linking methods, or to determine 
which linkage method is more successful in avoiding bias in the measures. 
2.3 Data and methods  
The register of Belgian employer firms that is used in this paper is particularly 
well suited to investigating these questions. First, the two record linking methods 
that we apply to the dataset have taken advantage of the development of similar 
methods in other countries and can be considered as illustrative examples of the 
traditional and the employee-flow approach. The traditional method was 
developed by Statistics Belgium in line with the OECD-Eurostat recommendations 
on firm record linking (Eurostat-OECD 2007). These guidelines aim at the 
construction of harmonized business registers and statistical indicators on firm 
demography. The employee-flow method was developed by the National Social 
Security Office in collaboration with the University of Leuven (Geurts et al. 2009) 
and builds on similar examples in other countries, in particular Canada (Baldwin 
et al. 1992), Sweden (Persson 2004), and the U.S. (Benedetto et al. 2007).5 Further, 
the initial longitudinal firm linkages present in the Belgian firm register are 
relatively consistent: firm identification numbers generally do not change after a 
change in ownership or legal form, while this is often mentioned as one of the main 
reasons for longitudinal linkage errors in other countries. The benchmark results 
that are obtained after applying the two linkage methods combined can therefore 
be considered fairly accurate estimates of firm and employment dynamics in the 
economy.  
The level of analysis used throughout this paper is the firm. The firm (or 
‘enterprise’) is the basic statistical unit for business demography statistics in the 
European Union, and data collection is harmonized across countries (Eurostat-
OECD 2007). The firm corresponds to the smallest enterprise unit which benefits 
                                                 
5 The methods has been developed for the construction of the DynaM longitudinal employer 
database. The database is designed to track changes in employment both at the macro and 
the firm level and to produce annual series of gross job gains and losses statistics in 
Belgium. See www.dynam-belgium.org 
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from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making.6 In Belgium, as in most 
European countries, this corresponds to the enterprise entity at the national level, 
which may include different establishments. 90 percent of the firms in our dataset 
are single-establishment firms. Some studies, especially for large countries such 
as the U.S., use the establishment as unit of analysis. In smaller countries, this level 
of observation is less suitable for job flow analysis, since establishments of the 
same firm are located at short distance from each other and people easily 
commute to different work locations. Within-firm relocation of jobs between 
establishments will have a minimal impact on the labor markets and would falsely 
be considered as job creation and job destruction in an establishment approach.  
Identifying longitudinal firm histories and, by extension, the point of entry and 
exit, requires an operational definition of entrants and exits. In this paper, ‘real’ 
entrants are defined as firms that enter the market by starting new operations and 
creating new employment positions. Likewise, real exits correspond to firms that 
shut down and terminate all existing employment contracts. In between, firms are 
defined as continuing, also when they merge or split up activities. These 
definitions closely correspond to the concepts of entry and exit used in theoretical 
models of firm dynamics (Jovanovic 1982), as well as to the definitions that are 
implicitly assumed in most empirical studies (Caves 1998). Such de novo entry is 
opposed to entry by established firms which can take a variety of forms (Caves 
and Porter 1977). Likewise, exits by closing down activities differ from firms that 
transfer their activities to another legal entity. The definitions of entry and exit 
used in this paper are also in line with the ones recommended by OECD and 
Eurostat, as will be discussed below. 
2.3.1 Linked employer-employee dataset 
The register of Belgian employer firms is maintained by the Belgian National 
Social Security Office (NSSO) and is based on quarterly social security 
                                                 
6 The unit of the ‘firm’ or more specifically the ‘employer-enterprise’ in the Belgian business 
register complies with the EU Regulation (EC) No 177/2008 for the harmonization of the 
national business registers for statistical purposes. It corresponds to “the smallest 
combination of legal units that is an organizational unit producing goods or services, which 
benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation 
of its current resources. An enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more 
locations. An enterprise may be a sole legal unit.” (Eurostat-OECD 2007) 
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declarations.7 It covers all private firms with at least one employee in the period 
from 2003-2012, including 200 000 active firms and 2 500 000 employees on 
average per year.8 Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix reports the number of firms and 
employees in the dataset, classified into eight industry groups. 
The register is a linked employer-employee dataset. Both employers and 
employees are identified by means of a unique identification number. This 
information is exploited for the employee-flow method. The NSSO employer 
number is uniquely linked to the CBE number, which is the official firm 
identification number that is used by all government administrations. The CBE 
number enables us to implement results of the traditional record linking method, 
developed by Statistics Belgium, into the NSSO dataset. The CBE/NSSO number 
ensures good quality longitudinal firm records. Upon registration, new firms 
receive a CBE number which they keep for their entire lifetime. Unlike in many 
other countries, the firm identification number is unaltered in the case of a change 
of ownership or legal form.  
A new CBE number is however assigned by the administration in a few 
situations: when a self-employed individual turns his or her business into a 
company, and when a firm changes ownership after bankruptcy. Furthermore, 
firm-induced ID changes occur for similar reasons as it is the case in other 
countries. For the purpose of accounting advantages or avoidance of liability, 
firms may exit by voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy and continue the same 
activities in a newly registered company.9  
Firm identification numbers may also be created or disappear when legal 
entities are merged or split-up. Such changes in the firm structure may reflect 
actual mergers, acquisitions, break-ups or divestitures, but also mere 
administrative transfers of activities between legal units of the same controlling 
enterprise. A common example of the latter is the subdivision of the firm in smaller 
entities with separate firm identification numbers. For expanding firms, this is a 
                                                 
7 The social security contributions are subject to strict control. The NSSO declarations are 
filled out electronically by the employer and missing declarations or unexpected changes 
in employment are checked by NSSO analysts. This ensures continuity of the firm 
identification number and make the data unlikely to be contaminated by measurement 
error. 
8 Temporary work agencies are left out from the analysis in this paper because the high job 
turnover in this industry confuses the discussion of average job reallocation. 
9 See for example Benedetto et al. (2007) for a discussion of these practices in the U.S. 
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way to remain below the size thresholds for legal obligations.10 Other reasons why 
firms create additional ID numbers are tax advantages (the separate entities are 
not considered as part of the same firm) or limitation of liability. The practice is 
common under the form of enterprises controlling a network of local affiliates, but 
it is also used to distribute the firm activities across industries with differential 
regulations. 
2.3.2 Firm linkage methods 
Traditional record linking method 
The traditional linkage method that is applied in this paper relies on probability-
based matching and the use of supplementary data sources. It has been developed 
by Statistics Belgium within the Eurostat-OECD framework on business 
demography. Eurostat and OECD provide clear-cut definitions of enterprise 
‘births’ and ‘deaths’. Firm identification numbers that enter and exit for other 
reasons should be filtered out. A birth, for instance, “amounts to the creation of a 
combination of production factors with the restriction that no other enterprises 
are involved in the event” (Eurostat-OECD 2007, p. 34). Births should not include 
entrants due to restructurings of a set of enterprises such as mergers or break-
ups, newly created enterprises after a change of legal form, take-overs of the 
activity of an existing enterprise, creations of additional legal units solely for the 
purpose of providing a single production factor or an ancillary activity, and so on. 
Likewise, a death “amounts to with the dissolution of a combination of production 
factors with the restriction that no other enterprises are involved in the event” 
(ibid., p. 51). 
Statistics Belgium uses information from Commercial Court files and from the 
NSSO to identify changes in firm ID numbers and in firm structure. The 
Commercial Court provides information on official mergers, acquisitions and split-
ups, and on changes in the CBE number. The link between the NSSO and the CBE 
number further help to track firms that change ID number.  
The linkages are complemented with a probabilistic matching procedure. 
Similarities in name, address, and 4-digits industry code are used to compute 
probabilities that records refer to the same firm. Automatic and industry-specific 
ad-hoc rules are applied to verify the results. Although advanced software is 
                                                 
10 In Belgium, small firms do not need to file full annual accounts or install a works council 
(with fewer than 100 employees, turnover below 7.3m EUR, and balance sheet total below 
3.65m EUR). 
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adopted to minimize false (non-)matches11, probability-based matching of firm 
records is subject to subjective evaluation and analyst intervention (Baldwin et al. 
1992; Robertson et al. 1997). Matches based on partial identifiers are often 
imperfect and have to be checked manually. Moreover, major changes in 
discriminating identification numbers, e.g. name or telephone number, reduce the 
probability of a positive match, while such modifications often occur at the very 
moment a firm implements a legal or organizational change. Probabilistic 
matching is also less suitable for the identification of changes in firm structure 
such as mergers and split-ups. Therefore, the matching procedure is followed by 
extensive analyst review. All accepted matches, as well as an important part of 
rejected and probable matches are validated by making use of information on firm 
continuity and inter-firm linkages from a comprehensive business database that 
combines different administrative sources, business surveys, and statistical 
registers.12  
Employee-flow method 
The employee-flow method, also called ‘labor-tracking’ method, uses one main 
criterion to establish linkages between firm identification numbers: similarity of 
the workforce. Actual implementations of this method are basically similar in 
design. Changes in firm ID numbers and in firm structure are identified by tracing 
large clusters of employees that appear to ‘move’ from one firm identification 
number to another between two subsequent observations in time. The methods 
rely on the assumption that the simultaneous transition of a significant number of 
employees from one firm identification number to another is unlikely to be the 
result of individual worker mobility. Therefore, the actual linkage procedure 
generally starts from a minimum cluster of three to five employees, as for smaller 
clusters, there is a high probability that the employee flow merely represents 
individual job changes. This absolute threshold is supplemented with a set of 
                                                 
11 The matching procedure used by Statistics Belgium is based on the Term Frequency – 
Inverse Document Frequency method. 
12 The validation process is carried out by making use of the comprehensive business 
‘datawarehouse’ DBRIS. DBRIS is a relational database of all Belgian firms which links 
information at the firm level of a vast set of administrative sources (national register of 
legal entities, Annual Accounts, VAT declarations, Social Security declarations,…), business 
surveys (Structure of Enterprises Survey, Structure of Earnings Survey,…), and statistical 
registers on enterprise ownership and control structure (including consolidations, 
participations and FDI registered by the National Bank of Belgium and the European Group 
Register). 
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relative thresholds, which aim at avoiding false matches and at distinguishing 
between different types of firm restructurings. Due to the minimum cluster size, 
employee-flow methods are inappropriate for linking small firms. Yet they do 
achieve high coverage of linkages between larger firms, where sufficiently large 
clusters of employees can be followed over time. 
The employee-flow linkages applied in this paper are generated by a simple 
linkage algorithm that consists of two stages. In a first stage, the set of pairwise ID 
numbers is identified that share a significant cluster of employees in two 
successive quarters. It includes all pairs for which at least five employees move 
from a first ID number in quarter q-1 (the ‘predecessor’) to a second ID number in 
quarter q (the ‘successor’).13 The simultaneous transition of a significant number 
of employees in such a short time span is a first indication that the employee flow 
might be not the result of individual job changes. The second stage singles out the 
ID pairs that are retained as firm linkages. It consists of a set of decision rules that 
capture different forms of inter-firm relationships. The rules include thresholds 
for the relative cluster sizes, i.e. the size of the clustered employee flow relative to 
the total workforce of the firms involved. Section 2.B in the Appendix describes 
the full set of rules and their formal conditions. Three major rules cover 90 percent 
of all linkages and are briefly discussed below.  
The first decision rule covers the major part of employee-flow linkages (57%) 
and captures links between ID numbers with largely identical workforces. Two 
firm identification numbers are linked if the employee-flow cluster represents at 
least 50 percent of the workforce of both the predecessor and the successor. This 
condition is a formal translation of our workforce-based definition of firm 
continuity: two successive firm identification numbers that employ mostly the 
same workforce, are considered to refer to the same firm.  
Two other major rules identify links between smaller and larger firms. A firm 
may disappear from the dataset while continuing its activities as part of a larger 
entity. Such ‘absorptions’ by existing firms do not meet our definition of exit, and 
the transfer of workers to the merged entity does not correspond to the 
destruction and creation of jobs. To capture these events, a link is established if at 
least 75 percent of the workforce of an exiting firm is transferred to an already 
established firm. This second rule identifies 22 percent of additional linkages. The 
third rule captures the opposite case, when a significant part of the workforce of 
                                                 
13 The minimum threshold of five employees is in line with other recent applications of the 
employee-flow method (Benedetto et al. 2007; Dixon and Rollin 2012). 
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a continuing enterprise is transferred to a newly created ID number. If the 
employee cluster coming from the established firm represents at least 75 percent 
of the workforce of the new entrant, a link between the two ID numbers is 
established. Such ‘split-offs’ cover an additional 11 percent of linkages. Mergers, 
break-ups and more complex forms of inter-firm linkages are identified with other 
decision rules described in the Appendix 2.B. They each cover only small parts of 
additional linkages.  
The threshold values for the relative cluster sizes are to a certain extent 
arbitrary. One may be concerned that changing these values will have a significant 
impact on empirical estimates. However, the robustness checks presented in the 
Appendix B.2 show that they have not. The reason is that the employee clusters 
that link two firm ID numbers mostly represent close to 100 percent of the 
workforce of the predecessor, the successor, or both. Several robustness checks 
have been performed to test the sensitivity of the empirical results to the set of 
criteria imposed by the linkage algorithm. Relaxing or restricting the relative 
cluster size thresholds hardly affects the results. Reducing the set of decision rules 
has little impact either. This does not mean that improvements of the method 
could not be achieved, for example by deriving industry-specific thresholds from 
firms that do not change identification number.  
Note that the employee-flow method uses a clear-cut operational definition of 
firm continuity that is directly translated into the linkage algorithm. If a significant 
part of one key input factor of the firm, the workforce, is moved from one 
administrative ID number to the next, it is defined as a continuing firm. This notion 
of firm continuity may or may not be appropriate for a particular research 
question, but at least it is unambiguous. The traditional method, by contrast, 
combines various notions of firm continuity as present in different supplementary 
data sources, derived from partial firm identifiers in the probabilistic matching 
procedure, and employed by the analysts in the validation process. The result is 
an ambiguous definition of firm continuity and it may be difficult, if not impossible, 
for the user of the dataset to ascertain whether it fits with the specific research 
question he wants to address. 
Both linkage methods combined 
We also construct longitudinal firm linkages that incorporate all information 
provided by both the traditional and the employee-flow method. Linkages edited 
in this way are the most accurate longitudinal firm records that can be obtained 
with the available methods. They will be used to calculate empirical benchmark 
Data and methods 29 
 
 
measures, which serve as a reference to compare the results obtained by each of 
the two individual methods. 
2.3.3 Re-estimating measures of entry, exit and growth 
Measures of firm and employment dynamics presented in this paper are 
computed as year-by-year changes between June 30th of year t-1 and year t. The 
entry and exit of a firm are defined as the first and last year it reports positive 
employment. In between, firms are labeled as continuing. Continuing firms may 
have no employees in a given year.  
Improved longitudinal linkages are first used to identify continuing firms 
which are misclassified as entrants and exits. They will be labeled as ‘spurious’ 
entrants and exits. As is the common practice, they are removed from the entry 
and exit populations to obtain improved measurements. Re-estimating firm-level 
growth measures is more challenging, as several firms can be interlinked in a 
given period. To our knowledge, no satisfactory solution has been suggested so 
far. We propose a simple solution for imputing employment growth at the firm 
level. Aggregate statistics then follow naturally from the revised firm-level 
observations.  
The following example illustrates the problem. Suppose a link is identified 
between two firms that merge into a new administrative entity. The two firms, 
previously misclassified as exits, are now identified as continuing. The jobs of 
these firms are not lost, neither should the jobs that are transferred to the new 
entity be treated as job creation. But in the same period, job growth or decline may 
have occurred at the aggregate level of both firms, which does reflect actual job 
creation or destruction.  
The approach adopted here is to first construct an aggregate event level 
including all firms interlinked in a given period from t-1 to t. Firm-level 
employment in t is then imputed by assuming the same growth rate for each firm 
involved in the event. The advantage of this imputation approach at the firm-level 
compared to solutions proposed elsewhere is that we do not change the firm 
counts and preserve the firm size distribution at the beginning of each period.14 
                                                 
14 The approach of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Pinkston and Spletzer 2002) and 
Statistics Canada (Dixon and Rollin 2012) is to collapsing both firms into a consolidated 
employer and calculate employment change at the level of this merged entity. For aggregate 
measures of job creation and destruction, our strategy yields the same result as this 
approach. The disadvantage of using a consolidated entity is that the firm counts will be 
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This allows for consistent estimations of firm-level measures that depend on firm 
size. The imputation procedure has a straightforward interpretation in the case of 
most types of events, as is discussed in Appendix 2.C.  
Imputation of employment is performed on a year-by-year basis, i.e. for firms 
involved in an event in a given period t-1 to t. In the next period, we restart from 
registered employment in t and impute employment in t+1 for events in that 
period. Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2014) have extended the imputation method 
over a five-year period. They found that firm ID numbers involved in a linkage 
event are more likely to be involved in another event in one of the following years 
than other firms. Reconstructing longitudinal employment histories of firms over 
several years thus quickly turns into a complex exercise in which multiple events 
of interlinked ID numbers have to be taken into account. 
2.4 Characteristics of linked firms 
The impact of missing linkages on empirical estimates crucially depends on the 
type of events that lead to missing firms linkages and, even more importantly, on 
the proportion of missing links by firm size class. Below, we discuss both elements 
before turning to the empirical results in Section 2.5. 
2.4.1 Events leading to missing linkages 
Table 2.1 summarizes the types of events that give rise to spurious entrants, 
spurious exits, and missing links of continuing firms. We use a basic typology of 
events that clarifies the main reasons behind missing linkages. The results are 
reported for each linkage method separately. 
Spurious entrants mostly emerge from ID changes. An ID change is defined as 
a one-to-one link between two successive ID numbers of a firm that simply 
continues its operations with a new number. ID changes explain more than half of 
the spurious entrants identified by the traditional method (57%), and two thirds 
of the ones identified by the employee-flow method (65%). Another third of 
misclassified entrants, according to both methods, are due to split-offs of parts of 
incumbents or full break-ups of firms into new entities. The events may reflect an 
                                                 
inconsistent across time and, more importantly, the relation between firm size and firm 
growth will be biased. Indeed, the size of the consolidated entity is by construction larger 
than those of the original firms. 
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actual split-up of the firm, but also the creation of an additional legal unit within 
the same controlling enterprise.15 Only few spurious entrants originate from 
mergers or more complex events that involve several firms. Spurious exits largely 
result from ID changes as well, as counterparts of spurious entrants. In addition, 
more than 40 percent of misclassified exits are explained by firms that are 
absorbed by an established firm or merged with other exits into a new firm ID 
number.16 
Table 2.1 Types of events leading to spurious entrants, spurious exits and linked 
continuing firms 
 Type of event (in percent of row total)   
a. Spurious entrants       
Linkage method: 
ID change Split-off or 
break-up 
Merger Combi-
nation 
Total 
 
Traditional method 57 36 1 6 100 (n = 1 149) 
Employee-flow method 65 30 2 3 100 (n =    952) 
Both methods combined 57 35 1 7 100 (n = 1 867) 
b. Spurious exits       
Linkage method: 
ID change Absorption 
or merger 
Break-up Combi-
nation 
Total 
 
Traditional method 45 49 0 6 100 (n = 1 469) 
Employee-flow method 54 42 1 3 100 (n = 1 163) 
Both methods combined 49 43 1 7 100 (n = 2 207) 
c. Linked continuing firms      
Linkage method: 
Absorption Split-off All 
continuing 
Combi-
nattion 
Total 
 
Traditional method 12 9 77 3 100 (n = 8 630) 
Employee-flow method 46 31 13 11 100 (n =    944) 
Both methods combined 14 11 71 4 100 (n = 9 240) 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
The number of continuing firms that are linked to another firm identification 
number strongly differs between the two linkage methods. The employee-flow 
                                                 
15 Rapidly growing firms have an incentive to split-up activities into smaller legal units to 
remain below the size threshold for legal obligations. 
16 Comparable results are reported by Benedetto et al. (2007) and Hethey and Schmieder 
(2013). Using a more comprehensive typology of events, they also find that large shares of 
spurious entrants and exits are explained by ID-changes, split-offs and absorptions 
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method mainly traces incumbents that take over the workforce of an exiting ID 
number (the counterpart of a spurious exit due to absorption), or split off part of 
their activities into a new legal entity (the counterpart of a spurious entrant due 
to split-off). The traditional method identifies many more links, especially 
between two continuing firms. It predominantly captures links between large 
conglomerates of legal entities that are part of the same controlling enterprise, 
such as franchised businesses of a large company. The probabilistic matching 
procedure re-identifies these links in each successive period. However, as long as 
no restructuring of activities between the entities occurs, such links have little 
impact on the empirical dynamics measures, as will be shown below. 
2.4.2 Spurious entrants and exits by size 
Table 2.2 provides the main explanation for the biases in the empirical measures 
that will be discussed below. It presents the percentage shares of administrative 
entrants and exits that are identified as spurious ones by either of the linkage 
methods. The first column reports the shares in the total population of entrants or 
exits, the other columns give the shares in a given size class. The benchmark 
results based on both linkage methods combined show that one in ten 
administrative entrants and one in eight exits are identified as spurious. Both the 
traditional and the employee-flow method capture a much lower share of 
misclassified firms, which indicates a high degree of complementarity between 
the two methods.   
Two important patterns emerge from Table 2.2. First, the probability that a 
new firm identification number corresponds to a spurious entrant increases 
dramatically with size, and the same holds for exits. This pattern is consistent 
across the two link methods. The traditional linkage method identifies about 5 
percent of the smallest entrants and exits as being misclassified, which amounts 
to more than 40 percent in the largest size class. The employee-flow linkages 
reveal this pattern even more sharply. It shows that one in three entrants and exits 
with 5 to 9 employees and almost all entrants and exits with over 100 employees 
are brought about by ID changes or firm restructurings. The implication for the 
entry and exit measures is that missing links will have a larger effect on the 
employment shares of entrants and exits than on the firm entry and exit rates. The 
results in Table 2.2 highlight that newly registered firms with over 50 employees 
are most likely incumbents that continue operations – either in total or partially – 
with a new identification number. Likewise, if a large firm exits the dataset, there 
is a high probability that it refers to a continuing employer that has transferred its 
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activities to another legal entity. The observation that firms entering the market 
with over 50 or 100 employees are exceptional is intuitive but rarely reflected in 
large-scale datasets. Research samples including a substantial amount of large 
entrants are a first indication that the longitudinal data may need more editing. 
Table 2.2  Share of spurious entrants and exits by size  
   Firm size (number of employees) 
  Total 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
Entrants        
Unedited data (n) 19 069 16 852 1 345 527 255 54 37 
Share of entrants identified as spurious (in percent of entrants in the unedited data) 
 Traditional method 6 5 13 16 20 31 41 
 Employee-flow method 5 - 30 52 67 77 97 
 Both methods combined 10 5 36 55 70 80 97 
Exits        
Unedited data (n) 18 692 16 058 1 454 649 374 96 60 
Share of exits identified as spurious (in percent of exits in the unedited data) 
 Traditional method 8 6 16 23 33 42 57 
 Employee-flow method 6 - 30 50 65 75 90 
 Both methods combined 12 6 36 54 69 78 91 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
The second observation from Table 2.2 is that the two linkage methods 
perform quite differently by firm size class. In all size classes above 5 employees, 
the employee-flow method captures two to three times more spurious entrants 
and exits than the traditional method, and it traces almost all misclassified firms 
that are identified when using both methods combined.17 The added value of the 
traditional method in these size classes is rather low. The traditional method is 
however necessary for identifying misclassified firms in the smallest size class 
(1-4 employees), where employee-flow linkages are absent by construction. The 
close approximation between the employee-flow and benchmark linkages in 
medium and large size classes is a feature that will be reflected throughout the 
results discussed in the next section. For all empirical measures with an 
                                                 
17 Benedetto et al. (2007) equally show for U.S. data that the employee-flow method has a 
nontrivial value added to other linkage methods for identifying missing links between firm 
identifiers. 
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employment component, the method performs better in avoiding bias than the 
traditional method.  
It will be shown below that correctly identifying entry and exit has a dramatic 
impact on job reallocation measures, because the relatively small amount of 
misclassified firms represent important employment shares at entry and exit. An 
accurate distinction between what we have labelled as real versus spurious 
entrants and exits has however implications for firm-level analysis that reach far 
beyond the set of measures considered in this paper. Earlier studies that have 
made a similar distinction have found pronounced differences between the 
characteristics of the two types of entrants and exits. Treating them as a 
homogeneous group can lead to highly misleading conclusions about the empirical 
patterns of firm entry, exit and growth. One distinctive feature is size. Baldwin and 
Gorecki (1987) and Mata (1993), for example, have shown that entry by 
established firms and exits brought about by changes in the firm structure are 
many times larger than de novo entrants and exits by closure. The results in this 
paper confirm these findings. On average, spurious entrants and exits are eight 
times larger than real entrants and exits.18 Other studies have demonstrated that 
entry and exit from ID changes, firm restructurings or diversifying firms also differ 
in characteristics other than size, such as in the determinants of entry (Acs and 
Audretsch 1989; Storey 1991), post-entry growth patterns (Mata et al. 1995; 
Geurts and Van Biesebroeck 2014), or the profitably and productivity at exit 
(Baldwin and Gorecki 1987).  
2.4.3 Firms with imputed employment growth 
Firm-level employment growth of linked firms is revised in each period from t-1 
to t using the approach described in Section 2.3.3. The revision applies to spurious 
exits reclassified as continuing firms and to continuing firms that are linked to 
another ID number. A moderate share of firms are affected and, although 
substantial, the impact on the empirical measures will be less important than the 
impact of filtering out spurious entrants and exits.  
Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix presents the share of firms of which employment 
growth is considerably revised after the imputation procedure. We only report 
firms that subject to a relative adjustment of more than 10 percent compared to 
the unedited data. The benchmark results based on both link methods combined 
                                                 
18 The average sizes of real versus spurious entrants and exits are reported in Table 2.A.2 
in the Appendix. 
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show that on average 3.8 percent of all active firms in a given period are 
concerned. Similar to spurious entrants and exits, this share increases with size 
and amounts to more than 7 percent of the firms with over 50 employees. The 
traditional link method affects more firms than the employee-flow method, 
especially in size classes under 50 employees. The employee-flow method, 
however, has a greater impact on larger firms, and will lead to a more substantial 
revision of total job reallocation measures.  
2.5 Results  
This section discusses the sensitivity of empirical measures of firm and 
employment dynamics to missing links in longitudinal firm histories. The 
measures are evaluated before and after implementing each linkage method, and 
compared with benchmark results based on both methods combined. All 
measures are computed as year-by-year changes between June 30th of year t-1 
and year t. Along with the description of our findings, we also briefly address the 
following three issues: the comparison with results for other countries; the 
implications for comparative statistics; and the policy implications. The results in 
this section refer to the total private sector. As shown in the Appendix 2.F, the 
results are qualitatively the same at the disaggregated industry level, but the 
biases are exacerbated in industries with a relatively high share of large firms, 
while they are smaller in industries with predominantly small firms.  
2.5.1 Entry and exit dynamics 
In the previous section, it has been shown that the share of misclassified firms 
strongly increases with firm size, and that spurious entrants and exits are, on 
average, much larger than firms actually entering and exiting the market. The 
implication for the empirical measures is that missing links will have a larger 
effect on job flows by entry and exit than on the firm turnover rates.  
Table 2.3 indeed shows that entry and exit rates are only moderately revised 
downwards after applying the linkage procedures. The results in the first row are 
based on the unedited administrative data. The next rows show the revised 
measures after spurious entrants and exits have been filtered out. The lower panel 
of the table shows the percent bias in the measures compared to the benchmark 
results. Each linkage method produces entry and exit rates that are slightly below 
10 percent, which is in line with results for other European countries (Reynolds 
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et al. 1994; OECD 2015). The traditional method yields entry and exits rates that 
most closely correspond to the benchmark results since it performs well in 
capturing misclassified firms in the smallest size classes, where the majority of 
entrants and exits is located and employee-flow links are absent by construction. 
Table 2.3  Summary statistics of entry and exit  
 Entry measures  Exit measures 
 
Entry 
rate 
Job 
creation 
rate 
Average  
size 
 Exit   
rate 
Job 
destruction 
rate 
Average 
size 
 (%) (%) (empl.)  (%) (%) (empl.) 
a. By linkage method 
Unedited data 9.6 2.5 3.3  9.4 3.1 4.1 
Traditional method 8.8 2.1 2.9  8.6 2.2 3.1 
Employee-flow method 9.1 1.5 2.0  8.8 1.6 2.3 
Both methods combined 8.7 1.4 2.0  8.3 1.5 2.3 
b. Percent bias vs. both methods combined 
Unedited data 11% 81% 64%  13% 102% 78% 
Traditional method 2% 50% 46%  4% 48% 35% 
Employee-flow method 5% 7% 1%  6% 8% 2% 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. The entry (exit) rate represents the 
share of entrants (exits) in all active employers of a given period. The job creation (job 
destruction) rate represents the employment share of entrants (exits) in total employment 
of a given period. 
In contrast to firm turnover rates, employment measures at entry and exit are 
considerably revised downwards after spurious entrants and exits are filtered out. 
When based on the unedited data, the job creation and job destruction rates are 
overestimated by 81 percent and 102 percent respectively, and average entry and 
exit sizes by 64 percent and 78 percent respectively. The employee-flow method 
strongly reduces these biases and produces results close to the ones that are 
obtained by both linkage methods combined. The traditional method corrects the 
initial biases only by about half. The large number of additional links that this 
method identifies in the smallest size class (see Table 2.2) account for only small 
shares of aggregate job reallocation and contribute little to bias reduction.  
The quantitative impacts of the linkage methods reported here are obviously 
country-specific, since they depend on the incidence of missing links in the raw 
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dataset. Knowing that the Belgian administrative firm ID is relatively consistent,19 
the large downward revision of the job reallocation rates after correcting for 
missing linkages is all the more striking. Comparable statistics for other countries 
are scarce, but data from available studies show a similar large impact on job flow 
measurements at entry and exit. Persson (1998), Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2000), 
and Hethey and Schmieder (2013), using employee-flow linkages to correct 
Swedish, Finnish, and German data respectively, equally find that job reallocation 
at entry and exit is reduced by about 50 percent when misclassified firms are 
filtered out. From a policy perspective, the revised outcomes can have significant 
implications, as will be discussed below. 
The employment distributions at entry and exit shed more light on the above 
results. The upper panel of Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of total 
employment created by new firms at entry, and the lower panel shows the 
employment distribution of firms in the year of exit. The top lines represent 
results based on unedited data, while the other three lines show the results after 
applying the linkage procedures. Missing linkages strongly shift the distributions 
to the right. The unedited data falsely suggest that an important amount of jobs is 
created by medium and large entrants, and likewise that more than half of job loss 
due to exit is brought about by medium and large firms exiting the market. These 
patterns are only partly corrected by the traditional method. The method fails to 
identify an important part of spurious entrants and exits in larger size classes and 
leaves a considerable upward bias in the middle and right tale of the distributions. 
The employee-flow method, by contrast, being more effective in tracing missing 
linkages of larger firms, strongly reduces the initial biases. Results obtained by 
this method reveal that job creation by entrants and job destruction by exits is 
almost entirely concentrated in the smallest size classes. Moreover, this method 
yields strongly right-skewed distributions that closely correspond to the ones 
obtained by using both methods combined.  
                                                 
19 As mentioned above, Belgian firm ID numbers do not change after a change of ownership 
or legal form, in contrast to many other countries. 
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Figure 2.1  Employment distribution of entrants and exits 
 a. Entrants 
 
 b. Exits 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
Many studies have found that the firm size distribution at entry is right-skewed 
and that the likelihood of a firm’s exit declines with its size (Cabral and Mata 2003; 
Caves 1998). Even a small number of larger entrants or exits may, however, 
represent important employment shares at entry or exit. This is indeed the 
pattern that is suggested by the unedited data and the traditional method. 
Improved longitudinal data instead reveal that small firms do not only represent 
the major part of units but also the major part of employment at entry and exit. 
The benchmark results show that firms that start with less than 10 employees 
 0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+
Size class
n jobs
Unedited data
Traditional method
Employee-flow method
Both methods combined
 0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+
Size class
n jobs
Unedited data
Traditional method
Employee-flow method
Both methods combined
Results 39 
 
 
represent more than 80 percent of total employment at entry, and likewise that 
small firms account for the bulk of job destruction due to exit. Firms with more 
than 50 employees barely contribute to job flows at entry or exit. In summary, 
improved linkages reveal that the firm size distributions at entry and exit are 
confined to a narrow range of small size classes. Although this is an intuitive result 
for entrants, it is rarely observed in research samples based on administrative 
datasets. Studies that use a sample with a broad range of firm sizes already at 
entry must be investigating a population that covers also other firms than genuine 
start-ups. As discussed above, failing to properly distinguish between real and 
spurious entrants has important implications for the analysis of entry 
characteristics and post-entry patterns. 
Given their policy relevance, statistics on job creation by start-ups and job 
destruction by firm exits are among the standard indicators produced by official 
institutes. One example are the comparative statistics published by Eurostat and 
OECD.20 Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix shows cross-country comparisons from 
these sources of the job creation rate by entrants, and the employment share of 
large firms at entry – both in the manufacturing sector. Looking at the results, one 
is puzzled by the remarkable divergence between European countries. The job 
creation rate of start-ups in France, for example, is reported to be ten times higher 
than in Germany. Consistent with our discussion above, France also reports an 
extremely high share of large firms in the population of entrants. We have also 
included results for Belgium based on our edited versions of the dataset. 
Interestingly, the traditional method ranks Belgium among the countries with 
middle to high values for both statistics, while the employee-flow method ranks it 
among the ones with the lowest values. It is not clear how the national datasets 
have been edited, but the analysis in this paper suggests that the large country 
differences may be explained by the quality of the longitudinal firm linkages. The 
results raise questions about the use of traditional linkage methods, 
recommended OECD-Eurostat, for obtaining internationally comparable results. 
As argued above, the comparability could be strongly increased by using an 
employee-flow method to edit the national datasets. The method is based on a 
linkage algorithm that only depends on a set of observable characteristics of firm 
                                                 
20 The OECD and Eurostat statistics discussed here are derived from harmonized national 
business registers. Countries can either apply their own method to obtain consistent 
longitudinal data or follow the traditional linkage approach recommended by Eurostat-
OECD as discussed above. 
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continuity, and can be standardized across countries. One requirement is the 
availability of linked employer-employee data. 
2.5.2 Size profile of firm growth 
As explained in Section 2.3.3, firm-level growth rates are revised when exits are 
reclassified as continuing firms, and when continuing firms are linked to another 
firm identifier. A simple approach has been applied to impute employment of 
these firms. This section presents an example of the sensitivity of firm-level 
growth estimates to missing longitudinal linkages. Is shows estimations of the 
relationship between firm size and the firm growth rate, both in the sample of all 
firms, and in the sample of continuing firms only. The regression model and 
estimation method are described in Appendix 2.D.21 The coefficient estimates with 
standard errors are reported in Table 2.A.4. 
From the previous results, it can be expected that growth rates of large firms 
will be more sensitive to longitudinal linkage errors than the ones of small firms. 
Because missing linkages strongly affect the exit population in particular, it can 
also be expected that growth rate estimates of all firms will be affected more 
severely than those of continuing firms only. 
The upper panel of Figure 2.2 plots the size coefficients of the regressions for 
firms that continue between t-1 and t. The point estimates represent the mean 
employment growth rates of a given size class of firms, which are the net result of 
job creation by expanding firms and job destruction by contracting firms. As 
expected, results for larger firms are more sensitive to missing links between 
identification numbers. The average growth rate of firms with over 100 
employees is 1.3 percent per year when based on the unedited data, but revised 
downwards to 0.3 percent in the benchmark results. Revisions based on the 
traditional and employee-flow method are quite similar. At least as important for 
firm-level analysis is the increase in the precision of the estimates that is reached 
after the data are edited (Table 2.A.4 in the Appendix). Improved longitudinal 
linkages eliminate large administrative leaps in the employment histories of 
individual firms which leads to a reduction in the standard deviations of the 
growth rates. 
                                                 
21 Regressions of continuing firms include 1.6 million firm-year observations; those of all 
firms 1.7 million. 
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Figure 2.2  Firm-level growth rates (in percent) of continuing firms and all firms by size 
 a. Continuing firms 
 
 b. All firms 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
The lower panel of Figure 2.2 reports the growth estimates for all active firms 
in t-1, i.e. including the ones that exit in t. The plotted curves show a positive 
relationship between firm size and firm growth, which is in line with Haltiwanger 
et al. (2013) who use a similar estimation method. The difference between the 
slopes of the upper and lower panels is explained by the higher exit rates of firms 
in smaller size classes. The lower panel shows that growth rates of all firms in all 
size classes are considerably revised upwards after the data are edited by the 
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linkages procedures. This means that reclassifying spurious exits as continuing 
firms overrules the downward revision in growth rates of continuing firms. The 
revision is most substantial in size classes between 5 and 100 employees, where 
the benchmark growth rates are 4 percentage points higher than the ones 
obtained with the unedited data. A considerable gain in the precision of the 
estimates is reached as well, mainly because the minimum growth rates of firms 
misclassified as exits are replaced with values closer to the mean (Table 2.A.4). 
Standard deviations of the benchmark estimates are about one-fourth smaller 
than the ones based on the unedited data. The employee-flow method proves to 
be more successful in reducing bias in the growth estimates in size classes above 
5 employees: both the mean and standard deviations are close to the benchmark 
results. In line with the above findings, this is explained by the greater capacity of 
the method to capture spurious exits in medium and large size classes. The 
traditional method, which misclassifies an important share of these firms, reduces 
the biases by only half. 
2.5.3 Job creation and job destruction 
The results up till now suggest that a poor strategy to identify real entrants and 
exits, and true employment gains and losses when firms are merged or split-up 
will strongly affect total job reallocation rates. The reason is that misclassifications 
increase with firm size, and thus account for important shares of aggregate job 
flows. To document aggregate measures of job creation and destruction, we follow 
Davis et al. (1996a), and decompose the net employment growth rate into the job 
creation rates by entry and by expansion, and the job destruction rates by exit and 
by contraction.22  
Total job creation and job destruction rates 
Table 2.4 shows that missing linkages introduce a considerable upward bias in 
each of the four job reallocation rates. Average annual employment growth was 
1.03 percent in the period of observation (2003-2012).23 Following the 
benchmark method, the net employment growth was the result of an average 
annual job creation rate of 7.06 percent and a job destruction rate of 6.03 percent. 
When based on the unedited data, these measures are overestimated by 28 and 
                                                 
22 The decomposition is given in Appendix 2.E. 
23 By definition, net employment growth is not affected by the linkage procedures since 
they only redefine the reallocation of jobs across firms. 
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32 percent, respectively. The biases are mainly due to the overestimations of the 
job reallocation rates by entry and exit discussed before. The relative biases in the 
job reallocation rates of expanding and contracting firms are much smaller, but 
further add to the overestimation of total job flows. In line with the previous 
results, Table 2.4 confirms that the employee-flow method performs very well in 
reducing the initial biases and yields job reallocation rates that are close to the 
benchmark results. The traditional method leaves a substantial upward bias in 
each of the measures.  
Improving longitudinal firm linkages not only reduces the total supposed 
amount of job flows on the labor market, but also affects the magnitude of the 
contribution of different types of firms to net employment creation. This may have 
significant policy implications as more accurate measurements may lead to 
different conclusions about the importance of specific groups of firms for job 
creation. We illustrate this with two examples: the contribution of new versus 
established firms to employment growth in a given period, and the contribution 
of small versus large firms. The findings regarding the first issue represent a 
general result that is obtained after improving firm linkages; the results we report 
on the second issue are country specific and may not necessarily be observed in 
other datasets. 
Support measures for start-ups are often motivated by statistical evidence 
about the huge amount of new jobs they create every year. Spurious entrants in 
the data, however, make their contribution to employment look much larger than 
it is. Table 2.4 shows that new firms contribute much less to job creation while 
established firms destroy less jobs than inadequately edited data suggest. The 
benchmark results reveal that jobs created by new firms represent a mere 1.39 
percent of total employment in a given year (column 3); while the traditional 
method and the unedited data overestimate this share by 50 to 81 percent. On the 
other hand, job destruction by incumbent firms (last column) proves to be much 
smaller if based on good quality longitudinal data. Net annual employment growth 
of established firms is not 1.05 percent, as suggested by the traditional method, 
but only 0.36 percent. The bias reduction in these measures obtained by 
improving firm linkages will be qualitatively the same in other datasets; 
fragmented evidence for other countries provided in Section 2.5.1 even suggests 
a remarkable quantitative similarity with the results in this paper. 
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Table 2.4  Annual job creation and job destruction rates  
 
Net 
growth 
rate 
 Job creation rate  Job destruction rate  Net 
growth 
rate of 
establ. 
firms 
 
Total By 
entry 
By ex-
pansion 
 Total By   
exit 
By con-
traction  
 (%)  (%) (%) (%)  (%) (%) (%)  (%) 
a. By linkage method           
Unedited data 1.03  9.01 2.52 6.48  7.98 3.06 4.92  -1.49 
Traditional method 1.03  8.17 2.09 6.08  7.14 2.24 4.89  -1.05 
Employee-flow method 1.03  7.24 1.49 5.75  6.21 1.64 4.57  -0.46 
Both methods combined 1.03  7.06 1.39 5.67  6.03 1.52 4.51  -0.36 
b. Percent bias vs. both methods combined 
Unedited data   28% 81% 14%  32% 102% 9%   
Traditional method   16% 50% 7%  18% 48% 9%   
Employee-flow method   3% 7% 1%  3% 8% 1%   
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. The job creation (job destruction) rate 
represents the employment share of a given class of firms in total employment of a given 
period. The net growth rate of established firms equals the job creation rate by expansion 
minus the job destruction rates by exit and contraction. 
Missing firm linkages also considerably affect the allocation of employment 
growth across different firm size classes. Figure 2.2 above already showed that 
correctly classifying firms and their individual employment histories leads to an 
upward revision of firm-level growth rates. The growth rates by firm size class 
were estimated conditional on industry and year dummies. Figure 2.A.2 in the 
Appendix presents the impact on net employment growth aggregated over all 
established firms in the total private sector. Improved linkages yield a dramatic 
change in the contribution of different size classes to net job creation. While the 
unedited data and the traditional method suggest that net job creation of 
established firms in all size classes is negative, the employee-flow and benchmark 
method lead to an upward correction that is increasing in firm size. Both methods 
reveal that large firms actually contribute positively to employment growth. 
In summary, results based on unedited data or on the tradition method 
overestimate the contribution of entrants and small firms to job creation, lending 
support to the common perception that these groups of firms contribute 
disproportionally to net employment growth. Results based on carefully edited 
longitudinal data challenge this view. Instead they indicate that job creation by 
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entrants actually very low, and that large established firms contribute a great deal 
more to employment growth in the Belgian economy than smaller firms. 
Annual variation in job creation and destruction 
To conclude this overview of empirical measures, we discuss the impact of missing 
linkages on time series of aggregate job flows. The bias in the job reallocation rates 
is found to vary significantly over time. This is explained by annual fluctuations in 
the number of medium and large firms that change identification number or firm 
structure. The job reallocation rates by entry and exit most clearly illustrate the 
problem.  
Figure 2.3 shows that annual variation in the job creation rate by entry and the 
job destruction rate by exit is strongly reduced when spurious entrants and exits 
are filtered out. The unedited data and the traditional method report large annual 
fluctuations, while the employee-flow and benchmark results reveal that both job 
creation by entry and job destruction by exit are rather non-volatile, with the 
largest year-to-year change corresponding to the recession period of 2009. One 
typical pattern is explained by ID changes: fluctuations in the employment shares 
of firms that change ID number lead to symmetric increases and decreases in the 
job creation rate by entry and the job destruction rate by exit. This effect is most 
noticeable in the results for 2007: the unedited data report a leap in both the entry 
and the exit rates, which is entirely absent in the benchmark results. Other studies 
have reported a similar smoothing of time series of entry and exit after applying 
improved longitudinal linkages (Jarmin and Miranda 2002; Hethey and Schmieder 
2013).  
Is this stable pattern of job reallocation from firm entry and exit more plausible 
than the annual fluctuations suggested by the unedited data and the traditional 
method? The correlation of the entry rate with GDP growth suggests it is. Business 
formation is considered to be procyclical, and especially job creation by entry is 
found to covary positively with output growth (Campbell 1988). The employee-
flow results strongly reflect this feature; annual changes in the job creation rate 
by entry show a high positive correlation with GDP growth of the previous quarter 
(0.86), which adds support to the reliability of this identification strategy for entry 
and exit. The correlation is only half as large (0.42) for entry rates based on the 
traditional method. Misclassifying continuing firms as entrants thus introduces 
substantial spurious variation in job creation by entry over time, which weakens 
the correlation with the business cycle. ID changes, mergers and split-ups are 
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indeed mainly driven by legal, tax or administrative motivations and less by 
macro-economic fluctuations.  
Figure 2.3  Annual job reallocation rates by entry and exit 
 a. Job creation rate by entry  
 
 b. Job destruction rate by exit 
 
Note: The job creation (job destruction) rate represents the employment share of entrants 
(exits) in total employment. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
We have discussed in this paper a series of commonly-used empirical measures 
on firm and employment dynamics and have exemplified to what extent they are 
biased due to missing firm linkages in the underlying data. The study has focused 
on firm-level measurements, but the problems and solutions are similar for 
establishment analysis based on administrative data. Measures with an 
employment component are found to be most seriously biased, whether it be firm-
level growth estimates or aggregate job flow measures. The most important 
source of bias is the spurious identification of firm entry and exit. Medium and 
large firms misclassified as entrants or exits distort the size distributions at entry 
and exit and lead to large overestimations of job reallocation in the economy. 
Missing firm linkages also affect the characteristics of successful firms and lead to 
an underestimation of firm-level growth rates, especially for larger firms. The 
biases are exacerbated in time series and at the more disaggregated industry level. 
Two prevailing solutions for improving longitudinal linkages have been 
evaluated: a traditional linkage method and an employee-flow method. In 
addition, we have proposed a consistent approach to impute employment 
histories of linked firms such that the edited data can be used for firm-level 
analysis. The two linkage methods are clearly complementary. The traditional 
method is preferable for the study of firms in the smallest size class (1-4 
employees), where employee-flow linkages are absent by construction. The 
employee-flow method, however, performs much better for improving firm 
linkages in medium and large size classes. It is shown that this method is more 
suitable for obtaining reliable estimates of aggregate job reallocation and of firm-
level measurements that depend on firm size.  
An additional advantage of the employee-flow method lies in its use for 
international comparability. The method uses an economic notion of firm 
continuity, defining it as continuity in one of the firm’s key production factors, the 
stock of employees. This definition is translated in linkage algorithms that use 
general criteria and are, unlike the traditional method, independent of country-
specific data characteristics. Using employee-flow methods to harmonize 
longitudinal business databases for research could not only produce more reliable 
but also more comparable results across countries on firm and employment 
dynamics. One example highlighted in this paper are comparative statistics on 
business demography published by Eurostat and OECD. The analysis suggests that 
large country differences may be explained by different quality of longitudinal 
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linkages in the national datasets, and that using a standardized employee-flow 
method could strongly increase comparability. 
Improving longitudinal firm linkages in large-scale datasets has implications 
for firm-level analysis that reach beyond the set of measures discussed in this 
paper. Our findings suggest that existing empirical evidence of related studies on 
firm dynamics and entrepreneurship may be reconsidered.  
A first area is the study of start-ups and post-entry performance. Consistent 
firm linkages enable the researcher to clearly distinguish between firms that enter 
the market de novo and entry by established firms - for example following an 
ownership change, a restructuring or a merger. Several authors have highlighted 
that the two types of entry fundamentally differ (Dunne et al. 1988; Geroski 1995; 
Mata et al. 1995). Firms that re-enter after a control change already have a better 
idea of their own productivity, tend to be larger, are less likely to fail, and exhibit 
less dynamic growth patterns. Their features may override the distinct patterns 
of genuine start-ups if both populations are confounded. As an example, we have 
shown that the employment distribution at entry is reduced to a narrow range of 
small size classes when we focus on de novo entrants. This intuitive feature is 
rarely observed in large-scale samples. Building on the same dataset, Geurts and 
Van Biesebroeck (2014) show that firm growth rates are strongly increasing in 
firm size in the first years after entry, but that this pattern is obscured or even 
reversed when the administrative sample is taken at face value. 
A second area that may gain from improved longitudinal data is research on 
the determinants of exit and the performance of successful firms. Similar to 
entrants, empirical evidence has shown that real exits and exits brought about by 
take-overs, mergers or split-ups strongly differ in size, profitably and productivity 
(Baldwin and Gorecki 1987; Caves 1998). By identifying firm linkages, one can 
avoid confusion between such restructuring events and real economic exits. One 
implication we have highlighted is that misclassifying surviving firms as exits 
leads to an underestimation of the performance of successful firms, and biases the 
size distribution at exit. Moreover, missing firm linkages introduce measurement 
error and outliers in firm-level estimates. A significant gain in precision can be 
achieved when longitudinal firm histories accurately observed. 
Being capable of tracing firm linkages over time has other applications in the 
field of firm dynamics that this paper has only hinted at. Ownership changes, 
mergers and acquisitions, break-ups and spin-offs are changes in the control 
structure of firms that researchers often do not want to abstract from, as we have 
done in this paper, but to study as events of economic importance. The employee-
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flow method in particular has been proved to be a powerful tool for identifying 
changes in the firm structure over time. A few studies have already used this 
method to investigate spin-offs (Eriksson and Kuhn 2006; Muendler et al. 2012), 
mergers and acquisitions (Mikkelson et al. 2006; Pesola 2009), and other forms of 
inter-firm relationships Benedetto et al. (2007). Many more applications are still 
to be explored. 
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Appendix  
2.A Tables and figures 
Table 2.A. 1  Eight main industries and NACE Rev.2 classes 
  Employer 
firms 
Employees Average    
firm size 
 Nace Rev. 2 classes (n) (n) (employees) 
1. Agriculture 4 097 20 912 5.1 
 Section A       
2. Manufacturing and energy 19 312 567 450 29.4 
 Section B, C, D, E    
3. Construction 26 354 207 510 7.9 
 Section F    
4. Wholesale and retail trade 55 208 480 235 8.7 
 Section G    
5. Accommodation and food services 20 524 120 042 5.8 
 Section I    
6. Business support services 34 000 388 616 11.4 
 
Freight transport, handling and storage: 
Nace 49.2, 49.4, 49.5, 50.2, 50.4, 51.2, 52.1, 52.241, 52.249; 
IT programming and services: Nace 62, 63;  
Central banks, holdings, financial leasing, hedge funds and auxiliary financial 
services: Nace 64.110, 64.2,64.3, 64.910, 64.991, 64.992, 64.999, 66; 
Accounting: Nace 69.2; Head offices: Nace 70;  
Architecture and engineering: Nace 71; Advertising: Nace 73; Professional and 
technical support services: Nace 74; Rental and leasing: Nace 77.1, 77.3, 77.4; 
Security: Nace 80; Services to buildings: Nace 81; 
Administrative services: 82; Repair of ICT: Nace 95.1 
 
7. Mixed business & household services 28 416 346 260 12.2 
 
Passenger transport and transport services:  
Nace 49.1, 49.3, 50.1, 50.3, 51.1, 52.210, 52.220, 52.230, 52.290;  
Postal and courier activities: Nace 53; Publishing: Nace 58;  
Movies, radio and television: Nace 59, 60; Telecommunication: Nace 61;  
Banks, credit and insurances institutions: Nace 64.190, 64.921, 64.922, 64.92, 65;  
Real estate: Nace 68; Legal activities: Nace 69.1; Scientific research: Nace 72;  
Veterinary : Nace 75; Rental and leasing of household goods: Nace 77.2;  
Travel agencies: Nace 79; 
Creative, arts and entertainment: Nace 90; Sports and recreation: Nace 93;  
Repair of household goods: Nace 95.2; Personal service activities: Nace 96 
 
8. Human health and social work 11 286 378 163 33.5 
 Section Q    
Total 199 197 2 509 188 12.6 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. Industries that are not in the listed 
categories are excluded from the analysis, i.e. primarily public sector organizations and 
temporary work agencies.  
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Table 2.A. 2  Average size (number of employees) of real versus spurious entrants and 
exits 
 
Real 
entrants 
Spurious 
entrants 
 
Real 
exits 
Spurious 
exits 
Linkage method      
Unedited data 3.3 -  4.1 - 
Traditional method 2.9 10.1  3.1 14.1 
Employee-flow method 2.0 27.1  2.3 30.5 
Both methods combined 2.0 15.5  2.3 18.1 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
 
 
Table 2.A. 3  Share (in percent) of active firms in t-1 with imputed employment in t 
  Firm size (number of employees) in t-1 
 Total 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
Linkage method        
Traditional method 3.1 2.8 3.5 3.8 4.2 4.5 4.1 
Employee-flow method 1.1 0.1 1.8 2.9 4.0 5.3 6.2 
Both methods combined 3.8 2.8 4.7 5.6 6.5 7.3 7.3 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
To clarify the impact of revising employment of linked firms on the empirical measures, 
this Table only reports the share of firms which are considerably affected by the imputation 
procedure, i.e. for which employment in t is revised by more than 10 percent. The revision 
is smaller for most of the linked firms. The main reason is that the traditional method 
establishes many links between continuing firms that do not relate to ID changes or firm 
restructurings and have little impact on employment reallocation. Another reason is that 
large firms are often linked to very small ones. If a large firm creates a small additional legal 
unit or absorbs a small entity, the revision of its employment will be relative small. 
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Table 2.A. 4  Firm-level growth estimates of continuing and all firms by linkage method 
 Size class (number of employees) 
 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
a. Continuing firms  
 Growth rate (%) 
Unedited data 1.63 2.00 2.27 2.02 2.40 1.25 
Traditional method 1.54 1.99 2.10 1.93 1.90 0.54 
Employee-flow method 1.63 2.01 2.19 1.86 2.24 0.29 
Both methods combined 1.56 2.02 2.15 1.90 2.07 0.30 
 Standard deviation 
Unedited data .077 .085 .078 .075 .120 .098 
Traditional method .073 .081 .074 .072 .114 .093 
Employee-flow method .068 .074 .068 .066 .106 .086 
Both methods combined .067 .073 .068 .065 .104 .085 
 
b. All firms  
 Growth rate (%) 
Unedited data -17.62 -8.19 -6.21 -5.24 -3.95 -2.04 
Traditional method -16.35 -6.85 -4.84 -3.57 -2.00 -1.08 
Employee-flow method -17.51 -5.26 -2.51 -1.39 -0.01 0.14 
Both methods combined -16.24 -4.69 -2.29 -1.11 0.29 0.17 
 Standard deviation 
Unedited data .129 .145 .135 .130 .208 .172 
Traditional method .114 .129 .119 .115 .185 .153 
Employee-flow method .100 .112 .104 .100 .161 .133 
Both methods combined .098 .110 .102 .098 .158 .129 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
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Figure 2.A. 1  Job creation rate by entrants in Manufacturing and Energy in European 
countries (2012) 
a. Job creation rate by entrants 
 
b. Employment share of entrants with 10+ employees 
 
Note: Results for 2012 unless otherwise stated. Panel b shows the employment share of 
firms with 10 employees or more in total employment at entry. 
Sources: Panel a: OECD (2015); Panel b: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-business-statistics. Results for 
Belgium are based on the data used in this paper. 
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Figure 2.A. 2  Net job creation of established firms by size class 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
Net job creation is calculated as the sum of job creation by expanding firms minus job 
destruction by exits and contracting firms. Firms are classified into the size class based on 
the average number of employees in t-1 and t. For a discussion see Davis et al. (1996b). The 
figure shows net employment growth aggregated over all established firms in the total 
private sector and therefore differs from the firm-level estimates in Figure 2.2 in 
Section 2.5.2, which represent firm-level growth rates conditional on industry dummies. 
  
  
-20 000
-15 000
-10 000
-5 000
 0
5 000
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+
Size class
n jobs
Unedited data
Official method
Employee-flow method
Both methods combined
Appendix 55 
 
 
2.B Employee-flow linkage algorithm 
Decision rules 
An employee-flow link between two different firm identification numbers is 
established if a cluster of at least 5 employees moves from one identification 
number in quarter q-1 (the ‘predecessor’) to another identification number in 
quarter q (the ‘successor’), and if the decision rules presented in Table 2.A.5 are 
met. The first three types of linkages represent the major share of links (90%). 
Table 2.A. 5  Type of employee-flow linkages by decision rules 
  Decision rules 
  
Number  
of 
predecessors 
to  
successors 
Predecessor 
type 
Successor 
type 
Minimum 
absolute 
cluster 
size 
(n employ-
ees) 
Minimum relative 
cluster size 
  
share in 
predecessor 
employ- 
ment 
share in 
successor 
employ-
ment 
Type of linkage   
1. Largely identical 1 to 1 any any 5 50% 50% 
2. Absorption 1 to 1 exit continuing 5 75% - 
3. Split-off 1 to 1 continuing entrant 5 - 75% 
4. Absorption (bis) 1 to 1 exit continuing 10 50% - 
5. Split-off (bis) 1 to 1 continuing entrant 10 - 50% 
6. Merger of exits n to 1 all exits entrant 5 50% (1) 50% 
7. Break-up into 
entrants 
1 to n exit 
all 
entrants 
5 50% 50% (2) 
8. Merger other n to 1 any entrant 5 - 
25% (3), 
50% (4) 
9. Break-up other 1 to n exit any 5 
25% (3), 
50% (4) 
- 
10. Cluster >= 30 1 to 1 any any 30 10% 10% 
(1) Share of the sum of the clusters in total employment of the predecessors 
(2) Share of each individual cluster in employment of successor 
(3) Share of each individual cluster 
(4) Share of the sum of the clusters 
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The types of linkages are not mutually exclusive. Some of them considerably 
overlap. Column (1) of Table 2.A.6 shows the total share of linkages that is covered 
by each type. Column (2) shows the share of additional linkages by type.  
Table 2.A. 6  Share of employee-flow linkages by type 
  Separate share in total Additive share in total 
  (1) (2) 
1. Largely identical 0.57 0.57 
2. Absorption 0.29 0.22 
3. Split-off 0.17 0.11 
4. Absorption (bis) 0.20 0.02 
5. Split-off (bis) 0.11 0.01 
6. Merger of exits 0.05 0.02 
7. Break-up into entrants 0.02 0.01 
8. Merger other 0.04 0.01 
9. Break-up other 0.02 0.00 
10. Cluster >= 30 0.18 0.03 
Total 1.00 1.00 
Note: Based on quarterly employee-flow links over the 2003-2012 period.  
Robustness checks 
The relative size thresholds imposed in the decision rules presented above are to 
a certain extent arbitrary, and the set of minor rules that define type 4 to 10 may 
be somewhat confusing. Both are however not critical to the empirical results. 
Several robustness checks have been performed to test the sensitivity of the 
results to the set of conditions imposed by the linkage algorithm. Variant 1 is a 
more restrictive version of the linkage procedure in which all relative cluster size 
thresholds are increased by 25 percent. Variant 2 relaxes the rules by decreasing 
the relative thresholds by 25 percent. Variant 3 is again more restrictive and 
applies only linkage types 1, 2, 3, and 10. The three variants lead to only marginal 
changes in the empirical estimates compared to the base-line employee-flow 
results. This is illustrated in Figure 2.A.3, which resumes one of the empirical 
measures that is most sensitive to missing linkages. The straight lines show the 
employment distributions at entry and exit, as given by the unedited data and by 
the base-line employee-flow method (cf. Figure 2.1 in the main text). The dotted 
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lines present the distributions based on the three variants of the employee-flow 
method.  
Figure 2.A. 3  Employment distribution of entrants and exits. Robustness checks of the 
decision rules of the employee-flow method 
 a. Entrants  
 
 b. Exits 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period.  
Both figures illustrate that increasing the size thresholds by 25 percent 
(variant 1) removes only few of the original employee-flow linkages and hardly 
affects the empirical results. The right-skewness of the employment distributions 
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is preserved and total job reallocation by entrants and exits is only slightly 
increased relative to the base-line employee-flow results (by +3% and +4% 
respectively). Relaxing the thresholds (variant 2) has an even smaller effect (-1% 
and -2% respectively), and also variant 3 barely affects the results (+2% and +3% 
respectively).  
Figure 2.A. 4  Frequency distribution of firms by share of employee cluster in firm’s 
workforce 
a. Predecessor exits and cluster is 
transferred to a successor that 
enters 
b. Predecessor exits and cluster is 
transferred to a continuing 
successor 
 
c. Successor enters and cluster is 
transferred from a predecessor 
that exits 
d. Successor enters and cluster is 
transferred from a continuing 
predecessor 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period.  
The reason why considerable changes in the decision rules hardly affect the 
results is because the employee clusters that link two firm identification numbers 
mostly represent close to 100 percent of the workforce of the predecessor, the 
successor, or both. This finding confirms Benedetto et al. (2007). Firms that 
change ID number, are absorbed or split-off indeed usually continue operations 
with mostly the same workforce, apart from naturally in and outflow of individual 
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employees. Figure 2.A.4 illustrates this for the most common types of events. 
Panel a. presents the distribution of all firm ID numbers that exit the dataset and 
from which a cluster of at least 5 employees is transferred to an entering ID 
number. The firms are distributed by the relative size of the clustered employee 
flow. For 42 percent of the firms, the cluster represents more than 95 percent of 
the workforce, and for 77 percent of the firms, the cluster exceeds 80 percent of 
the workforce. Similar results are reported by the examples in the other panels.  
 
2.C Re-estimating measures of entry, exit and growth 
Reclassifying entrants and exits 
Improved longitudinal linkages are primarily used to identify continuing firms 
that are misclassified as entrants and exits. They will be labeled as ‘spurious’ 
entrants and exits. As is the common practice, they are removed from the entry 
and exit populations to obtain improved measurements. Spurious entrants are 
new identification numbers that are linked to a previously active firm, and 
spurious exits are discontinued identification numbers linked to a subsequently 
active firm. Formally, an entrant in a given period from t-1 to t is identified as 
spurious if it is linked to an active predecessor, i.e. a firm with at least one 
employee in t-1. Similarly, a spurious exit in period t-1 to t is an exiting firm linked 
to an active successor in t. Other entrants and exits are labeled as ‘real’. 
Imputing employment of linked firms 
Since we are interested in the effect of improving longitudinal linkages not only 
on aggregate statistics, but also on firm-level estimates, a consistent solution for 
revising employment growth of linked firm is required. Different strategies can be 
followed. We propose a simple solution for imputing employment growth at the 
firm level. Aggregate statistics then follow naturally from the revised firm-level 
observations. 
The following example illustrates the problem. Suppose a link is identified 
between two firms that merge into one entity with a new administrative 
identification number. The two firms, previously misclassified as exits, are now 
identified as continuing. The jobs of these firms are not lost, neither should the 
jobs that appear at the new entity be treated as job creation. The approach of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Pinkston and Spletzer 2002) and of Statistics 
Canada (Dixon and Rollin 2012) is to collapsing both firms into a consolidated 
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employer. Employment change at the level of this merged entity will now reflect 
true job creation or destruction. The disadvantage of this approach is that the firm 
counts will be inconsistent across time and, more importantly, the relation 
between firm size and firm growth will be biased. Indeed, the size of the 
consolidated entity is by construction larger than those of the original firms. The 
alternative approach adopted in this paper it to impute employment growth of 
each of the two firms by assuming that their individual growth rates equal the one 
of the consolidated entity. For aggregate measures of job reallocation, this strategy 
yields the same result as one in which firm-level observations are replaced by a 
consolidated entity. The advantage of our approach is that we do not intervene in 
the number of firms and preserve the firm size distribution at the beginning of 
each period. This allows for consistent estimations of firm-level measures that 
depend on firm size, and for a direct comparison of firm-level growth rates before 
and after applying the linkage procedures. 
The approach adopted in this paper is based on the following consideration: if 
firms change identification number, merge or split-up, existing jobs are 
administratively transferred between ID numbers and it would be wrong to 
classify employment disappearing at one ID number as job destruction and 
employment appearing at the other ID number as job creation. At the same time, 
the firms involved can expand or contract, and thus actually create or destroy jobs. 
Therefore, job reallocation between firm identification numbers involved in the 
same event K should not be considered as job creation and destruction, but job 
growth or decline at the aggregate level of K should be.  
Examples of the three most frequent types of events - ID changes, split-offs and 
take-overs - may serve to illustrate this point. If firm A increases employment from 
10 to 12 employees and changes identification number from i to j in the same 
period, a missing link between the two identification numbers would generate 
spurious job destruction at the level of the disappearing identification number i 
and spurious job creation at the new identification number j. It is obvious that 
firm-level employment growth of A should be calculated as the net employment 
change at the sum of both identification numbers (+2 employees), and that excess 
job reallocation at the level of the individual identification numbers should be 
eliminated. Similarly, a take-over of i by j would generate spurious job destruction 
at the level of i and spurious job creation at the level of j, which would be recorded 
as an expanding firm. Firm j, however, increases employment through the 
acquisition, and not by creating new job opportunities. Just as i should not be 
regarded as an exit destroying jobs, the jobs reallocated to the acquirer are not to 
be considered as job creation. Employment growth at the level of the sum of both 
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units, however, does correspond to actual job creation (or destruction). As a final 
example, consider firm i which splits off part of its activities into a new legal entity 
j. The jobs that are split off are not lost, nor does the new entity create new 
employment. Yet aggregate employment growth or decline at the level of i+j 
should be taken into account.24  
The revision of employment is implemented by imputing firm-level 
employment in t, assuming the same growth rate from t-1 to t for each firm 
involved in the same event. Formally, let K be an event consisting of n interlinked 
firms i in the period from t-1 to t, then imputed employment 𝐸𝑖?̃?  of firm i in t equals 
𝐸𝑖?̃? = 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 ∗  
∑ 𝐸𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (1) 
 where 𝐸𝑖  is administratively recorded employment of 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛 ∈ 𝐾 
Firm-level growth is then calculated as the difference between imputed 
employment in t and registered employment in t-1. It is clear that employment in 
t at the level of the event K is not affected by the imputation procedure since 
∑ 𝐸𝑖?̃?
𝑛
𝑖=1 =  ∑ 𝐸𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  
In the case of most events, equation (1) simplifies to an expression with a 
straightforward interpretation, as illustrated below.  
1. ID change: one-to-one link between an exit i and an entrant j.  
If firm A changes identification number from i to j in period t-1 to t, then i will 
be considered a continuing firm for which imputed employment in t is given 
by j: 
𝐸𝑖?̃? =  𝐸𝑗𝑡  and 𝐸𝑗?̃? =  0.  
2. Split-off: one-to-one or one-to-many link between a continuing firm i and n 
entrants j.  
If part of firm i is split off into one or more new firms j, imputed employment 
of i in t is calculated as the sum of employment of all units: 
𝐸𝑖?̃? =  𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1   and 𝐸𝑗?̃? =  0  for each  𝑗 = {1, … , 𝑛 }.   
                                                 
24 Another example is the relocation of activities between legal entities of the same 
company.  Large companies often register parts of the activities in different firm 
identification numbers, which are either functionally or geographically split up. 
Reorganizations of activities between these numbers, usually for legal or accounting 
convenience, result in administrative transfers of employees which generate spurious 
creation and destruction at the individual identification numbers. Linking the identification 
numbers at the event-level corrects for this. 
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3. Take-over: one-to-one or many-to-one link between n exits i and a continuing 
firm j. 
If one or more firms i are taken over by an established firm j, then i and j are 
considered continuing firms for which imputed employment in t is given by 
their share in the sum of all units in t-1: 
𝐸𝑘?̃? =  
𝐸𝑘𝑡−1
∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=1 +𝐸𝑗𝑡−1
∗  𝐸𝑗𝑡   for each  𝑘 = {1, … , 𝑛, 𝑗}. 
4. One-to-one link between two continuing firms i and j. 
If two continuing firms i and j are linked, imputed employment of i and j in t is 
given by the share of each firm in the sum of both units in t-1: 
𝐸𝑘?̃? =  
𝐸𝑘𝑡−1
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1+𝐸𝑗𝑡−1
∗  (𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑗𝑡)  for each  𝑘 = {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
5. Merger of exits: many-to-one link between n exits i and an entrant j. 
If several exits i are merged into a new firm j, each i is considered a continuing 
firm for which imputed employment in t is given by its share in the sum of all 
i in t-1: 
𝐸𝑖?̃? =  
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=2
∗  𝐸𝑗𝑡   for each  𝑖 = {2, … , 𝑛} and 𝐸𝑗?̃? =  0. 
6. Break-up into entrants: one-to-many link between an exit i and n entrants j. 
If an exit i is broken up into several new firms j, imputed employment of i in t 
is calculated as the sum of employment of all j in t: 
𝐸𝑖?̃? =  ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=2   and 𝐸𝑗?̃? =  0  for each  𝑗 = {2, … , 𝑛 }.   
7. Merger of parts of firms: many-to-one link between n continuing firms i and 
an entrant j.  
If parts of several continuing firms i are split off and merged into a new firm j, 
imputed employment for each i in t is given by its share in the sum of all i in 
t-1: 
𝐸𝑖?̃? =  
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑖=2
∗  (∑ 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=2 + 𝐸𝑗𝑡) for each  𝑖 = {2, … , 𝑛} and 𝐸𝑗?̃? =  0. 
8. Break-up and take-over: one-to-many link between an exit i and n continuing 
firms j.  
If several parts of an exit i are taken over by different continuing firms j, then 
i and j are considered continuing firms for which imputed employment in t is 
given by their share in the sum of all units in t-1: 
𝐸𝑘?̃? =  
𝐸𝑘𝑡−1
𝐸𝑖𝑡−1+(∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑗=2 )
∗  ∑ 𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=2  for each  𝑘 = {𝑖, 1, … , 𝑛}. 
9. In the case of a more complex combination of interlinked firms, the general 
formula presented in equation (1) applies. 
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Imputation of employment is performed on a year-by-year basis, i.e. for firms 
involved in an event in a given period from t-1 to t. In the next period from t to t+1, 
we restart from registered employment in t and impute employment in t+1 for 
events in that period. Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2014) have extended the 
imputation method over a five-year period. They found that firms involved in an 
event are more likely to be involved in another event thereafter. Reconstructing 
longitudinal firm histories over several years thus rapidly becomes a complex 
exercise as multiple changes in identification numbers have to be taken into 
account. 
 
2.D Firm-level growth estimates 
To document the relationship between firm size and firm growth, we regress 
annual net employment growth at the firm level on firm size classes using a 
saturated dummy regression model that is estimated by OLS. As explanatory 
variables we include six size classes (1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100 or 
more employees), as well as industry and year dummies. The model includes a 
separate indicator for all possible values taken by the discrete explanatory 
variables, as well as the set of interactions between the size and industry 
dummies. The dependent variable is calculated as the discrete-time firm-level 
growth rate using average employment size in year t-1 and t in the denominator, 
as proposed by Davis et al. (1996a). Denoting employment of firm i in year t as Eit, 
its growth rate over the preceding year is 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) ?̅?𝑖𝑡⁄ , with ?̅?𝑖𝑡 =
(𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) 2⁄ .  These growth rates range from -2 for exits to +2 for entrants, 
show job creation and destruction symmetrically and are bounded away from 
infinity.25  
We follow Davis et al. (1996b) for the size classification of continuing firms, 
which is based on average employment in year t-1 and t instead of on base-year 
employment in year t-1.26 This classification is used to mitigate regression-to-the-
mean effects from a traditional base-year approach. Exits are assigned to the size 
class of employment in their last year. Finally, as in Haltiwanger et al. (2013), we 
                                                 
25 Some continuing firms have zero employment in t-1 or t (‘dormant’ firms).  They are 
treated as outliers and are omitted from the estimations in the period concerned. 
26 Due to averaging and employment imputation for transfers, employment is a continuous 
variable.  Firms are classified into the following size intervals: ]0,5[, [5,10[, [10,20[, [20,50[, 
[50,100[, [100,[.   
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estimate employment-weighted specifications of the model, which enables the 
size coefficients to be interpreted as net employment growth rates for a given size 
class of firms.  
The following regression model is estimated:  
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘
𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑑 ])1[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘]
6
𝑘=1 + ∑  𝛾𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑑
𝑑 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑡  is the growth rate of firm i in the period from t-1 to t and the dummy 
variable  1[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘] takes a value of one if the average size of firm i in period t-1 
to t equals k. The industry dummies 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑑  enter both additively and interacted with 
the set of size dummies. As we enforce ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑑
𝑑 = 0, the average effect of size on 
growth is captured by the uninteracted 𝛼𝑘 coefficients, while the 𝛽𝑘
𝑑  coefficients 
allow for industry heterogeneity. The additive year dummies 𝑦𝑡  control for 
business cycle effects. 
 
2.E Job reallocation measures 
To document aggregate measures of job creation and destruction, we follow Davis 
et al. (1996a), and decompose the net employment growth rate into the job 
creation rates by entry and by expansion, and the job destruction rates by exit and 
by contraction. Formally, if 𝐸𝑡  is total employment in year t, and 𝑔𝑡  is the net 
employment growth rate between year t-1 and t, then 
𝑔𝑡 =
(𝐸𝑡−𝐸𝑡−1)
𝑋𝑡
=
𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑋𝑡
+ 
𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑋𝑡
− 
𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑡
− 
𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑋𝑡
  (3) 
 where 𝑋𝑡 =  (𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1) 2⁄   is the average employment in year t-1 and t  
 and 𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 , 𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑 , 𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡  are the number of jobs created by 
entrants and expanding firms, and destroyed by exits and contracting firms 
respectively in period t-1 to t. Each component 
𝐽𝑅𝑡
𝑖
𝑋𝑡
 represents the job creation or 
destruction rate of the corresponding group of firms.  
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2.F Job reallocation by industry 
The general results discussed for the total private sector are also found at the 
disaggregated industry level, but the biases are exacerbated in industries with a 
relatively high share of large firms. This is most noticeable in manufacturing and 
in the sector of human health and social work, where average firm size is much 
larger than in other industries (29.4 and 33.5 employees respectively). Table 2.A.7 
shows that the traditional method produces job reallocation rates by entry and 
exit, which are overestimated by up to 200 percent compared with benchmark 
results. The employee-flow method, which more easily identifies missing linkages 
in larger size classes, reduces the biases to less than 10 percent. 
In line with the patterns of annual variation discussed in Section 2.5.3, job 
reallocation rates by entry and exit in most industries are much more stable over 
time than it is suggested by unedited or partly edited longitudinal data. 
Figure 2.A.5 shows the results for some selected industries. The unedited data and 
the traditional method report large fluctuations in the job creation rate by entry, 
which are often reflected symmetrically in the job destruction rate by exit. The 
employee-flow method strongly reduces this spurious variation and reveals that 
in most industries, job reallocation rates by entry and exit vary smoothly in time. 
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Table 2.A. 7  Annual job reallocation rates by industry 
  Rates (%)  Percent bias vs. both methods combined 
  
Job creation 
rate 
 
Job destruction 
rate 
 
Job creation  
rate 
 
Job destruction 
rate 
  
By 
entry 
By 
expan-
sion 
 
By 
exit 
By 
contrac-
tion 
 
By 
entry 
By 
expan-
sion 
 
By 
exit 
By 
contrac-
tion 
Industry (net growth rates in parentheses) 
Agriculture (+0.2%) - average firm size: 5.1       
Unedited data 6.1 15.7  7.4 14.3  25 0  20 1 
Traditional method 5.3 15.9  6.5 14.1  8 1  5 -1 
Employee-flow method 5.3 15.6  6.6 14.2  9 0  8 0 
Both methods combined 4.9 15.7  6.2 14.2       
Manufacturing (-1.3%) - average firm size: 29.4        
Unedited data 1.4 4.5  2.3 4.9  309 29  184 13 
Traditional method 1.1 3.9  1.3 4.8  214 10  55 11 
Employee-flow method 0.4 3.6  0.9 4.4  10 2  8 1 
Both methods combined 0.3 3.5  0.8 4.3       
Construction (+1.3%) - average firm size: 7.9        
Unedited data 3.4 8.6  4.4 6.3  40 9  51 3 
Traditional method 2.9 8.3  3.5 6.2  21 5  22 1 
Employee-flow method 2.7 8.0  3.2 6.2  9 1  9 0 
Both methods combined 2.4 7.9  2.9 6.1       
Trade (+0.8%) - average firm size: 8.7          
Unedited data 2.6 6.5  3.2 5.0  67 12  78 7 
Traditional method 2.0 6.0  2.3 5.0  30 4  27 6 
Employee-flow method 1.7 5.9  1.9 4.8  7 1  9 1 
Both methods combined 1.6 5.8  1.8 4.7       
Accommodation and food services (+0.8%) - average firm size: 5.8     
Unedited data 7.0 11.6  6.8 10.9  28 5  36 3 
Traditional method 6.5 11.1  6.2 10.8  19 0  24 2 
Employee-flow method 5.6 11.1  5.2 10.7  3 0  3 0 
Both methods combined 5.5 11.0  5.0 10.6       
Business support services (+3.5%) - average firm size: 11.4       
Unedited data 3.4 9.2  3.8 5.3  87 17  143 15 
Traditional method 2.6 8.6  2.3 5.1  42 9  47 11 
Employee-flow method 2.0 8.1  1.7 4.8  7 2  10 4 
Both methods combined 1.8 7.9  1.6 4.6       
Mixed business & household services (-0.3%) - average firm size: 12.2    
Unedited data 2.3 4.9  2.7 4.8  101 18  129 9 
Traditional method 1.8 4.5  1.7 4.8  51 9  48 10 
Employee-flow method 1.3 4.2  1.3 4.4  8 2  9 2 
Both methods combined 1.2 4.1  1.2 4.4       
Human health and social work (+3.6%) - average firm size: 33.5     
Unedited data 1.4 4.8  1.4 1.3  171 7  277 18 
Traditional method 1.3 4.6  1.1 1.3  154 2  214 21 
Employee-flow method 0.5 4.5  0.4 1.1  7 1  7 5 
Both methods combined 0.5 4.5  0.4 1.1       
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. Net employment growth rates by industry are 
decomposed in a similar way as for the total private sector (see Appendix 2.E).  
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Figure 2.A. 5  Annual job reallocation by entry and exit in selected industries 
a.  Manufacturing 
 Job creation rate by entry  Job destruction rate by exit 
    
 
b.  Business support services 
 Job creation rate by entry  Job destruction rate by exit 
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(figure 2.A.5 continued) 
c. Mixed business & household services 
 Job creation rate by entry  Job destruction rate by exit 
    
 
Note: The job creation (job destruction) rate represents the employment share of entrants 
(exits) in total employment.
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Firm creation and  
post-entry dynamics of de novo entrants 
Abstract 
We show that within the same age cohort, growth rates of young firms are 
strongly increasing in firm size. This robust empirical pattern is confined to 
the initial years after entry; in line with many previous studies, we find that 
growth rates become independent of size as a cohort matures. Both the initial 
pattern and the subsequent convergence are consistent with the framework of 
the passive learning model if young firms adjust their size only slowly to new 
information, for example due to financing or hiring frictions. Importantly, we 
focus our analysis on firms that enter de novo. They are defined as new firms 
starting new operations and hiring their first employee. We distinguish them 
from pre-existing companies that merely re-register as a new firm, for example 
following a restructuring or merger. The extremely narrow size distribution 
that we observe for de novo entrants provides further support for the passive 
learning model. 
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3.1 Motivation 
New firms entering the economy are generally both numerous and small. As an 
entry cohort matures, the average firm size increases and the size distribution, 
being initially highly right-skewed, shifts to the right. Empirical studies have 
consistently documented how selection leads to a rapid increase in concentration 
in a given cohort: many young firms fail shortly after entry and firms that expand 
have a higher probability of survival than firms that stay small (Evans 1987a; 
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989; Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes 1995). The 
passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) has been widely used to rationalize 
these post-entry patterns. It assumes that firms enter with an innate productivity 
they do not know themselves at entry but gradually discover by operating in the 
market. Firms that learn they are more efficient grow and survive, while the 
inefficient exit. 
Less consensus exists how growth patterns of young surviving firms 
contribute to the tendency towards increased concentration in a given cohort. 
Empirical studies typically find that growth rates are very high in the first years 
after entry and rapidly decrease with age, another regularity in line with model of 
Jovanovic (Evans 1987a; Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda 2013; Mata and 
Portugal 2004). But it is unclear whether within a cohort smaller firms grow faster 
and to some extent catch up in size, or whether larger firms have higher growth 
rates. The first pattern would imply a negative size-growth relationship and slow 
down concentration, while the second pattern would accelerate the trend towards 
increased concentration (Dunne and Hughes 1994). 
Knowing the form of this relationship is important for two reasons. First, 
theoretical models of firm dynamics often assume or imply a specific relation 
between growth and size. Second, policy measures to support entrepreneurship 
and growth often discriminate between firms of different size. 
The few studies that have examined the relationship between growth and size 
of young survivors conditional on age, both measured in terms of employment, 
report contrasting findings. Evans (1987a), Lotti, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2003) 
and Mata (1994) find a negative relationship, but Haltiwanger et al. (2013) 
conclude that there is no systematic relationship between firm size and growth. 
Furthermore, when using their preferred methodology, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) 
find that the growth-size relationship within a given age cohort is positive, both 
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for young and older firms.1 The model of Jovanovic provides little guidance either. 
In the general version, the relationship is undetermined. Only under specific 
assumptions does the model predict growth among firms of the same age to be 
independent of size. 
We use data for the universe of Belgian employer firms over a ten-year period 
and find that the size-growth relationship of young, surviving firms of the same 
age is strongly and robustly positive. We show, however, that this relationship is 
confined to the very first years of operation. When entrants mature, the empirical 
pattern converges to growth rates that are more or less proportionate to size. This 
convergence confirms previous studies showing that growth rates are 
independent of size for older and larger firms (Mansfield 1962; Hall 1987; Geroski 
1995). A positive size-growth pattern among older firms, as in Haltiwanger et al. 
(2013), cannot be a steady state as the firm size distribution would become 
degenerate. 
Both the initial deviation and the subsequent convergence are consistent with 
an augmented passive learning model. The initial pattern can be rationalized 
within the Jovanovic (1982) framework if one takes into account that young firms 
adjust their size only gradually to new information and not instantaneously as is 
assumed in the stylized setting of the model. For example, financing or hiring 
constraints may prevent young firms from expanding immediately to their desired 
size. Recent evidence indeed suggests that young firms face more severe financial 
constraints than older firms (Cabral and Mata 2003; Beck et al. 2006), and that 
fast-growing firms experience the greatest constraints to growth (Brown, Earle 
and Morgulis 2015). A similar delay before weak performers exit the industry will 
also reduce the growth rate of small firms and contribute to the observed positive 
relationship between growth and size.2 As firms mature and gradually learn their 
true efficiency, additional information becomes less informative and they 
converge to their steady state size. 
Two measurement problems we explicitly address are worth highlighting as 
they illustrate the empirical pitfalls in estimating the relationship between growth 
and size for young firms. First, the estimated pattern is sensitive to identification 
of new firms and their post-entry histories in the data. We define de novo entrants 
                                                 
1 The general results presented in Haltiwanger et al. (2013) are shown in greater detail for 
young firms in Decker, et al. (2014), they confirm the positive relationship. 
2 Abbring and Campbell (2005) show that many poorly performing firms stick around while 
making losses as they are committed to a year’s lease on their premises. 
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as new firms starting new operations and identify their point of entry as the year 
they hire their first employee. Second, the potential negative bias in the 
relationship, induced by sample selection and regression-to-the-mean, is 
exacerbated in a sample that consists of very small firms. We now discuss these 
two aspects in some more detail.  
Firm-level administrative data are currently the main source for empirical 
analysis on firm dynamics.3 The identification of individual firm histories in the 
data is, however, hampered by the fact that firms may change administrative ID 
code or restructure, leading to missing links in firm histories over time. It is widely 
recognized that such events lead to spurious measurements of entry and exit, and 
to overestimations of firm and employment dynamics (Haltiwanger et al. 2013; 
Geurts 2016). The bias they introduce in post-entry growth patterns has, however, 
received less attention. We make use of two state of the art record linking methods 
to minimize these problems. They enable us to more accurately trace the complete 
histories of de novo entrants, from the moment they hire their first employee till 
they cease activities, i.e. true economic exit. We distinguish them from spurious 
entrants, i.e. firms that continue existing economic activities with a new ID code, 
for example after a merger or split of legal entities, or a change in legal identifier. 
Similarly, true economic exit is distinguished from firms that disappear from the 
data without closing down operations. We show that failing to identify even a 
small amount of spurious entrants has major implications for the estimation of 
post-entry growth patterns.  
Our exclusive focus on de novo entrants reveals that the firm size distribution 
at entry is confined to a much narrower range of small size classes than found in 
many previous studies. This empirical observation is very much in line with the 
passive learning model which predicts that firms, lacking prior information about 
their efficiency, all enter at the same size. Studies that cover a sample with a broad 
range of firm sizes already at entry must be investigating growth in a different 
population than de novo entrants.  
It is well-known that two statistical problems may bias the relationship 
between size and growth for surviving firms. Regression-to-the-mean as well as 
sample selection may spuriously induce a negative relationship if firm size is 
measured in the base year, i.e. at the start of the period over which growth rates 
are calculated (Hall 1987). Although these problems may be less important for 
larger firms, the statistical side-effects of the base-year size classification are 
                                                 
3 See for example cross-country analysis in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009). 
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greatly exacerbated in a sample of small firms, as is the case in our sample of 
de novo entrants. We therefore need to directly address these measurement 
issues. To avoid bias in the size-growth relationship, we use three alternative firm-
size classifications that approximate a continuous size-growth relationship. We 
find a robust positive size-growth relationship for each of the alternatives.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 starts with a 
brief overview of stylized facts on entry and post-entry dynamics. It also reviews 
predictions of the model of Jovanovic (1982) and discusses how they are affected 
by delayed adjustment. Section 3.3 presents the dataset and our strategy to 
identify de novo entrants and their post-entry histories. In Section 3.4, the 
empirical model and the size measurement issues are discussed. The results are 
presented in Section 3.5, first showing that some well-established facts about firm 
entry and exit are replicated in the Belgian dataset, and then showing post-entry 
growth patterns by age and size. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Facts and theory 
3.2.1 Some stylized facts 
Empirical studies for various countries have found entry rates of new firms in 
manufacturing and services to vary between 5 and 15 percent per year. Most 
entrants tend to be much smaller than the average incumbent, such that the 
employment share of new entrants is generally far less than 5 percent of the 
workforce (Siegfried and Evans 1994; Geroski 1995; Caves 1998). As a cohort 
matures, average firm size increases and the number of firms falls. This tendency 
towards increased concentration in a given age cohort is very strong in the first 
years after entry. A typical pattern is that 5 to 10 years after entry, average firm 
size has doubled, but only half of an entry cohort survives.4 Cabral and Mata 
(2003) showed firm size to be highly right-skewed at entry and shift towards a 
more symmetric distribution over time. The long-run cohort’s size distribution 
remains, however, right-skewed, without convergence to a common size (Konings 
1995). 
The rapid increase in concentration among an entry cohort is explained by 
specific post-entry dynamics showing systematic differences between young 
                                                 
4 See for example Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) for the U.S., Wagner (1994) and 
Boeri and Cramer (1992) for Germany; Mata et al. (1995) for Portugal. 
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firms and incumbents. A first difference is a selection process that reduces the 
number of smaller firms in a cohort. Many empirical studies have shown that 
young firms exhibit high failure rates immediately after entry. Two patterns are 
highly robust: (i) exit rates are decreasing in firm size and (ii) survival rates 
increase as firms mature.5  
Another well-established fact is that young surviving firms exhibit remarkably 
high growth rates which decline with age.6 Variation in growth rates among 
surviving firms can contribute to increased concentration if larger (young) firms 
tend to grow faster than smaller ones, or if growth rates exhibit positive serial 
correlation (Dunne and Hughes 1994). The existing evidence on which pattern 
prevails in the early post-entry process has been inconclusive. 
Several studies lump all firms below a certain age in one cohort and verify 
whether growth rates conditional on survival increase or decrease with firm size 
among these young firms. Dunne et al. (1989) and Almus and Nerlinger (2000) 
find, for the manufacturing sectors of the U.S. and Germany, that smaller plants or 
firms grow faster than larger ones. Wagner (1994) also studies German 
manufacturing firms, but finds growth rates to be independent of size.7 As these 
patterns include an age effect within the broader cohort—and we know that 
younger firms tend to be smaller and growing faster—they provide imperfect 
evidence on the size-growth relationship among firms of the same age.8  
The few studies that have investigated post-entry growth conditional on age 
obtain contrasting results. Evans (1987a) and Lotti et al. (2003) report an inverse 
relationship between growth and size given age for surviving young firms in the 
first six years after entry. They find this pattern diminishes with age and 
converges towards growth that is proportionate with size, consistent with 
evidence that suggests Gibrat’s law holds in a sample of older firms or among firms 
that have exhausted scale economies (Mansfield 1962; Hall 1987; Geroski 1995). 
Mata (1994) finds a weak negative relationship that is insignificant at the 
                                                 
5 See for example Evans (1987a) and Dunne et al. (1989) for U.S. manufacturing plants, 
Haltiwanger et al. (2012) for U.S. manufacturing and services; Mata et al. (1995) for 
Portugal. 
6 See the same studies for the U.S.; Mata and Portugal (2004) for Portugal. 
7 The three studies group together all firms younger than, respectively, 5, 6, or 10 years.  
Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli (1999) also investigate the relation between growth and 
size of young Italian manufacturing firms, but they estimate growth rates relative to size at 
entry. 
8 A discussion of this age composition effect is provided in Section 3.5.3. 
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1 percent level.9 Haltiwanger et al. (2013) report a negative as well as a positive 
pattern, depending on the size classification method. When using their preferred 
methodology, they find larger firms to grow more rapidly than smaller ones 
among young survivors of the same age. Moreover, their results show no 
convergence towards proportionate growth for older firms. The contrasting 
results may be partly explained by differences in measurement methods and 
industry scope, as we discuss in more detail below.10 We will show that an 
accurate identification de novo entrants matters greatly too. 
Note that some studies have used firms as their unit of analysis while others 
used plants or establishments. In our analysis, we are not interested in country 
comparisons of performance, but rather try to uncover general patterns of firm 
behavior. The unit of analysis most closely related to the theoretical notion of new 
firm creation is the firm and that is the unit of observation we will work with. As 
the vast amount of new entrants tend to have only a single plant or establishment, 
this definition covers a subset of the entrants that plant-level studies would 
identify. 
3.2.2 Theoretical framework 
How do firms enter? 
The passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) implies a particular process of 
firm dynamics by age and size and has often been used to rationalize exit and 
growth patterns of entrants. The key assumption is that firms enter without 
knowing their own innate productivity. Prior to entry, they receive, but do not 
observe, a random draw from the productivity distribution in the industry. Since 
entrants know the population distribution, they have the same prior beliefs and 
all enter at the same size.11 Each period they update their prior distribution over 
                                                 
9 Pooling young firms up to age 4 into one age class, Mata (1994) finds a stronger negative 
relationship. As noted before, this result is likely to reflect an age composition effect of 
small, fast-growing firms being younger. 
10 Evans (1987a) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013) report results for U.S. firms. Lotti et al. 
(2003) cover Italian firms and Mata (1994) Portuguese firms.  Haltiwanger et al. (2013) 
classify firms by average size in t-1 and t and include both manufacturing and services, 
while the other studies use a base-year size classification and are limited to manufacturing 
firms. 
11 Models of entrepreneurial entry with financing constraints, such as Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) and Cabral and Mata (2003), also predict that the size distribution of entrants will 
cover a narrow range. 
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their own productivity level using Bayes’ law as evidence on profitability is 
realized. Firm sizes diverge as the cohort matures even though the underlying 
firm-specific productivity level is constant. 
This modeling approach contrasts with Lucas (1978) which features a 
dispersion of managerial skill in the population. High-skill individuals self-select 
into entrepreneurship, rather than becoming an employee, and they choose their 
firm size optimally upon entry. It also contrasts with the model of Hopenhayn 
(1992) where firms similarly receive a random draw from a known productivity 
distribution, but they observe this realization after paying a fixed entry cost and 
before hiring any production factors. If they enter, they immediately do so at the 
“right” size. 
The first implication of the Jovanovic model rarely holds in large-scale datasets 
used to investigate firm dynamics. Firms are predicted to all enter at the same or 
similar scale, while actual entrants typically span a broad range of firm sizes. 
Deviations might simply be due to the stylized assumptions of the model, but two 
measurement issues help explain the discrepancy between the prediction and 
stylized facts. First, variation in entry size can reflect that some time has passed 
between the moment a firm is established and the first time it is observed in the 
dataset. In our administrative database of Belgian employers, new firms are 
observed in the first year they record positive employment on June 30. On that 
day, some firms have already been in existence, either without employees for an 
unknown period, or with employees for up to 12 months. They have had the 
chance to learn about their innate productivity, and choose different growth rates, 
or even exit, in response. The observed entry size distribution should thus (at least 
partly) be regarded as the outcome of an initial selection and size adjustment 
process. For this reason, we denote the first year of entry in the dataset as age 1, 
and the unknown moment of the firm’s establishment as age 0. 
Second, and more importantly, the group of entrants in administrative datasets 
typically includes some pre-existing firms that re-enter the dataset after a legal or 
ownership restructuring or enter with a new subsidiary. Examples include 
divestitures, control changes, legal restructuring for tax or liability reason, 
incumbents entering a new industry or starting activities in a new region, etc. 
These other modes of entry are certainly economically relevant, but we do not 
expect post-entry dynamics of these firms to conform to the predictions of the 
passive learning model. We label them as spurious entrants, as opposed to de novo 
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entrants which we study in this paper.12 Several studies have demonstrated that 
entry by established firms fundamentally differs from de novo entry (Dunne et al. 
1988; Baldwin and Gorecki 1987; Konings et al. 1996; Bilsen and Konings 1998; 
Mata and Portugal 2004). These firms already have a better idea of their own 
productivity. They tend to enter with a larger size, are less likely to fail, and exhibit 
less dynamic growth patterns. They are an interesting group of firms to study, as 
these changes could very well be systematically related to past or future 
performance, but here we choose to focus on de novo entrants.  
Just as the optimal size with which firms enter in Lucas (1978) or Hopenhayn 
(1992), the uniform entry size in Jovanovic (1982) is an extreme assumption in a 
stylized model of entry. Even de novo entrants may possess some pre-entry 
knowledge about their resources and capabilities which affects both entry 
decisions and subsequent success (Helfat and Lieberman 2002). Moreover, some 
entrepreneurs enter small simply because they have no or limited growth 
intentions (Acs, Astebro, Audretsch and Robinson 2016). Initial size may thus 
partially reflect both prior knowledge and post-entry growth paths. The 
substantial size dispersion at entry that is generally observed in empirical 
datasets has been used to explain post-entry growth patterns (Audretsch et al. 
1999). After carefully identifying de novo entrants, however, our sample reveals 
very little variation in entry sizes, reflecting more closely the stylized assumption 
in Jovanovic (1982). 
How do firms grow after entry?  
Many heterogeneous firm models do not incorporate firm-specific stochastic 
elements that give rise to systematic heterogeneity in growth rates. In the model 
of Hopenhayn (1992), firms enter immediately at their optimal size and later 
adjustments in firm size are responses to random productivity shocks firms have 
no control over. Abbring and Campbell (2004) add persistence in post-entry 
shocks to the model which leads to serial correlation in growth rates and 
eventually to a positive size-growth relationship. 
The passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) is one exception.13 Firms only 
discover their own innate efficiency level from operating in the market. Initially, 
                                                 
12 As shown in Section 3.3., the vast majority of spurious entrants we distinguish from 
de novo entrants are simply incumbents that continue the same activities with a new 
identification code after an administrative or legal change. 
13 The active learning model of Ericson and Pakes (1995) is another exception. In their 
model, growth is a function of firms’ actions as they can make investments to raise 
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they have the same beliefs about this and they all enter at the same size. Realized 
profits depend on their actual underlying efficiency and idiosyncratic cost shocks 
and they use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs and expand or contract into their 
correct size. Firms that discover they are more efficient, grow and survive, while 
the inefficient shrink and exit. As time passes, firm sizes within an entering cohort 
diverge and become strictly increasing in firms’ estimate of their own efficiency. 
As firms mature and gradually learn their true efficiency, additional information 
becomes less informative and they converge to their steady state size.14  
This model generates several testable predictions about exit and growth 
patterns in relation to the firm’s age and size. First, the noisy selection process 
implies an inverse relationship between exit and size given age and between exit 
and age. Unsuccessful firms stay small, they might even contract, and eventually 
choose to exit. Larger firms are those that received favorable cost information in 
previous periods and have expanded. While initial profit realizations provide new 
entrants with a lot of information on their ability, subsequent information 
becomes gradually less informative and is less likely to induce exit.  
Second, the model implies that conditional on survival younger firms have 
higher and more variable growth rates than older firms. They are still highly 
uncertain about their own quality and respond to market success by expanding. 
As the weakest firms exit, average efficiency among surviving firms improves from 
period to period which is reflected in higher average firm sizes. As firms mature, 
revisions of estimated efficiency become smaller. Firms eventually approach their 
optimal scale and the variance of growth rates converges to zero. 
Third, because smaller firms are on average younger, the model also predicts 
an inverse relationship between growth rates and size in a cross-section of firms 
that encompasses a range of cohorts. Several empirical studies find evidence for 
this inverse relationship and Jovanovic (1982) cites it as a key motivation for the 
model. However, without additional assumptions, the model does not imply any 
                                                 
productivity.  As the link between investment and productivity is stochastic, even identical 
investments can generate different outcomes. 
14 Further growth is driven solely by business cycle shocks affecting all firms similarly.  In 
the model of Hopenhayn (1992), even mature firms experience random productivity 
shocks that induce random growth rates in steady state, but these are unrelated to firm 
size. 
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systematic relationship between growth rates and size conditional on age.15  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas cost function leads to a prediction that growth rates are 
independent of firm size among firms of the same age cohort, consistent with 
Gibrat’s law. At each point, a firm’s size reflects its best estimate of its efficiency. 
With this cost assumption, adjustment is complete and subsequent adjustments 
depend only on future information which is by definition random. 
In the stylized framework of the Jovanovic model, a firm’s current size only 
reflects its past growth history. The model assumes instantaneous adjustment to 
new information, but in reality, frictions might distort this process. Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) show for several countries that deviations between factor prices 
and marginal productivities and between observed and optimal output levels are 
widespread. As these deviations partially reflect the dynamic adjustment of quasi-
fixed production factors (Asker, Collard-Wexler and De Loecker 2014), it is likely 
that younger, less established firms face greater external frictions. For the 
prediction of the size-growth relationship conditional on age, it matters greatly 
whether they already affect firm size at the moment of entry or whether they 
mainly influence adjustments in firm size following entry. 
A prominent example of the first situation is the model of Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) where entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints. Heterogeneity among firm 
size at startup reflects that the smallest entrants faced the strongest financial 
constraint. They need to finance their expansion from realized profits. If the 
friction is not perfectly correlated with ability, they will also have the highest 
growth potential and we should observe a negative relation between initial size 
and subsequent growth, as in Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli (1999). An 
alternative mechanism that generates the same prediction is developed by Cabral 
(1995). If production capacity requires substantial sunk costs that are foregone 
when firms exit, smaller firms are more likely to exit and they will choose to invest 
gradually and enter at even smaller scale.  
In the second situation, entry size is not distorted by frictions. Yet following 
entry, some firms cannot immediately adjust to their desired size when they revise 
their estimate of their innate efficiency. Credit, hiring, or regulatory constraints 
can limit growth in the first years. For some expanding firms, current size will be 
below desired size and they will need several years to incorporate positive 
                                                 
15 Dunne et al. (1989) argues that efficiency levels, and thus firm sizes, are bounded from 
above. This leads to a negative relationship as there is less room for further increases for 
larger firms. 
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information into their size. For some years, their size and growth rate both reflect 
underlying firm quality. Until adjustment is complete and desired size catches up 
with actual size, it leads to higher growth rates for larger firms. Delayed 
adjustment of firm size introduces a positive correlation between past and current 
growth, and thus between firm size and growth.16  
Delayed adjustment can have many reasons. It can be externally imposed, for 
example credit constrained firms may need to finance investments from retained 
earnings. A vast literature documents the excessive sensitivity of many firms’ 
investments to free cash flow (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988; Evans and 
Leighton 1989). Cabral and Mata (2003) and Beck et al. (2006) find that young 
firms face more severe financial constraints than older firms, while Brown, Earle 
and Morgulis (2015) show that fast-growing firms experience the greatest 
constraints to growth.  Search frictions to hire specialized staff in thin labor 
markets or zoning regulations are other external frictions that can delay 
adjustment to positive shocks. Risk aversion will exacerbate the pattern of gradual 
adjustment. While larger firms might be risk-neutral, individual entrepreneurs are 
likely to be somewhat risk averse (Brockhaus 1980). Especially in the face of 
irreversible investments and sunk costs, firms will not incorporate all positive 
information immediately in their size. Past growth will result in a somewhat 
higher size, but also be followed by future growth.  
Delayed exit further contributes to a positive relationship between growth and 
size. The option value associated with the sunk entry costs may provide an 
incentive for some loss-making firms to continue operations before eventually 
deciding to withdraw from the market. In many administrative firm-level datasets 
it is common to observe firms with no employment and no or minimal sales for 
several years. If fixed costs are low relative to sunk entry costs, small firms might 
simply hang around for the business cycle to improve rather than exit.  
  
                                                 
16 In a Markov Perfect equilibrium, the value of current state variables are sufficient 
statistics for the entire firm history (Ericsson and Pakes 1995).  With adjustment frictions 
this is not necessarily the case anymore. 
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3.3 Data  
The analysis is based on the register of Belgian employers maintained by the 
National Social Security Office (NSSO). It includes all private firms with at least 
one employee and covers the period from 2003 to 2012. In an average year, the 
sample includes 178 000 firms and 2 070 000 employees.  
De novo entrants are defined as new firms starting new operations. We identify 
their point of entry in the data as the year they hire their first employee. We 
distinguish them from spurious entrants by making use of two state-of-the-art 
record linking methods. The methods are further used to trace the complete 
histories of firms from the moment they start operating till they cease activities, 
i.e. true economic exit. For those firms that change ID code or restructure, we 
impute employment measures up to the sixth year of existence. To our knowledge, 
we are the first to use this approach to obtain consistent post-entry firm histories. 
The details of our methodological approach are explained in Appendix 3.B. Below, 
we provide a summary and show that the size range of de novo entrants 
dramatically differs from the size range at entry suggested by the raw dataset. This 
has major implications for the post-entry size-growth relationship. 
It is widely recognized that administrative firm-level data suffer from missing 
links in individual firm histories, which hinders the straightforward identification 
of firm dynamics. Firms may change ID code due to mergers, takeovers, split-offs, 
ownership changes or for tax optimization purposes. These events generate 
various biases in empirical measures, such as spurious measurements of entry 
and exit, misclassifications of firm growth across age and size classes, and 
overestimations of job and firm turnover (Haltiwanger et al. 2013; Geurts 2016). 
To minimize these problems, we use two record linking methods cumulating the 
missing linkages we identify.  
The first consists of a set of traditional record linking techniques developed by 
Statistics Belgium in line with the OECD-Eurostat recommendations on 
constructing longitudinal business data (Eurostat-OECD 2007). The method relies 
on probability-based matching and the use of supplementary data sources with 
information on firm continuity. The second linking method is based on an 
employee-flow approach. It follows one of the key production factors of the firm, 
the stock of employees, to identify changes in ID codes and firm structure. 
Continuity of the firm’s workforce is thus used to identify firms that operate 
continuously.  
84  Chapter 3 
 
 
The established linkages are first used to identify continuing firms that are 
misclassified as exits and entrants in consecutive years. They are labeled as 
‘spurious’ exits and entrants as opposed to true exits and de novo entrants. It is 
especially important to recognize that spurious entrants are pre-existing firms 
that are likely to exhibit characteristics similar to other incumbents. If they are 
mixed up with de novo entrants, the typical size and growth patterns of young 
firms will be biased towards those of incumbents. Panel b. of Table 3.A.1 in the 
Appendix shows that 78 percent of the spurious entrants we identify are simply 
incumbents that continue the same activities with a new identification code after 
a purely administrative or legal change. Another 18 percent are split-offs of 
another firm.  
Next, the linkages are used to trace the employment histories of de novo 
entrants that are involved in an ID change or restructuring in the years following 
entry. When a firm changes ID code its employment history in the data appears to 
be discontinued. Similarly, firms that merge or split up are recorded with artificial 
jumps in employment which do not correspond to the actual creation or 
destruction of jobs. For these firms, we impute employment up to the sixth year 
after entry. Our approach is to construct an aggregate event-level that includes all 
firm ID’s interlinked in a given period t-1 to t. Firm-level employment in t and t+n 
is then imputed by assuming the same growth rate for each firm involved in the 
event. For one-to-one ID changes, which represent the vast majority of events, this 
simply means replacing the new by the old ID code. For firms that split-up, the 
method reduces to keeping the entities combined in one firm as before the event. 
For mergers and more complex events, the firms are kept separated as before the 
event, and employment of each of them is assumed to exhibit the same grow rate 
as the merged entity recorded in the data. An important advantage of this 
imputation method is that it preserves the firm size distribution in t-1 to calculate 
growth rates from t-1 to t and in subsequent periods, allowing a more accurate 
estimate of post-entry employment patterns by size. 
Table 3.1 shows that the two linkage methods are complementary for the 
identification of de novo entry across different size classes of firms. The first row 
reports the average annual number of entrants as observed in the raw 
administrative data. The next rows present the fraction of these firms that are 
identified as either de novo or spurious entrants.  
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Table 3.1  Share of de novo and spurious entrants in all administratively recorded entrants 
  
Total 
 
By firm size class 
    
 
1-4         5-9 10-19 20-49 50-49 100+ 
Number of firms 17283  15 368 1 209  446  190    39    32 
Share of de novo entrants 0.91  0.95 0.64 0.41 0.26 0.17 0.03 
Share of spurious entrants         
 Identified by         
 Both methods combined 0.09  0.05 0.36 0.59 0.74 0.83 0.97 
 Traditional method 0.06  0.05 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.32 0.44 
 Employee-flow method 0.05        - 0.32 0.57 0.72 0.82 0.97 
Note: Average of annual shares over the 2003-2012 period.  Firm size classes are based on 
employment.  
Spurious entrants only represent 9 percent of the total, but this low fraction 
does not mean it is an unimportant group. The probability that a new ID code 
corresponds to spurious entry increases dramatically with size. They account for 
more than one third of administrative entrants with 5 to 9 employees and even 
two thirds of those with 10 or more employees. De novo entrants with more than 
50 employees are extremely rare. As a result, the size-distribution of de novo 
entrants is more strongly right-skewed than in the unedited data and the presence 
of spurious entrants would introduce a bias in post-entry patterns by size. 
Table 3.1 further shows the complementarity of the two linkage methods. The 
traditional method is needed especially in the size class below five employees, 
where employee-flow links are absent by construction. Yet the employee-flow 
method is essential in larger size classes, where it identifies two to three times 
more spurious entrants than the traditional method. 
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3.4 Empirical model 
We characterize survival and growth patterns for young firms by age and size 
using the employment history of de novo entrants up to the moment of true 
economic exit. As shown in Dunne et al. (1989), the mean growth rate of a class of 
firms can be decomposed into the growth rate of survivors weighted by the 
probability of survival, minus the probability of exit. The two equations, using the 
firm-level growth rate and the exit dummy as dependent variables, are estimated 
separately.  
Employment is measured as the number of employees registered on June 30. 
The set of entrants in year t includes all firms that started as an employer after 
June 30 of year t-1 and survive until June 30 of year t. It conditions on surviving a 
first selection process, from a firm’s establishment, the unknown point in time of 
age 0, to the first recorded instance of positive employment, denoted as age 1. 
Exits in observation period t-1 to t are firms for which t-1 is the last year of positive 
employment. Firms that change ID code or firm structure are not considered as 
exits. Their growth path following the event is based on imputed employment. The 
years between entry and exit, firms are denoted as survivors.17 
Following Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996a), firm-level growth rates are 
calculated as discrete-time employment changes relative to the average of 
employment in year t-1 and year t. Denoting employment of firm i in year t as 𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 
the growth rate over the preceding year equals 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) ?̅?𝑖𝑡⁄ , with  
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) 2⁄ . These growth rates range from -2 for exits to +2 for 
entrants, show job creation and destruction symmetrically and are bounded away 
from infinity.18 Regressions use employment weights such that the coefficient 
estimates are readily interpreted as aggregate employment changes for a class of 
firms. Specifically, the mean estimated growth rate represents the rate of net 
                                                 
17 Some survivors have zero employment in a given year (‘dormant’ firms).  They are 
treated as outliers and omitted from the regressions in the periods concerned. 
18 This growth rate is close to the more commonly used logarithmic growth rate  
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1⁄ ), especially for values between -1 and +1.  Both measures show 
expansion and contraction symmetrically, whereas the growth rate relative to base-year 
employment t-1 ranges from -1 to infinity.  Symmetry is a crucial feature for estimating 
mean growth rates of young firms, as their employment fluctuates widely.  A further 
advantage of our growth rate is that using the corresponding employment weights, ?̅?𝑖𝑡, in 
the regressions yields coefficient estimates that exactly represent net employment growth 
of a class of firms.  Equivalent weights do not exist for the logarithmic growth rate.  In the 
exit regressions we use 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 as employment weights. 
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employment creation in a given age-size class of firms, and the exit rate represents 
the job destruction rate. 
At each age, firms are grouped into six size classes, based on the number of 
employees and defined on a logarithmic scale: ]0,2[, [2,4[, [4,8[, [8,16[, [16,32[, 
and [32,[.19 All observations with more than 32 employees are in the same size 
class because few de novo entrants reach this size within the first five years of 
existence. Exits are assigned to the size class of employment in their last year.  
To document patterns of firm dynamics, we regress the dependent variables 
on age and size classes using a saturated dummy regression model. It includes 
separate indicators for all possible values taken by the two discrete explanatory 
variables and their interactions. This approach follows Haltiwanger et al. (2013) 
and has two advantages over other estimation methods used to examine the 
relationship between growth and size. First, as emphasized by Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), a saturated regression model fits the conditional expectation function 
perfectly, regardless of the distribution of the dependent variable. Moreover, no 
particular shape of the size-growth relationship has to be imposed. Second, the 
estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity, a recurrent problem in empirical 
studies of the size-growth relationship.20  
For each of the two dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  {𝑔𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡}, firm-level 
employment growth and the exit dummy, the following regression model is 
estimated:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ ∑(𝛼𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑑  𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑑]) 1[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗] 1[𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘]
6
𝑘=1
6
𝑗=2
+ ∑  𝛾𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑑
𝑑
+ 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where the dummy variable 1[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗] takes a value of one if the age of firm i in 
year t equals j and similarly for the size category dummies. The six industry 
dummies 𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑑  enter both additively and interacted with the full set of age-size 
interactions. As we impose that ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑑
𝑑 = 0, the average effect of age and size on 
growth and exit is captured by the uninteracted 𝛼𝑗𝑘  coefficients, while the 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑑  
                                                 
19 Due to the use of average employment and imputed employment levels, size is a 
continuous variable. 
20 For a further discussion of the econometric problems see Hall (1987), Evans (1987b), 
and Dunne et al. (1989).  Since we examine how growth rates of survivors depend on the 
current size of the firm, where both growth and size are updated at each age, we also avoid 
the sample censoring bias many previous studies had to address (Mansfield 1962).  
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coefficients allow for industry heterogeneity. The additive year dummies control 
for business cycle effects. 
Size classification of surviving firms 
We approximate a continuous size-growth relationship using three alternative 
approaches to allocate surviving firms in a size category. The objective is to 
mitigate two statistical side-effects of a conventional base-year classification, 
which classifies firms by size in t-1. First, as discussed extensively in the literature, 
regression-to-the-mean may spuriously induce a negative relationship between 
size and growth if firm size is measured at the start of the period over which 
growth rates are calculated. Even if employment growth is independent of size, 
random variation due to measurement error or transitory fluctuations will 
systematically bias growth estimates upwards for firms that are small in t-1 (Hall 
1987; Friedman 1992; Davis et al. 1996b). Second, employment in the subset of 
surviving firms is bounded from below by one. Therefore, the lower tail of possible 
rates of decline is truncated, while the upper tail of growth rates is unaffected. It 
especially affects smaller firms which will already exit when hit with a moderate 
negative shock and leads to sample selection bias. It again induces an inverse 
relation between size and growth if size is determined at the start of the period 
(Mata 1994; Baldwin and Picot 1995). 
Hall (1987) and others have found that these problems have little effect on the 
size-growth relationship for larger, more established firms. However, they are 
exacerbated in a population of predominantly small firms, as in our sample of 
de novo entrants. Single employee firms that survive cannot even have a negative 
growth rate. Dunne et al. (1989) and Mata (1994) largely circumvent these 
statistical problems by excluding the smallest firms from their sample. This is not 
an option for us, given our focus on de novo entrants which are predominantly 
observed in size classes below 5 employees.21 Instead, we use three alternatives 
to allocate firms in a given size class. The intention is to approximate firm growth 
in continuous time and we refer to the ‘current’ size of the firm. A more detailed 
discussion of these methodologies is in Appendix 3.C; here we provide a brief 
overview.  
The first size classification method, and the one we use for our benchmark 
estimates, allocates employment gains and losses to each of the size classes that 
                                                 
21 Among de novo entrants, 94 percent of firms have fewer than 5 employees at age 2 and 
82 percent at age 6. 
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the firm passes through as it grows or contracts (Butani et al. 2006). In this 
‘dynamic’ size classification, firms are initially assigned to a size class based on 
employment in t-1, but are re-assigned to a new class when they cross a threshold. 
The growth from 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 to the threshold is assigned to the initial class and the 
remaining growth from the threshold to 𝐸𝑖𝑡  is assigned to the next size class. This 
methodology approximates instantaneous class re-assignment that would be 
feasible if size and growth were measured in continuous time. As it attributes 
symmetric employment changes to the same size classes, it avoids the negative as 
well as the positive bias in the size-growth relationship that afflict other 
methodologies.  
The second classification method uses each firm twice in the regression, 
assigning a weight of one half to each observation. One observation uses the firm’s 
employment level at the beginning of the period—both as a base for the growth 
rate and to determine the size class. The second observation uses the firm’s 
employment at the end of the period again for both calculations. This approach 
was proposed by Prais (1958) to avoid regression-to-the-mean bias and can be 
motivated similarly as the use of average wage shares in a Solow residual, i.e. as a 
discrete approximation to the continuous Divisia index of productivity growth 
(Caves, Christensen and Diewert 1982).  
A last classification method follows Davis et al. (1996a, 1996b) and uses the 
average of firm size in years t-1 and t as a proxy for the size over the intervening 
period. It is adopted for comparison with the results reported by Haltiwanger et 
al. (2013). Baldwin and Picot (1995), however, indicate that this size classification 
introduces an upward bias between size and growth if there is positive trend 
growth rate in the population. 22 
  
                                                 
22 The weights in the growth regressions follow naturally from the three size classification 
approaches.  They always equal the employment used in the denominator of the growth 
rate calculation: (i) the truncated average employment within the size class, (ii) 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 or 𝐸𝑖𝑡, 
and (iii) ?̅?𝑖𝑡. 
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3.5 Results 
In constructing the dataset, we have taken great care to only identify firms as 
de novo entrants when they start new operations, corresponding to firm creation 
in Jovanovic (1982). With continuing firms misclassified as entrants or exits 
filtered out, we find two novel patterns. In particular, we show that de novo entry 
is confined to a much narrower range of small size classes than usually found and 
that growth rates for surviving entrants are increasing with firm size. We discuss 
the two novel results in detail below, but first summarize a few patterns for 
de novo employer entrants in the Belgian private sector that are consistent with 
the empirical evidence from other countries, as discussed in Section 3.2. They 
suggest that the novel findings are not an artifact of the Belgian dataset. A brief 
summary of the confirmed patterns is provided below, while Appendix 3.D 
contains a more detailed discussion. 
3.5.1 Confirmed patterns 
In line with results for many other countries, summary statistics in Table 3.A.2 
show that the annual rate of firm entry in Belgium is high (9%), but involves only 
a small fraction of employment (1.5%). Most entrants are extremely small; 
average entry size is 1.9 employees, six times smaller than the average size of 
incumbents. In the years following entry, a large fraction of the entering cohort 
exits and the average size among survivors increases. Only half of all entrants 
survive to age 6, at which time the average firm size in the surviving group has 
almost doubled.  
A first mechanism generating this pattern of increased concentration within an 
entry cohort is selective survival. In line with previous evidence we find high exit 
rates for young firms which are decreasing in age as well as in size, see panel a. of 
Figure 3.A.1. Our results suggest that the selection process of the passive learning 
model—which predicts market exit of the least efficient and therefore the smallest 
firms—unfolds quickly in the first years after entry. By age 6, exit rates have 
approximately halved. A second prediction of the passive learning model is also 
borne out in the Belgian data. Surviving young firms exhibit high growth rates in 
the early years after entry, but growth slows down rapidly with age. The average 
growth rate declines convexly as it converges to a constant steady state – panel b. 
of Figure 3.A.1. 
As young firms have much higher growth rates and are overrepresented in 
smaller size classes, the changing composition of the sample leads to a negative 
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relationship between growth and size in a cross-section of firms if we pool all ages. 
Such a relationship has often been documented in the literature and it is also what 
we find for Belgium, as shown by the ‘all firms’ line in Figure 3.1. Growth rates 
among all firms that survive from year t-1 to t decline monotonically with the 
current size of the firm. It is instructive, however, to separately consider the size-
growth relationship for young firms of at most six years old, and that of older 
firms. The dashed line at the bottom of Figure 3.1 shows low growth rates for 
incumbents regardless of firm size. For them, absolute employment growth is 
proportional to the current size of the firm, confirming an empirical regularity 
found in many previous studies.23 In contrast, growth rates for young firms are 
not only higher, they clearly increase with size.  
Figure 3.1  Growth rates of surviving firms by size: young firms versus incumbents 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. We use the dynamic size classification 
as benchmark method to construct the X-axis. For young firms the 32-63 size class is really 
32+, but very few de novo entrants have more than 63 employees (shown below). 
                                                 
23 The second proposition of Gibrat’s Law is not confirmed in our dataset. Table 3.A.4 in the 
Appendix shows that standard deviations of growth rates for mature firms are decreasing 
in firm size. 
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The patterns described so far are in line with results from other studies based 
on large-scale firm-level datasets, even when no or little attempt has been made 
to distinguish between what we have labelled de novo and spurious entrants. It 
suggests that most patterns are fairly robust to less accurate identification of truly 
new and young firms. When calculated using the raw administrative data, we 
indeed find almost the same results for incumbents and all firms as in Figure 3.1.24 
The positive relationship between growth and size that we observe among young 
de novo firms, however, is not replicated in the raw sample of administrative 
entrants. Instead, the light gray line in Figure 3.1 for the unadjusted 
administrative data suggests that among young firms, small firms have higher 
growth rates than larger ones. In Section 3.5.3 below, we show that the difference 
between de novo and administrative entrants is even more pronounced when 
growth rates are estimated conditional on age, and how spurious entry biases the 
estimated relationship. 
As discussed before, the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982) has no 
prediction on the size-growth relationship for young firms. Only with some 
functional form restrictions does it predict growth to be independent of firm size 
for all age cohorts. Whatever form the relationship takes, as long as small size 
classes have relatively more young firms and surviving young firms have higher 
growth rates—two confirmed predictions of the model—the size-growth 
relationship is guaranteed to be a negative in the full population of firms. At least 
if the composition effect is strong enough to overturn the positive relationship for 
young firms. This is certainly the case in our sample of de novo entrants, a finding 
we turn to first in the next section. 
3.5.2 Entry distribution 
Although summary statistics based on all administrative entrants or limited to the 
set of de novo entrants look very much alike, a closer examination of both samples 
reveals some fundamental differences. This is because spurious entrants—pre-
existing firms that underwent some reorganization and are misclassified as 
entrants—introduce incumbent-like features into the population of 
administrative entrants. As a small group they have little impact on average 
statistics, but they strongly affect the entry distribution by size or the size-growth 
                                                 
24 The results calculated using the raw administrative data are reported in Geurts and 
Van Biesebroeck (2014). 
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pattern, especially if we use weights to reflect the aggregate employment 
evolution. 
Figure 3.2  Employment distribution of entrants 
 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
The importance of identifying entrants correctly is readily seen from the 
employment distribution at entry by firm size. Figure 3.2 shows average annual 
employment divided into seven size classes on a logarithmic scale. The upper 
panel shows the employment distribution of de novo entrants (dark) against that 
of all administrative entrants (light). It is well-known that new firms 
predominantly enter in the smaller size classes, but the distribution based on the 
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administrative sample greatly understates this pattern. Employment of de novo 
entrants is almost entirely concentrated in the first three size categories, which 
account for fully 82 percent of total job creation of new start-ups. Firms entering 
with at least 32 employees are exceedingly rare and account for less than 
5 percent of total job creation. 
The distribution of spurious entrants—the difference between the two series 
in the left graph—mirrors this pattern. It is mainly concentrated in the larger size 
classes. The lower panel shows the employment distribution of spurious entrants 
(dark) relative to that of incumbents (light). The cumulative employment share of 
the first three size classes is only 13 percent for spurious entrants, while firms 
with at least 32 workers employ 58 percent of the group’s total. The employment 
distribution of spurious entrants is remarkably similar to that of incumbents. It 
confirms that spurious entrants are a subset of older firms and suggests that their 
incidence is unrelated to firm size.  
As we have shown, the sample of administrative entrants that uses untreated 
firm-data mixes two distinct populations of firms. Failing to distinguish between 
them, as is generally not done, has two implications. First, the size distribution of 
entrants has a much more dispersed shape than the strong right-skew we observe 
for de novo start-ups. Second, given that employment by spurious entrants 
accounts for 44 percent of the total in the sample of administrative entrants, it 
gives an inflated impression of the importance of new firms for job creation in 
official statistics. In an average year, new job creation by all de novo entrants only 
represents 1.5 percent of the Belgian private-sector workforce. Using 
administrative entrants instead would suggest this fraction is 2.7 percent, 
1.8 times higher.  
Besides eliminating false entrants with incumbent-like characteristics, our 
focus on de novo entrants has another important implication. It shrinks the firm 
sizes that we observe for entrants to a very narrow range. Note that the bottom 
five size classes, which capture almost all employment of new entrants, are all 
firms with fewer than 32 employees. This empirical observation is very much in 
line with the passive learning model, where entrants—having no prior knowledge 
about their own efficiency—are assumed to all enter at the same size. This is 
approximately what we observe, and contrasts with the much wider range 
observed in most previous studies. 
The limited size differences we do observe among de novo entrants are 
plausibly the result of selection and growth effects occurring between a firm’s 
startup and the first time we observe it, as new firms only enter the dataset on 
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June 30. Alternatively, they can reflect some prior knowledge that entrants have 
about their own intrinsic quality even before they enter the market. The narrow 
range of observed sizes then implies that a lot is still unknown to these firms when 
they enter.  
It can be expected that spurious entrants also exhibit incumbent-like dynamics 
following entry and that their overrepresentation in large size classes creates a 
bias in the size-growth and size-exit pattern for entrants. The bias is hardly 
noticeable in exit probabilities by size, since exit rates are decreasing in size both 
for young and older firms. The bias is, however, large in growth estimates by size, 
where young and older firms strongly differ. This is the topic we turn to next. 
3.5.3 Post-entry growth 
Most previous studies that empirically examined the relationship between growth 
and size of young firms have taken for granted firm entry, exit and growth as 
observed in the data, or applied only a rough correction for spurious entry and 
exit.25 It is thus unlikely that reported empirical patterns refer to a well-defined 
set of truly young firms. Including spurious entrants does not markedly affect 
many entry and post-entry patterns, as illustrated above. It does, however, bias 
the size-growth relationship of young firms. Only Haltiwanger et al. (2013) use a 
dataset which has been edited by advanced record linking methods to distinguish 
between real and spurious entry and exit.26 It is therefore not surprising that our 
results are more in line with that study. 
                                                 
25 The problem that large-scale firm-level data suffer from spurious entry and exit due to 
administrative or legal changes, has been recognized since the nineties. However, only with 
the recent development of advanced record linkage methods, has the extent of the problem 
and its profound impact on empirical results become clear. Most previous studies did not 
or could not address this problem.  Evans (1987a, 1987b) uses U.S. data from the Dunn and 
Bradstreet files which are known to suffer from data problems with respect to young and 
small firms (Davis et al. 1996).  Almus and Nerlinger (2000), Lotti et al. (2003) and Mata 
(2004) do not report the use of linkage methods to clean the sample from spurious entry 
and exit.  Wagner (1994) recognizes that large entry is unlikely and therefore excludes the 
largest firms from the entry sample, ignoring that spurious entrants also occur in other size 
classes.  Dunne et al. (1989), using the U.S. Census of Manufacturers, partially correct for 
ownership changes but not for other administrative changes or changes in firm structure. 
26 Unfortunately, most studies do not report the employment distribution at entry, which 
would be informative about the size range and employment share of larger entrants.  
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) use traditional record linking methods to eliminate spurious 
entrants, but additionally rely on physical addresses to more accurately identify entry and 
exit of multi-establishment firms.  It is unclear to what extent their approach identifies all 
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A positive relationship between growth and firm size 
We show the size-growth relationship of de novo firms in their first years after 
entry in Figure 3.3. We then illustrate the robustness of the pattern in Figure 3.4 
and describe how delayed adjustment can explain it. In Appendix 3.E, we discuss 
likely reasons why previous studies did not find the same pattern. 
Figure 3.3 plots the coefficients from the employment growth regression of 
de novo entrants that survive from period t-1 to t. Due to the weighting, they 
represent the net employment growth rates of the entire group of survivors within 
each age-size class. The benchmark results use the dynamic size classification to 
assign firms to a size class, while results using two alternative classification 
methods follow below. As discussed, each method represents an alternative way 
to classify firms by current size to approximate a continuous size-growth 
relationship. For clarity, we do not show confidence bounds but report all 
coefficient estimates and standard errors in Table 3.A.3 in the Appendix. 
Coefficients are estimated extremely precisely and almost all successive point 
estimates are significantly different. 
As can be seen from the ordering of the different curves, growth rates decrease 
with firm age when firm size is held constant, in line with the prediction of the 
passive learning model. In the first year after entry (age 2), surviving young firms 
of all sizes exhibit very high growth rates. Thereafter, growth rates decline 
monotonically with age within every size category. Growth rates fall most strongly 
between age 2 and age 3, and decline at a decreasing rate when an entry cohort 
matures. Incumbents (labeled age 6+) exhibit growth rates close to zero in all size 
classes. The convergence of young firm’s growth rates to the pattern for 
incumbents has not been completed entirely when entrants reach age 6, i.e. when 
we have observed them for five years. 
The more remarkable pattern in Figure 3.3 is that growth rates are strongly 
increasing in current size for firms of the same age cohort. Larger firms grow on 
average more rapidly than smaller firms of the same age. The positive relationship 
between growth and size is most pronounced in the first year after entry and 
gradually weakens with age. Already at age 6, five years after entering the dataset, 
                                                 
spurious entrants, especially in medium and large size classes where we relied heavily on 
the employee-flow method.  In their sample, larger firms still represent an important share 
of employment at entry.  Firms entering with more than, respectively, 20 or 250 employees 
represent 50% or 18% of employment at entry.  The corresponding shares in our sample 
are only 7% or less than 1%.  At a minimum, it is likely that their entrant population is not 
limited to de novo entrants as we defined them. 
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the relationship has shifted towards growth rates that are almost proportional to 
the current size of the firm. The point estimates for incumbents suggest that 
growth rates will continue to decline and eventually converge to growth rates 
close to zero in all size classes. This contrasts with the exit probabilities, which are 
inversely related to size even for older cohorts.27 For the smallest firms, growth 
has basically stalled after five years while for larger firms growth will remain 
positive for a few years longer. As a result, the firm distribution will continue to 
shift to the right as illustrated in Figure 3.A.3 in the Appendix. 
Figure 3.3  Growth rates of surviving de novo entrants by age and size  
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
                                                 
27 In the passive learning model, the persistent negative relationship between exit rates and 
size among mature firms is explained by the dependence of the firm’s value function on 
realized costs which are subject to random transitory shocks. Firms terminate their 
activities when they perceive adverse changes in the distribution of their future profits. As 
the firm ages, the difference between expected future profit and current profit diminishes 
because of the increased precision of the firm’s information about its own efficiency. 
However, the firm’s decision to stay in the market is based on its realized costs which also 
depend on firm-specific stochastic shocks that vary from time to time. The firm’s value of 
continuing in operation in the next period is determined by the joint distribution of realized 
costs in all past periods, hence the dependence on past realizations does not erode away as 
time progresses. Firms that received negative cost shocks in the past will be smaller at all 
ages than equally efficient firms that received positive shocks. This induces exit of the 
smallest marginal firms. 
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Figure 3.A.4 and Table 3.A.4 in the Appendix provide information of the 
growth rate distributions of surviving firms in each age-size category. Figure 3.A.4 
shows the distributions at age 2 and Table 3.A.4 presents summary statistics at all 
ages. Growth rates in all subsets tend to be similar. They show a rather symmetric 
shape which deviates moderately from a normal distribution in two ways. First, 
growth rates are relatively concentrated in the middle of the distribution. At age 
2, about 75 percent of the firms exhibit growth rates that deviate less than one 
standard deviation from the mean. As a cohort matures, growth rates further tend 
towards the mean, with about 80 percent of the firms older than age 6 exhibiting 
growth rates smaller than one standard deviation. This pattern is consistent in all 
size classes, although the variation in growth rates tends to decrease more 
strongly among larger firms. As a result, standard deviations are decreasing in 
firm size at age 6, as they are for more mature firms. The second way in which 
variation in growth rates among young firms differs from a normal distribution 
regards its skewness. Growth distributions at early ages are moderately right-
skewed and move towards a symmetric shape when age increases. This pattern is 
highly comparable across size classes. In the first year after entry, about 9 percent 
of the firms are in the left tail of the growth distribution (smaller than one 
standard deviation below the mean), and about 16 percent in the right tail. Firms 
older than 6 years are equally distributed in the left and right tails, and the mean 
and median growth rates have almost converged.  
A robust relationship 
We conduct two robustness checks that confirm the positive relationship between 
growth and size of de novo entrants. The first presents results based on alternative 
size classifications. The second verifies whether the positive relationship between 
growth and size holds in all sectors. 
As most de novo entrants start with very few employees, we measure firm 
growth in the following years over a much narrower range of small size classes 
than is usually the case in other studies. This heightens the statistical problems 
associated with the conventional base-year size classification that we discussed 
earlier. To complement the results based on the dynamic size classification, we 
show in Figure 3.4 estimates based on two alternative size classifications. Panel a. 
presents results that average over growth rates using the beginning-of-period and 
end-of-period sizes as base. In panel b. firms are classified by the average of their 
size in years t-1 and t, as in Haltiwanger et al. (2013).  
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Figure 3.4  Alternative size classifications: growth rates of surviving de novo entrants 
 a. Average of estimates using firm base size at t-1 and t 
 
 b. Average size classification 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
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The patterns using both alternative methods are similar to the benchmark 
results. Growth rates are increasing in firm size within each age class. The strong 
positive slope in the first few years following entry gradually converges to a 
virtually flat profile for incumbents. The positive relationship is somewhat more 
pronounced than in our benchmark results, especially in panel b., where job gains 
of fast-growing firms are entirely allocated to the intermediate size class between 
t-1 and t. In the dynamic size classification, this growth is allocated to each 
respective size class the firm passes through.  
It is quite remarkable that across the three graphs, there is only a single 
instance where any of the curves intersect. The patterns we uncover are very 
smooth and monotonic: growth rates increase with size for each age cohort and 
decrease with age for each size class. This is even more remarkable given that they 
have been estimated over the very turbulent 2003-2012 period that includes the 
Great Recession. The patterns also hold if we limit the sample to firms entering 
between 2003 and 2007 and follow their growth to at most 2008, the onset of the 
crisis, or if we limit the sample to firms entering from 2008 onwards.28  
The positive relationship between growth and size of young firms of the same 
age confirms the results in Haltiwanger et al. (2013) that are obtained using the 
average size classification. As noted before, that study uses a dataset and size 
measurement that reduce potential biases when working with small and young 
firms. An important difference, however, is that the growth rates they report do 
not evolve to size-invariant growth among older firms, while many studies have 
found that proportionate growth rates a good approximation of the size-growth 
relationship among large and well-established firms (Mansfield 1962; Hall 1987; 
Geroski 1995). In addition, a positive size-growth pattern cannot be a steady state 
as the firm size distribution would collapse. 
Figure 3.5 presents the relationship between growth and size of de novo 
entrants for six broad industry groups: Manufacturing, Construction, Trade, 
Accommodation & Food Services, Business Services, and Mixed Household & 
Business Services. Growth rates of surviving de novo entrants in all industries 
show broadly the same pattern as in Figure 3.3. They are high in the first year, but 
decrease quickly with age within each size class. Only in Accommodation & Food 
Services, where average firm size is small, there is little room for size 
                                                 
28 Separate results for pre and post-crisis entrants are shown in Geurts and Van 
Biesebroeck (2014). 
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diversification after entry resulting in little difference between growth rates from 
age 3 onwards.  
Figure 3.5  Growth rates of surviving de novo entrants in six industry groups 
 Manufacturing and energy Construction 
   
 Wholesale and retail trade Accommodation and food services 
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(Figure 3.5 continued) 
 Business support services Mixed business and household services 
   
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. 
In all other industries, we see the same positive relation between growth and 
size conditional on age, while for older cohorts the pattern moves to a more 
proportional distribution. The increasing relationship is more pronounced in 
service sectors, where entry costs are often lower. Firms can easily enter with a 
very small size and gradually adjust to an optimal scale. The increasing pattern is 
least pronounced in Manufacturing. Consistent with a higher minimum efficient 
scale in manufacturing, we find higher average size at entry and a negative 
growth-size relation for size classes above 16 employees in most age cohorts. The 
results for this sector thus do not differ entirely from the three previous studies 
that found a negative growth size relationship and are each based on samples of 
young firms in Manufacturing only (Evans 1987a; Lotti, Santarelli and Vivarelli 
2003; Mata 1994). 
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What explains the positive relationship? 
We have argued that the positive relation between growth and size among young 
firms of the same age cohort is not at odds with the predictions of Jovanovic 
(1982) if one takes into account that young firms exhibit some lag of adjustment 
to prior information.29  Firms that receive positive information, i.e. learn that they 
are more efficient than previously realized, will not always adjust completely to 
this new information right away. Risk aversion might induce them to wait an extra 
period for the positive information to be confirmed or it might take some time for 
additional capacity to become operational. Financial constraints, hiring frictions, 
or regulations can impose external barriers that need to be overcome before a firm 
can expand its operations. Such partially delayed growth will induce a positive 
size-growth relationship. Some of the positive news leads to instantaneous growth 
and raises a firm’s current size. The remaining fraction of growth postponed to 
subsequent years then leads to a positive correlation between growth and size. 
A corresponding delay for firms that adjust to negative information will further 
strengthen the positive correlation. If annually recurring fixed costs of operation 
are sufficiently low relative to sunk entry costs, firms might delay their eventually 
withdrawal from the market even as they make losses. In the data we even observe 
many firms with no employees for some years. It suggests that merely surviving 
might not be all that costly. As firms adjust their size downward but postpone exit, 
it leads to low or negative growth rates for smaller firms. 
Figure 3.A.5 in the Appendix provides some evidence for such behavior. In 
panel a., firms that are about to exit in the next period exhibit much lower growth 
rates than firms that will survive. The difference is approximately constant in each 
of the 5 years following entry. Average growth rates are negative for impending 
exiters at all ages except age 2, indicating that firms stay small or decline in the 
year before they exit. The difference in growth rates already appears two years 
before exit, shown in grey, but is less pronounced. Given that there are many more 
firms exiting in the smaller size classes, this pre-exit growth difference contributes 
to the positive size-growth relationship.30  
                                                 
29 While the model in general has no prediction for the size-growth relationship conditional 
on age, under some assumptions—in particular constant returns to scale—growth rates 
should be size invariant. 
30 Panel b. in the same figure shows that delayed exit does not explain the observed positive 
size-growth relationship entirely.  Excluding all de novo entrants that exit before age 6, 
growth rates still show a positive relationship in the first years that gradually convergences 
to a size-invariant pattern. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In constructing the dataset, we have taken great care to identify a sample of firms 
that start new operations, corresponding to actual new firm creation. 
Complementing the traditional firm linkage method with an employee-flow 
method, we filtered out misclassified, spurious entrants. Given their incumbent-
like entry distribution and growth patterns, they bias the patterns of interest. By 
establishing a more complete set of firm linkages, we also avoid confusing firm 
restructuring events with economic exits. For the remaining group of de novo 
entrants, we confirm several patterns from the literature. In particular, exit rates 
are shown to be strongly declining in age and size, while growth rates for 
survivors decline with age and also with size if we pool across age cohorts. 
In addition, we obtain two novel findings. First, we find that firm entry sizes 
are reduced to a narrow range of small size classes. Second, growth rates of 
de novo entrants are increasing with size in the first years, but quickly converge to 
proportionate growth as an entry cohort matures. The firm size distribution at 
entry differs more markedly from that of mature firms than is usually the case, but 
the positive size-growth pattern accelerates the tendency towards increased 
concentration in an entry cohort and leads to a pronounced right shift in the firm 
size distribution. 
The exit and growth patterns by age and size class are remarkably regular. We 
have estimated them over an extremely turbulent time period that includes the 
Great Recession, but all age and size patterns are entirely monotonic. The 
persistent features of firm dynamics of very young firms seem to dominate cyclical 
factors. 
Our results are consistent with firms having a very imperfect knowledge of 
their productivity at entry. All patterns are in line with the passive learning model 
of Jovanovic (1982) where a firm’s underlying efficiency is constant, but is only 
discovered as a firm operates in the market. If we add delayed adjustment, both in 
exit and in growth, even the positive size-growth relationship for young firms is 
consistent with the model. 
Note that frictions could even influence firms’ choice of initial entry size. Evans 
and Jovanovic (1989) provide an alternative model where liquidity constraints 
force some firms to enter below their desired size and grow into their optimal size 
afterwards using retained earnings to expand. This would lead to a negative size-
growth relationship as constrained, smaller entrants would have a greater upside 
potential. Both the narrow firm size distribution and the positive size-growth 
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relationship we have documented are more supportive of constraints affecting 
firms following their entry decision rather than before. 
Our findings suggest some cautious policy conclusions. A recent literature has 
documented that especially in less developed economies, production factors are 
often stuck at unproductive firms (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). This type of 
misallocation lowers potential output and aggregate productivity. Our evidence 
suggests that new firms do not know their own likelihood of success very well and 
it is inevitable that some unproductive entrants end up with too much resources. 
Policy can accommodate this by making sure that adjustments to firm size after 
entry are easy to make. At the same time, lowering entry barriers in a situation 
where adjustment frictions after entry are large is likely to generate bad aggregate 
outcomes.  
It is, however, not straightforward to draw strong policy inferences from the 
empirical regularities presented for de novo entrants. As demonstrated by Brown 
et al. (2015), subsets of firms which exhibit the highest growth rates are not 
necessarily the ones that experience the strongest constraints on growth and 
would respond the most to policy intervention. In particular, they show that in a 
cross-section of firms of all ages, the job creation effect from loan programs 
increases with firm size, while employment growth rates in the same population 
are negatively related to firm size. They do find evidence, however, that fast-
growing firms are the ones that experience the greatest constraints to growth. 
We have suggested that delayed adjustment is one mechanism that can explain 
the observed positive size-growth relationship. In increasingly global markets and 
with rapid technological advancement, such growth delays can be quite costly. 
New entrants often have only a narrow window of opportunity to occupy a market 
niche. If scaling-up in response to positive information happens too slowly, a firm 
risks coming too late and be shut out of the market by early movers. 
Guner et al. (2008) provide evidence that many government policies favor 
small firms. This is often rationalized on the assumption that small firms are the 
engine of job creation in the economy. Previous literature has already highlighted 
that one should not confuse the (conditional) effects of age and size—it tends to 
be young firms which are vital for job creation. Our current findings cast further 
doubt on the employment growth potential of small entrants. Among young firms 
of the same age, those showing up in the dataset with a smaller size also tend to 
grow more slowly subsequently.  
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In continuous time, one can think of firm entry as the moment the first 
employee is hired. Some entrants add additional employees in the next minutes or 
days, while others take years. With adjustment frictions, it is likely that a size-
pattern established early on will be perpetuated over time. A small size, 
conditional on age, is indicative of negative news about a firm’s profitability early 
on. While not all firms can freely choose their size—a large literature documents 
constraints and frictions that limit a firm’s initial size—our overall patterns 
suggest that by and large small firms choose to be small. Directing subsidies 
primarily towards the smallest firms or imposing size restrictions to qualify for 
government support are policies that should be avoided.  
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Appendix 
3.A Tables and Figures 
Table 3.A. 1  Employee-flow linkages by decision rule 
a. Type of employee-flow linkages by decision rules 
 See Table 2.A.5 in the Appendix of Chapter 2 
b. Share of employee-flow linkages by type 
  
 
  All links 
Spurious 
entrants 
Transfers 
1.  ID-change (largely identical) 0.57 0.78 0.71 
2.  Takeover (absorption) 75% 0.22 - 0.15 
3.  Split-off 75% 0.12 0.18 0.05 
4.  Takeover (absorption) 50%  0.01 - 0.02 
5.  Split-off 50% 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6.  Merger of exits 0.01 - 0.01 
7.  Break-up into entrants 0.01 0.01 0.01 
8.  Merger other 0.01 0.01 0.02 
9.  Break-up other 0.00 0.00 0.01 
10.  Cluster >= 30 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Note: Total sums to one in each column. Annual averages over the sample period.  
 
Table 3.A. 2  Summary statistics for de novo entrants 
  Entry 
rate 
Employment 
share 
Exit rate Share of 
survivors 
Employment 
share of 
survivors 
Average 
size 
(employees) 
Age 1 (entry) 0.09 0.015  1.00 1.00 1.93 
Age 2   0.21 0.79 0.98 2.39 
Age 3   0.15 0.68 0.98 2.78 
Age 4   0.13 0.60 0.98 3.10 
Age 5   0.11 0.54 0.98 3.38 
Age 6   0.10 0.49 0.98 3.61 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period. The year a firm enters the dataset is 
indicated by age 1. 
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Table 3.A. 3  Growth rates of surviving de novo entrants by age and size 
Coefficient estimates shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Standard errors in parentheses. 
a. Dynamic size classification 
 
Firm size class (employment) 
 1 2-4 4-7 8-15 16-31 32+ 
Age 2 0.133 0.150 0.163 0.191 0.196 0.234 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.005) 
Age 3 0.068 0.067 0.077 0.101 0.113 0.142 
 (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
Age 4 0.037 0.038 0.049 0.070 0.069 0.081 
 (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
Age 5 0.026 0.025 0.029 0.038 0.038 0.059 
 (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
Age 6 0.019 0.014 0.025 0.028 0.033 0.032 
 (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) 
Incumbents 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 
(age 6+) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
b. Average of estimates using firm base size at t-1 and t 
 
Firm size class (employment) 
 1 2-4 4-7 8-15 16-31 32+ 
Age 2 0.166 0.198 0.229 0.272 0.312 0.309 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.006) (.007) (.008) 
Age 3 0.048 0.083 0.105 0.145 0.167 0.161 
 (.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Age 4 0.009 0.046 0.066 0.094 0.086 0.104 
 (.005) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Age 5 0.002 0.023 0.042 0.051 0.065 0.061 
 (.005) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.004) 
Age 6 -0.011 0.015 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.042 
 (.006) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) 
Incumbents -0.029 -0.006 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.001 
(age 6+) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
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c. Average size classification 
 
Firm size class (employment) 
 1 2-4 4-7 8-15 16-31 32+ 
Age 2 0.085 0.216 0.263 0.334 0.372 0.373 
 (.004) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.007) (.008) 
Age 3 0.040 0.082 0.117 0.148 0.162 0.191 
 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
Age 4 0.016 0.038 0.070 0.102 0.113 0.091 
 (.005) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
Age 5 0.007 0.024 0.037 0.063 0.046 0.069 
 (.006) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.005) 
Age 6 0.003 0.005 0.034 0.041 0.056 0.035 
 (.007) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.006) 
Incumbents -0.011 -0.005 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.000 
(age 6+) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) 
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Table 3.A. 4  Summary statistics of growth distributions of surviving de novo entrants  
  Firm size class (employment) 
 1 2-3 4-7 8-15 16-31 32+ 
Mean       
 Age 2 .063 .205 .246 .286 .337 .379 
 Age 3 .029 .077 .109 .135 .166 .178 
 Age 4 .015 .037 .067 .102 .107 .071 
 Age 5 .006 .023 .035 .064 .056 .076 
 Age 6 .005 .006 .032 .040 .053 .045 
 Incumbents -.008 -.003 .003 .007 .008 .004 
Standard deviation 
 Age 2 .310 .540 .524 .570 .625 .592 
 Age 3 .323 .458 .414 .416 .425 .375 
 Age 4 .327 .426 .388 .365 .354 .316 
 Age 5 .321 .401 .353 .317 .307 .280 
 Age 6 .319 .392 .344 .309 .265 .210 
 Incumbents .304 .347 .287 .234 .195 .147 
Median       
 Age 2 .000 .000 .182 .222 .240 .243 
 Age 3 .000 .000 .000 .105 .125 .110 
 Age 4 .000 .000 .000 .087 .080 .048 
 Age 5 .000 .000 .000 .000 .057 .048 
 Age 6 .000 .000 .000 .000 .036 .023 
 Incumbents .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Share of firms in left tail (smaller than mean - 1 standard deviation) 
 Age 2 .065 .122 .100 .110 .092 .067 
 Age 3 .097 .146 .116 .106 .099 .072 
 Age 4 .110 .155 .122 .095 .103 .086 
 Age 5 .111 .150 .122 .104 .098 .055 
 Age 6 .111 .149 .110 .098 .100 .107 
 Incumbents .108 .131 .104 .093 .078 .070 
Share of firms in center (within 1 standard deviation of the mean) 
 Age 2 .775 .695 .753 .741 .751 .789 
 Age 3 .763 .730 .763 .768 .779 .778 
 Age 4 .759 .755 .725 .782 .781 .786 
 Age 5 .768 .773 .722 .769 .781 .848 
 Age 6 .771 .686 .746 .789 .789 .783 
 Incumbents .793 .741 .800 .804 .834 .852 
Share of firms in right tail (larger than mean + 1 standard deviation) 
 Age 2 .160 .183 .146 .148 .157 .144 
 Age 3 .141 .124 .122 .126 .121 .151 
 Age 4 .131 .090 .152 .124 .116 .128 
 Age 5 .121 .077 .157 .127 .121 .097 
 Age 6 .118 .165 .144 .114 .111 .111 
 Incumbents .099 .128 .096 .103 .088 .079 
Note: Results based on pooled sample across years (2003-2012) and all industries using 
the average size classification. Incumbents are firms older than age 6.  
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Table 3.A. 5  Six main industries and NACE Rev. 2 classes 
  De novo entrants 
 
Nace Rev. 2 classes 
Number 
of firms 
Number of 
employees 
Average 
entry size 
(employees) 
1. Manufacturing and energy   777 1 996 2.6 
 Section B, C, D, E    
2. Construction 2 730 5 150 1.9 
 Section F    
3. Wholesale and retail trade 4 236 7 497 1.8 
 Section G    
4. Accommodation and food services 2 793 6 570 2.4 
 Section I    
5. Business support services 2 945 5 143 1.7 
 
Nace 49.2, 49.4, 49.5, 50.2, 50.4, 51.2, 52.1, 
52.241, 52.249, 62, 63, 64.110, 64.2, 64.3, 
64.910, 64.991, 64.992, 64.999, 66, 69.2, 70, 71, 
73, 74, 77.1, 77.3, 77.4, 80, 81 (excluding 81.210, 
81.220), 82, 95.1 
   
6. Mixed business & household services 2 011 3 459 1.7 
 
Nace 49.1, 49.3, 50.1, 50.3, 51.1, 52.210, 52.220, 
52.230, 52.290, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64.19, 64.921, 
64.92, 65, 69.1,72, 75, 77.2, 79, 95.2, 96, and 
Section L 
   
Total 15 492 29 815 1.9 
Note: Annual averages (2003-2012) of de novo entrants and employment in entry year.  
Firms not in the listed categories are excluded from the analysis, primarily quasi-public 
sector services and subsidized household help. The detailed explanation of the Nace codes 
is provided in Table 2.A.1 of Chapter 2.      
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Figure 3.A 1  Confirmed predictions of the passive learning model 
 a. Exit rates of de novo entrants by age and size 
 
 b. Growth rates of surviving de novo entrants by age 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period.  Age 6+ refers to incumbents. 
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Figure 3.A 2  Growth rates of administrative and spurious entrants by age and size 
 a.  Growth rates of administrative entrants 
  (including de novo and spurious entrants) 
 
 b. Growth rates of spurious entrants 
 
Note: Annual averages over the 2003-2012 period.  Age 6+ refers to incumbents. 
  
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
1 2-3 4-7 8-15 16-31 32+
age 2
age 3
age 4
age 5
age 6
age 6+
size class
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
1 2-3 4-7 8-15 16-31 32+
age 2
age 3
age 4
age 5
age 6
age 6+
size class
114  Chapter 3 
 
 
Figure 3.A 3  Evolution of the firm size distribution 
 
 
  
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
D
e
n
s
it
y
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
Size
de novo entrants
de novo entrants age 6
firms older than 6
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.5000
Appendix 115 
 
 
Figure 3.A 4  Distribution of growth rates of surviving de novo entrants at age 2 by firm 
size class 
 Size 1 Size 2-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Size 4-7 Size 8-15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Size 16-31 Size 32+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results based on pooled sample across years (2003-2012) and all industries using 
the average size classification. The solid lines show the normal distribution. 
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Figure 3.A 5  Delayed adjustment of de novo entrants in exit and growth 
 a. Delayed exit: growth rates of survivors versus exiters  
 
 b. Delayed growth: growth rates of firms surviving till age 5 
 
Note: In panel  b. we use the dynamic size classification. 
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Figure 3.A 6  Estimated size-growth relationships on simulated data with constant 
growth rate 
 
Note: Calculations on simulated dataset with growth rates that are size-invariant. 
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3.B Data 
The analysis is based on a firm-level dataset maintained by the National Social 
Security Office (NSSO) of Belgium. It covers the universe of firms with at least one 
employee over the period 2003-2012. For comparability with other studies, we 
restrict the analysis to firms in the private, non-farm sector and also exclude 
highly subsidized sectors which receive strong support from government 
programs.31 In an average year, the sample includes 178 000 firms and 2 070 000 
employees. Total employment increased during the sample period by 0.9 percent 
per year till 2008, dropped by 2.5 percent between 2008 and 2010 and has been 
more or less stable since.  
Large-scale firm-level data collected for administrative or statistical purposes 
have become the main information source for empirical analysis on firm 
dynamics. A drawback of these data, however, is that changes in ID code or firm 
structure lead to missing linkages in the longitudinal observation of firms. This 
mistakenly introduces entry and exit events, as well as spurious shocks to firm-
level employment growth. We refer to Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of the 
problem and the solutions that we have implemented. Here, we only summarize 
the strategy that has been adopted to identify de novo entrants and their post-
entry employment histories.  
 The first linking method we apply has been developed by Statistics Belgium 
and implements the OECD-Eurostat recommendations on business demography 
statistics (Eurostat-OECD 2007). It exploits information on firm continuity from a 
comprehensive database that combines information from different 
administrations such as the national register of legal entities, the trade register, 
VAT declarations, and Social Security reports. In addition, it relies on a 
probabilistic matching procedure that uses similarities in firm name, address, and 
industry code to link different ID codes of the same firm across two years.  
Our second linking method uses a definition of firm continuity that is based on 
its workforce. It follows one of the main production factors of the firm, the stock 
of employees, to trace changes in ID codes and firm structure. It exploits the linked 
employer-employee information in the NSSO dataset: both firms and employees 
are identified with a unique ID code. The advantage is that an individual never 
                                                 
31 Table 3.A.5 lists all NACE sectors we include in the analysis and classifies them into six 
industries.  Excluded sectors include “Human health and social work activities,” where most 
expenditures are publicly financed, and “Subsidized household help,” where service 
vouchers subsidize 70% of the wage cost. 
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changes ID and can always be followed. If a firm changes ID code but continues its 
activities, the stock of employees will largely be the same for the old and the new 
firm ID. Similarly, when firms merge or split up, this will be reflected in a merge 
or division of workforces. Continuity of the workforce can thus be used to identify 
firms that operate continuously but change ID code or firm structure. 
In practice, we follow clusters of employees that move simultaneously from 
one ID code to another between two quarterly observations. A set of decision rules 
regarding the size of the employee cluster relative to the firms’ total workforce is 
used to determine whether we should consider the two ID codes as a single, 
continuing firm. The primary rule, to identify one-to-one ID changes, verifies 
whether the cluster represents at least 50 percent of the workforce of both the 
disappearing and the newly appearing ID code. A second rule identifies takeovers, 
allowing the receiving ID code to exist already, but requiring a cluster of at least 
75 percent of the workforce of the initial ID code to move together. A set of 
additional decision rules is listed in Table 3.A.1 and these capture takeovers, split-
offs and other forms of organizational restructurings. The table shows that the 
first two rules account for 80 percent of the identified links. In Chapter 2, we 
conduct several robustness checks to verify the sensitivity of measures of firm 
dynamics to alternative size thresholds and decision rules of the employee-flow 
method. We find that they are not critical to the empirical results.  
The linkages established by the two record linking methods are first used to 
identify continuing firms that are misclassified as entrants and exits. They are 
labeled as ‘spurious’ entrants and exits as opposed to de novo entrants and true 
exits. Panel b. of Table 3.A.1 shows that 78 percent of the spurious entrants we 
identify are simply incumbents that continue the same activities with a new 
identification code after a purely administrative or legal change. Another 18 
percent are split-offs of another firm.32 Second, for those firms that are involved 
in an ID change or restructuring, administratively recorded employment changes 
from one period to the next do not reflect internal job growth but are but 
artificially inflated or deflated by the event. Therefore, as a further step in the data 
editing, employment of these firms is imputed in the years after the event. Our 
approach is to construct an aggregate event-level that includes all firm ID’s 
                                                 
32 Some administrative entrants are subsidiaries of foreign firms entering the Belgian 
market and are not de novo entrants either.  Our linkage methods are unable to identify 
these FDI entrants.  As it is an extremely small group, their presence is unlikely to affect the 
results.  On a reduced sample, covering the 2005-2010 period, we find that they represent 
fewer than 1 percent of all de novo entrants. 
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interlinked from t-1 to t. Firm-level employment in t and t+n is then imputed by 
assuming the same growth rate for each firm involved in the event. The imputation 
procedure is extended to the sixth year of existence for de novo entrants. 33 For 
one-to-one ID changes, which represent the vast majority of events, the 
imputation method simply corresponds to replacing the new by the old ID code. 
With respect to more complex events, the imputation method treats break-ups 
and mergers of firms symmetrically and preserves the firm size distribution in the 
sample. Imputed employment histories more closely reflect actual job creation or 
destruction at the firm level and allow a more accurate estimate of post-entry exit 
and growth patterns by size. 
The linkage methods similarly divide the group of de novo young firms that 
disappear from the dataset into true economic and spurious exit. The extent of 
misclassification is somewhat lower than on the entry side, 4 percent of 
administrative exits are identified as spurious, but the likelihood is again 
increasing with firm size. In the working paper, see Geurts and Van Biesebroeck 
(2014), we report those statistics and provide separate summary statistics for all 
the different groups of entrants and exiting firms. 
3.C Size classification 
Regression-to-the-mean and sample selection may spuriously introduce a 
negative relation in estimates of the relationship between growth and size of 
surviving firms if firms are classified by their size in the base year t-1. The extent 
to which these problems bias actual empirical results, and possible solutions have 
been extensively debated in the literature, without reaching a unanimous 
conclusion so far.34 As discussed before, both problems are exacerbated if growth 
rates are measured in a population of predominantly small firms, as is the case in 
our sample of de novo entrants. We therefore need to directly address these 
measurement problems. To avoid bias in the size-growth relationship, we use 
three alternative firm-size classifications that approximate a continuous size-
growth relationship.  
                                                 
33 We also impute employment for mature firms involved in an event to calculate consistent 
employment growth rates for them, which we use as a comparison for the evolution of 
de novo firms. 
34 For a discussion see for example Hall (1987), Baldwin and Picot (1995), Davis et al. 
(1996b), Davidsson et al. (1998), and Kirchhoff and Greene (1998). 
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The first size classification method, and the one we use for our benchmark 
estimates, allocates employment gains and losses to each respective size class in 
which the growth or loss occurred. This ‘dynamic’ sizing is used by the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics to avoid base-year classification biases in the Business 
Employment Dynamics statistics (Butani et al. 2006), and is further discussed in 
Davidsson, Lindmark and Olofsson (1998) and de Wit and de Kok (2014). Firms 
are initially assigned to a size class based on employment in t-1, but are re-
assigned to a new class when they cross a threshold. The growth from 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 to the 
threshold is assigned to the initial class and the remaining growth from the 
threshold to 𝐸𝑖𝑡  is assigned to the next size class. Growth rates use average 
employment in the denominator as discussed in Section 3.4 of the main text, but 
use the intermediate size class thresholds as upper or lower limits. This 
methodology approximates instantaneous class re-assignment that would be 
feasible if size and growth were measured in continuous time. We choose the size 
class thresholds such that they imply symmetric and (almost) equal ranges of 
potential growth rates within each class between -0.67 and +0.67.35 This approach 
mitigates the negative bias in the size-growth relationship caused by regression-
to-the-mean because symmetric growth and decline are equally attributed to the 
same size classes. The problem of left-truncated growth rates in the smallest size 
classes is also mitigated because the range of growth rates within each size class 
is symmetric with mean zero. The equal ranges of potential growth rates further 
imply that no size class is favored when the sample exhibits on average positive 
(or negative) growth, avoiding the upward size-growth bias of the methodology 
used by Haltiwanger et al. (2013) discussed below. 
The second classification method uses each firm twice in the regression, 
assigning a weight of one half to each observation. One observation uses the firm’s 
employment level at the beginning of the period both as a base for the growth rate 
and to determine the size class. The second observation uses the firm’s 
employment at the end of the period for both calculations. Growth rates of firms 
assigned to the same size class based on 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 or 𝐸𝑖𝑡  contribute to the regression 
in a symmetric way as before. Firms assigned to different size classes can show a 
different size-growth relationship in each instance and both contribute equally to 
the average pattern identified in the regression. This approach has been proposed 
                                                 
35 The size thresholds between the size classes ]0,2[, [2,4[, [4,8[, [8,16[, [16,32[, and [32,[ 
are 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32 for expansion and 1.85, 3.7, 7.4, 15, 31 for contraction. This yields 
growth ranges of [-0.60,+0.67], [-0.67,+0.67], [-0.67,+0.67], [-0.68,+0.67], [-0.70,+0.67], 
[-0.68,+0.67], and [-0.67, ] respectively. 
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by Prais (1958) to avoid regression-to-the-mean bias and can be motivated 
similarly as the use of average wage shares in a Solow residual, i.e. as a discrete 
approximation to the continuous Divisia index of productivity growth (Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert 1982).  
For comparison with the results of Haltiwanger et al. (2013), our last 
classification method uses the average of firm size in years t-1 and t as a proxy for 
the size over the intervening period. This size classification, proposed by Davis et 
al. (1996a, 1996b), reduces the regression fallacy and the truncation problem. If 
firm size fluctuates around a stable long-run size, using the average size 
classification would yield unbiased results. However, in a sample with on average 
positive growth rates, it introduces an upward bias between size and growth 
(Baldwin and Picot 1995). 36  Rapidly growing firms are more likely to cross a size 
class border and their measured rate of growth will be entirely reassigned to a 
higher size class. 
In Figure 3.A.6, we report regression results on a simulated dataset where we 
imposed the same average growth rate for all size categories. We started from a 
cohort of de novo entrants that replicates the actual entry size distribution 
observed in the data. We then applied a stochastic growth rate to each observation 
that averaged 10 percent regardless of size, but with a large dispersion, as in the 
observed data. We then applied an exit rule that was stochastically decreasing in 
firm size, generating an exit probability that is negatively correlated with the 
growth rate. The size-growth relationship was then estimated using each of the 
size classification methodologies just discussed and also using the base-year 
classification. The graph plots the regression coefficients on the different size class 
dummies. The results confirm the strong downward bias in the size-growth 
relationship for the base-year classification and a much more constant 
relationship for the three alternatives, especially for firms with at least 
4 employees. 
3.D Confirmed patterns 
As found in many other countries, the annual entry rate is high but involves only 
a small fraction of the labor force. Statistics in Table 3.A.2 show that de novo 
entrants represent 9 percent of all active employer firms in a given year, but only 
1.5 percent of total employment. Most entrants are small. Average entry size is 
                                                 
36 For further discussion see also Davidsson et al. (1998) and Kirchhoff and Greene (1998). 
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1.9 employees, six times smaller than the average size of incumbents. In the years 
following entry, a large fraction of the entering cohort exits and the average firm 
size among survivors increases. Only half of all entrants are still around at age 6, 
at which time the average firm size in the surviving group has almost doubled. Job 
creation by survivors is substantial and almost compensates for job loss due to the 
exit of young firms. Total employment created by an entry cohort falls only slightly 
below its initial value in the five years after entry. 
As the entry cohort matures, the size distribution becomes more concentrated 
as illustrated by the kernel density in Figure 3.A.3. The strongly right-skewed 
distribution at entry gradually gets a fatter right tail, but at age 6 it has not yet 
converged to the distribution of incumbents.  
A first mechanism generating this pattern of increased concentration in an 
entry cohort is selective survival. In line with the predictions of the passive 
learning model, we find high exit rates for young firms which are decreasing in age 
as well as in size. This is shown in panel a. of Figure 3.A.1, which plots the age-size 
coefficients for the exit regression representing job destruction rates for each age-
size class.37 Exit rates are especially high in the first full year of existence, from age 
1 to age 2, and then rapidly decrease with age. Five years after entry, exit rates 
have approximately halved, but they are still significantly higher than for 
incumbents, i.e. firms older than six years. The ordering of the lines for different 
size classes further shows that exit rates decline with size within every age cohort. 
The same pattern holds for each age group and is even true for incumbents. These 
results suggest that the selection process of the passive learning model—which 
predicts market exit of the least efficient and therefore the smallest firms—
unfolds quickly in the first years after entry. 
Panel b. of Figure 3.A.1 shows that a second prediction of the passive learning 
model is also borne out in the Belgian data. Surviving young firms exhibit high 
growth rates in the early years after entry, but growth slows down rapidly with 
age. In contrast with the exit probabilities which decline at a relatively constant 
pace, the growth slowdown is most pronounced in the first few years. The average 
growth rate declines convexly as it converges to a constant steady state. On 
average, surviving young firms at age 6 still show a positive growth rate of 
4 percentage points while the average incumbent does not show any employment 
growth.  
                                                 
37 Recall that all regression coefficients are estimated using employment weights. 
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Much higher growth rates of young firms—which are overrepresented in 
smaller size classes—induce a negative relationship between growth and size in a 
cross-section of firms of all ages. Such a relationship has often been documented 
in the literature and it is also what we find for Belgium, as shown by the ‘all firms’ 
line in Figure 3.1 in the text. Average growth rates among all firms surviving from 
year t-1 to t decline monotonically with the current size of the firm. As incumbents 
dominate this population, the absolute growth rates are rather low, especially 
beyond the first two size classes. 
It is instructive, however, to show the size-growth relationship separately for 
young firms that entered the sample at most five years ago, and older firms. The 
dashed line at the bottom of Figure 3.1 shows low growth rates for incumbents 
regardless of firm size. For them, absolute employment growth is proportional to 
the current size of the firm, confirming an empirical regularity found in many 
previous studies. In contrast, growth rates for young firms are not only higher, 
they clearly increase with size.  
Except for this last finding for young firms, all patterns described so far are in 
line with results from other empirical studies based on large-scale firm-level 
datasets, even when no or little attempt has been made to distinguish between 
what we have labelled de novo and spurious entrants. It suggests that most 
patterns are fairly robust to less accurate identification of truly new and young 
firms.38 The positive relationship between growth and size that we observe among 
young de novo firms, however, is not replicated in the full sample of administrative 
entrants. Instead, as indicated by the light gray line in Figure 3.1, the raw, 
administrative data suggest that small young firms have higher growth rates than 
larger ones. In Section 3.5.3, we showed that the difference is even more 
pronounced when growth rates are estimated conditional on age, that the pattern 
of the solid black line is robust, and how spurious entry biases the estimated 
relationship. 
3.E Why do many studies find a negative relationship? 
Several reasons why previous studies did not find the same positive relationship 
between growth and size of young firms have been mentioned briefly in the text. 
This section provides a point by point discussion. A first reason is that not all 
                                                 
38 The patterns in both panels of Figure 3.A.1 and those for incumbents and all firms in 
Figure 3.1 in the text are qualitatively the same when calculated using the raw 
administrative data, reported in Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2014). 
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studies condition on age, which is crucial. For example, Dunne et al. (1989) find a 
negative relationship but lump all firms up to age 5 in one group. Similarly, Mata 
(1994) finds a significant negative relationship only when young firms up to age 4 
are pooled into one age class. Given the important share of young—on average 
high-growth—firms in smaller size classes, while larger size classes contain 
almost exclusively older—low-growth—firms, composition effects induce a 
negative relationship if firms of different ages are pooled. Pooling across all firms, 
incumbents and young firms, we also found a negative relationship in our dataset, 
see Figure 3.1 in the text.  
A second reason is the inherent negative bias induced by the conventional base 
year classification. Most recent studies use a base year classification but control 
for potential bias using various other solutions than to one presented in this paper. 
Hence it remains unclear to what extent the difference in results is explained by 
different methodologies. One solution adopted by Mata (1994) is to omit all firms 
that enter with fewer than 10 employees to avoid truncated growth rates of the 
smallest firms. The same solution adopted to our sample of de novo entrants would 
imply to exclude 98.5 percent of the firms at entry. It is questionable whether the 
growth patterns of the 1.5 percent largest entrants are representative for those of 
total population of new firms entering the market. Evans (1987a) and Lotti et al. 
(2003) do include entrants of all sizes and use other estimation techniques to 
control for sample selection bias. Still, they report an inverse growth-size 
relationship for young firms even given age. Importantly, however, the also find 
convergence towards proportional growth rates for older firms, as we do.  
A third reason is that spurious entrants are generally not adequately filtered 
out from the dataset. Since they are misclassified older firms, their growth rates 
tend to be much lower, resembling those of incumbents.39 As spurious entrants 
dominate in larger size classes, they introduce a downward bias in post-entry 
growth rates that is strongly increasing with firm size. This effect is shown in 
Figure 3.A.2 which replicates Figure 3.3 on the full sample of administrative 
entrants, and on the subsample of spurious entrants that we filtered out. Panel b. 
shows the incumbent-like growth patterns for spurious entrants. They only grow 
faster than incumbents in the first recorded year and the positive growth-size 
relationship is not present for any age cohort, in line with the evidence for 
incumbents. The results confirms that the administratively recorded age of these 
firms is unrelated to actual firm age. Spurious entrants are already in a more 
                                                 
39 In Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2014) we show growth rates in all age-size classes 
separately for spurious entrants which highlights their uniformly low growth rates. 
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advanced stage of the selection process with less need for size adjustments. 
Panel a. shows growth rate estimates based on the raw sample of administrative 
entrants, before spurious entrants are filtered out. The downward bias spurious 
entrants introduce in growth rates of young firms is hardly noticeable in the 
smallest size classes where we showed that the share of spurious entrants is 
negligible. Yet, in larger size classes where spurious entrants represent the 
majority of administratively recorded entrants, their low growth rates swamp the 
high growth rates typically observed for de novo entrants. It obscures the positive 
relationship between growth and current size and even reverses it at age 2. 
Growth rates seem to be size invariant already from age 3 onwards.  
Misclassified exits have a similar effect on the estimated pattern. Larger 
entrants that grow strongly are more likely to be involved in a restructuring that 
changes their firm ID, but is not economic exit. Some firms reorganize to cope with 
higher than expected growth rates, for example by splitting off some activities or 
adopting a different administrative structure. One incentive to split-up activities 
into smaller units, for example, is to remain below the size threshold of 
100 employees above which firms are submitted to more stringent legal 
obligations.40  Other firms are taken over by rivals that see the growth potential. 
Misclassifying such events involving large firms that grow strongly as exits 
obscures the positive size-growth relationship. 
Finally, most previous studies, e.g. Evans (1987a), Dunne et al. (1989), Mata 
(1994), Lotti et al. (2003), focus on the manufacturing sector where the positive 
relationship is weaker also in our dataset. We find the increasing relationship to 
be most pronounced in the sectors of ‘business support services’ and in ‘mixed 
business and household services,’ where entry costs are often lower—graphs by 
industry are shown in Geurts and Van Biesebroeck (2014). Firms in these sectors 
can easily enter with a very small size and gradually adjust to optimal scale. 
Consistent with a higher minimum efficient scale in manufacturing, we find firms 
to enter with higher average size and show a much weaker size-growth 
relationship.  
                                                 
40 In Belgium, small firms do not need to file full annual accounts or install a works council 
(fewer than 100 employees, turnover below 7.3m EUR, and balance sheet total below 
3.65m EUR). 
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Employment performance following takeovers 
Abstract 
The merger literature has documented many motivations for takeover activity, 
which may lead to either employment expansion or contraction of the merged 
company. In public perception, however, mergers and acquisitions are 
associated with dramatic job loss. Empirical studies based on takeovers by 
listed firms in Europe have confirmed this view. Are these examples of publicly 
announced acquisitions representative for takeover activity undertaken by a 
wide range of other firms?  
To shed light on this question we focus on a comprehensive sample of 
takeovers in the Belgian domestic market. We investigate how the individual 
characteristics of both the acquiring and the acquired firm affect the decision 
to engage in a takeover and subsequent employment growth.  
The results indicate that takeovers have a small negative impact on 
employment growth of the merged entity that is persistent in the three post-
merger periods. The adverse employment effect is mainly attributed to 
takeovers undertaken by small acquirers. For large acquirers we find 
substantial variation in post-merger employment growth suggesting that 
workforce rationalizations are not the dominant motivation for takeover 
activity. In particular, we find suggestive evidence that takeovers targeted at 
high-growth firms have a positive impact on firm employment growth. 
JEL Codes: J23, L23 
Keywords: Mergers; Acquisitions; Panel data; Labor demand 
__________________________________ 
This chapter is joint work with Johannes Van Biesebroeck. I would like to thank Eric 
Bartelsman, John Earle, Joep Konings, Otto Toivanen for valuable comments and 
suggestions for improvement, as well as participants of the PhD seminar at the Center for 
Economic Studies KU Leuven.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Examples of mass layoffs following takeovers of large companies have led to the 
popular perception that mergers and acquisitions lead to substantial workforce 
reductions. Even if only a small fraction of firms engage in takeover activity, our 
dataset shows that each year, more than 6 percent of employees in the Belgian 
private sector are working in a company that is involved in a takeover. If takeovers 
do significantly reduce the firm’s demand for labor, the consequences for 
aggregate employment may be considerable.  
This paper investigates the impact of takeovers on employment in the merged 
entity using a comprehensive sample of 2259 domestic takeovers in the Belgian 
private sector in 2007-2012. We investigate how the individual characteristics of 
both the acquiring and the acquired firm affect the decision to engage in a takeover 
and subsequent employment growth. The results indicate small but significant 
adverse effects on employment growth which persist for several years after the 
merger. We show, however, that the negative effect is not universal and strongly 
depends on the size, previous growth and industry characteristics of the acquirer 
and the target firm. 
Predictions from merger theory and empirical evidence of the effects on firm 
employment are ambiguous. A purely anti-competitive merger reduces output 
and thus employment. By eliminating competition between the two companies, 
the integrated firm may exploit its market power and substantially increase the 
price of its product at the same time reducing output. A merger or takeover that 
increases labor productivity without changing the level of output, will reduce 
employment as well. Theory provides ample reason to assume that the vertical 
integration of firms leads to gains in labor productivity (Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007). Productivity increases can for instance be realized by production cost 
savings, arising from economies of scale or from efficiently reallocating 
production and workers across the integrated firm. Conyon, Girma, Thompson 
and Wright (2001, 2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) indeed find evidence 
that acquisitions undertaken by listed UK and European firms respectively lead to 
increased labor productivity and substantial job loss in the merged company.  
The merger literature, however, has described many other motives that drive 
takeover activity (Jensen 1988). Takeovers aiming at synergy gains, the 
improvement of management and control, or tax incentives may as well lead to 
employment losses as to the growth of the firm both in output and in jobs. Mergers 
may also occur in response to non-profit maximizing motives (Jensen 1986; Roll 
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1986). Evidence of a positive employment impact has been found by Brown and 
Medoff (1988) for domestic takeovers in the state of Michigan. Margolis (2006) 
presents evidence for France that although worker displacement increases in the 
short term, it is significantly lower than in non-merging firms three years after the 
takeover. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) showed that takeovers undertaken by listed 
firms in the U.S. have no adverse effect on employment of the merged entity.  
This paper contributes to previous literature in three ways. First, takeovers are 
defined as the integration of two independent employer firms into a single legal 
unit. This setting enables us to explicitly concentrate on the employment effects of 
merging separate workforces into a larger combined entity. Our approach differs 
from a related stream of literature that analyses the impact of ownership changes 
on the performance of the target firm only. In these studies, the impact on 
employment of the acquiring firm remains out of scope and job reallocation across 
the merged entity after the transaction is regarded as job gains or job losses. Our 
sample also contrasts with Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), 
who focus on equity transactions between firms and include takeovers by listed 
companies only. Even if the two firms are brought under common ownership, they 
may continue as separate legal entities after the transaction. Second, we provide 
a comprehensive picture of takeover activity by including mergers between both 
small and large firms. This enables us to investigate how the employment 
outcomes depend on the size of the acquirer and on the relative size of the target 
in the merged entity. Third, and most importantly, we take into account that the 
characteristics of both the target and the acquirer, and the specific combination 
between the two affect the decision to engage in a takeover and subsequent 
employment growth. As a counterfactual for the takeovers, we use pairs of firms 
which match on the combined pre-merger characteristics of the target and the 
acquirer but continue as independent firms. This setting has two advantages. First, 
in previous studies, non-merging firms with similar characteristics as the larger 
merged entity have been used as a control group. If we aim at comparing the 
potential employment outcome of the merged firms in the absence of a takeover, 
pairs of non-merging firms provide a more valid counterfactual. Second, our 
approach enables us to assess how the combined pre-merger characteristics of the 
acquirer and the target lead to differential employment outcomes. In the present 
version of the paper, we make a first attempt to link these pre-merger features to 
different motivations for takeover activity. 
We rely on estimation techniques from the treatment effects literature to 
control for the fact that firms do not randomly select into a takeover. This enables 
us to construct a counterfactual pair of firms with similar characteristics as the 
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acquirer and the target up to three years prior to the takeover. In particular, we 
consider such features as pre-merger size, previous growth, industry, and the 
corporate structure of the two firms. We also make use of a set of record linking 
methods to control for additional firm restructurings and control changes that 
may occur in the pre- and post-merger periods. The potential bias this creates in 
firm employment histories has been largely neglected in previous studies. We 
show that firms in a takeover are seven times more likely to be involved in an 
additional restructuring than other firms, and that ignoring these events leads to 
a substantial underestimation of post-merger growth performance. Finally, in line 
with Brown and Medoff (1988), we estimate the direct effect of takeovers on 
employment in the merged entity. Conyon et al. (2002) have estimated the firm’s 
derived labor demand conditional on output and wages, and distinguished 
between changes in labor efficiency and direct employment effects. Our sample 
does not include information that allow for a similar analysis.  
We find that takeovers, on average, lead to significant but small reductions in 
employment growth of the merged entity. In the year of the transaction, 
employment growth is 2.4 percentage points lower than it would have been in the 
absence of a merger. This adverse effect persists for a substantial period of time. 
Growth reductions continue to be larger than 2 percentage points in the three 
years after the transaction. The negative employment impact is most obvious for 
takeovers undertaken by small acquirers in all industries. In other subsamples, 
however, we find suggestive evidence that workforce rationalizations are not the 
dominant motivation for takeover activity. This is most pronounced for takeovers 
undertaken by large acquirers and takeovers of high-growth targets. Takeovers 
by large companies lead to smaller decreases in employment and exhibit 
substantial variation in post-merger employment patterns. Acquisitions of high-
growth firms have a more positive impact on employment growth than other 
takeovers, which is in line with the literature suggesting substantial synergy gains 
from this type of takeovers. Finally, we do not find takeovers of firms in related 
and unrelated industries to lead to differential employment outcomes. This result 
reflects recent evidence by Atalay, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2014), which suggest 
that vertical and horizontal integration do not fundamentally differ. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of 
previous empirical studies. Section 4.3 describes our empirical models and 
estimation methods. Section 4.4 discusses the data and provides summary 
statistics. Section 4.5 presents the results and section 4.6 concludes.  
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4.2 Literature 
A large number of studies have investigated the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on employment of the acquired plant or firm, and are based on 
samples of various types of control changes including plain ownership changes 
(Bhagat et al. 1990; Lichtenberg and Siegel 1991; McGuckin and Nguyen 2001). 
Some studies have estimated the impact of a foreign takeovers in particular, i.e. 
whether employment growth of the domestic plant is positively or negatively 
affected when it is acquired by a foreign company. Overall, the results indicate that 
takeovers have no to small negative effects on employment of the acquired plant, 
and that the impact varies greatly across sectors. Girma and Görg (2003), for 
example, show that foreign takeovers in the UK electronics industry reduced 
employment growth in the domestic plants, but that there was no significant effect 
for the food sector. Lehto and Böckerman (2008) show for Finland that foreign 
acquisitions had an adverse effect on employment in manufacturing plants, but 
not in services. For plants that are taken over by a domestic company, by contrast, 
the study finds a consistent negative employment effect.  
Looking at employment changes in the acquired plant or firm is, however, only 
half the picture. Takeovers may also affect employment of the acquiring firm, and 
jobs may be relocated across different plants of the merged company. Studies that 
focus on the target firm only consider job reallocation that occurs between the 
target and the acquiring firm as employment gain or loss, and disregard 
employment changes at the level of the acquiring firm. A more consistent 
approach, therefore, is to consider employment changes in both the target and the 
acquirer. Brown and Medoff (1988), Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2004) have adopted this by estimating the employment impact at the level of the 
combined entity, while Margolis (2006) observes employment in the two separate 
entities both before and after the merger. 
Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) focus on acquisitions by 
listed companies and find that takeovers lead to either no employment changes or 
significant job losses in the years following the transaction. Reductions in the 
firm’s workforce are generally attributed to takeovers motivated by cost savings. 
The transaction provides an opportunity for organizational restructuring, the 
more efficient use of labor, and adjustment to the new optimal employment level 
of the merged firm. Conyon et al. (2002) find evidence for increased labor 
efficiency going with significant rationalizations in the use of labor in a sample of 
mergers and acquisitions of 277 listed firms in the UK in 1975-1996. They show 
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negative employment effects in the order of -8 to -19 percent in the takeover 
period, which are particularly pronounced for two types of control changes: in the 
case of related mergers, where labor efficiency gains from increasing returns to 
scale are likely to be more substantial than in unrelated mergers (Dutz 1989); and 
in the case of hostile mergers, where new managers with no ties with current 
employees are less reluctant to renegotiate existing labor contracts (Shleifer and 
Summers 1988). The study, however, neglects employment in units that are 
divested after the merger, and is therefore likely to overestimate job losses 
attributed to the takeover. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) do control for divestiture 
activity in their study of 646 large mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. and Europe 
in 1987-1998. They argue that if mergers indeed provide an opportunity to adjust 
to a firm’s optimal employment level, workforce reductions following takeovers 
are more likely to occur when firms carry excess labor. Job losses due to mergers 
should then be more pronounced in rigid labor markets where high labor 
adjustment costs prevent the pre-merger entities from operating at their optimal 
employment level. Holmes and Schmitz (2010) have formulated this argument in 
more general terms as an opportunity cost of adopting new management 
practices. In line with this hypothesis, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) find that 
mergers and acquisitions in European countries lead to significant reductions in 
labor demand of the order of -10 percent compared to the pre-merger level, while 
they find no adverse effects on company employment in the U.S.  
Labor cost savings are, however, only one of the strategies to realize gains from 
takeovers. A large number of other potential benefits that drive takeover activity 
have been described in the merger literature, including such factors as increased 
market power, synergy gains, economies of scale, improved managerial 
competence, tax benefits, and deregulation (Jarell et al. 1988; Jensen 1988). 
Mergers may also occur in response to non-profit maximizing motives. Several 
theories explain why decision makers may have an incentive to acquire another 
firm even if it reduces the firms’ profits. The free cash flow theory describes why 
managers may choose to expand the firm beyond its optimal size (Jensen 1986), 
and the hubris theory argues that targets of realized takeovers are, on average, 
overvalued (Roll 1986). The wide variety of motivations that explain takeover 
activity imply that the consequences for employment growth are highly 
ambiguous. One example of a study that has found a positive effect on employment 
of the merged entity is Brown and Medoff (1988), which uses a sample of 
438 takeovers including also smaller firms in 1978-1984 in the state of Michigan. 
Their results suggest that mergers lead to significant increases in employment in 
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the post-merger periods, especially when the comparison is not restricted to 
surviving firms only but also accounts for job losses due to exits.  
4.3 Empirical model 
4.3.1 Basic models 
We estimate the impact of mergers and takeovers on employment of the merged 
entity in the year of the transaction and the next three years. In line with the 
aforementioned empirical studies, the employment series for the takeovers used 
in the estimations apply to the employment level of the combined entity, both 
before and after the transaction. Divestitures and additional changes in the firm 
structure are accounted for by an employment imputation procedure discussed in 
Section 4.4.1. We note that the distinction between a merger and a takeover is 
essentially a legal one without a clear-cut difference in an economic sense. Similar 
to previous work, we do not discern between these two types and use the terms 
interchangeably. 
Comparing employment growth of firms that have merged and firms that have 
not would yield invalid estimates of the causal effect of takeover activity on firm 
employment. The reason is that firms do not randomly select into a takeover. Firm 
size, the level of competition in the industry, and other characteristics affect the 
decision to engage in a takeover. Moreover, employment growth and takeover 
activity are unlikely to be independent. Previous success, for example, is likely 
affect both the takeover decision and subsequent growth performance. Conyon 
et al. (2002) have proposed to solve this endogeneity problem by relying on an 
instrumental variables approach. As they are interested in estimating the 
simultaneous changes in firm employment, output and wages in subsequent 
periods after the takeover, they use a generalized method of moment’s estimator, 
which exploits the dynamic panel features of the sample. In this paper, we opt for 
another estimation strategy using the counterfactual framework of the treatment 
effects literature. A discussion of this type of estimators is provided by Imbens 
(2004) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).  
The goal of treatment effects estimators is to utilize covariates to make 
‘treatment’ and outcome independent once we condition on those covariates. In 
our setting, treatment equals the takeover event. The causal effect of a takeover 
on employment can then be reformulated as the comparison between 
employment growth of firms involved in a takeover and the potential outcome if 
136  Chapter 4 
 
 
the firms would not have been merged. The goal of the estimation approach is to 
construct a valid counterfactual for the treated firms by selection-on-observables, 
i.e. the identification of observable covariates that are related to takeover activity 
and employment growth. If the covariates are well-specified such that the 
selection into takeover is random after conditioning on these covariates, 
treatment effects estimators yield unbiased results.  
Before turning to the details of the regression, we discuss the estimated 
treatment and outcome models in their basic forms. In previous empirical work, 
the impact of takeovers on employment is modelled by regressing the logarithm 
of employment on a dummy variable for takeover and a set of covariates. We 
follow this approach with one modification. The choice of the dependent variable 
technically restricts the analysis to surviving firms only since the logarithm of the 
zero employment level of firms that exit is not defined. As our sample includes a 
considerable number of small firms, we want to allow for the possibility of exit 
and associated employment loss in the post-merger years. Exit is inversely related 
to firm size and job destruction due to exit among small firms has been found to 
be considerable (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 1996a). If exit is related to 
takeover activity and firms that exit are excluded from the estimation, the impact 
of takeovers on employment will be biased. To include the possibility of exit, our 
dependent variable is defined as the firm-level employment growth rate. 
Following Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996b), growth rates are calculated as 
employment changes relative to the average of employment at the beginning and 
end of the period considered. Denoting employment of firm i in year t as 𝐸𝑖𝑡 , the 
growth rate over the preceding year equals 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) ?̅?𝑖𝑡⁄ , with  
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) 2⁄ . These growth rates range from -2 for exits to +2 for 
entrants, show job creation and destruction symmetrically, and are bounded away 
from infinity.1 Given this definition, our basic regression has the following form: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ∑  𝛾𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
The dummy variable 𝑀𝑖𝑡  takes a value of one if firm i is involved in a takeover 
in period t-1 to t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘  are a set of observable covariates and 𝛾𝑡  are year dummies 
that control for business cycle effects. 𝛽 is our coefficient of interest. If the model 
is correctly specified, 𝛽 ∗ 100 represents the percentage point difference between 
                                                 
1 This growth rate is close to the more commonly used logarithmic growth rate  
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1⁄ ), especially for values between -1 and +1.  Both measures show 
expansion and contraction symmetrically.  Symmetry is a crucial feature for estimating 
mean growth rates of small firms, as their employment fluctuates widely. 
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the mean employment growth rate of the merged firms i and the outcome if they 
would not have been involved in a takeover.2 
As noted above, the treatment effects estimators we will use rely on the 
selection-on-observable assumption, which means that conditional on the set of 
covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘  employment growth is independent of takeover activity. This 
assumption implies that systematic differences in employment growth between 
firms involved in a takeover and other firms with the same values for the 
covariates are attributable to the takeover. In this framework, 𝑔1 would denote 
employment growth of a firm if it is involved in a takeover, and 𝑔0 the outcome if 
it is not. Using this notation, we are interested in 𝑔1 − 𝑔0 for the merged firms, i.e. 
the difference between their observed employment growth and their potential 
outcome if they were not involved in a takeover. Clearly, we do not observe 𝑔0 of 
the merged firms. Yet the conditional independence assumption can be 
reformulated as 𝐸 (𝑔0|𝑋, 𝑀 = 1) =  𝐸 (𝑔0|𝑋, 𝑀 = 0), or the expected conditional 
growth rate of firms involved in a takeover would have been the same as that of 
other firms in the absence of a takeover. Based on this equality, treatments effects 
estimators use the conditional outcomes of firms that are not involved in a 
takeover as the counterfactual outcome 𝑔0 for firms involved in a takeover. The 
effect of a takeover on employment growth of the merged firms can then be 
defined as 𝐸 (𝑔1 − 𝑔0| 𝑀 = 1), otherwise known as the average treatment effect 
on the treated.  
The second assumption of treatment effects estimators to be valid is the so-
called common support or overlap condition. Only observations that have a 
positive probability of being both treated and non-treated should be included in 
the analysis. The estimators are biased if, conditional on the covariates, the 
probability of being involved in a takeover equals either zero or one. Although 
current sophisticated estimators partially ensure that the counterfactual 
observations are chosen from the region of common support, a large subset of 
firms in our dataset are clearly incomparable with the firms involved in a takeover. 
More specifically, small and young firms are rarely involved in a takeover, while 
they constitute the majority of firms. We therefore restrict the sample to takeovers 
taking place in period t-1 to t of which the acquiring firm has at least 10 employees 
and is at least four years old at the time before the transaction (t-1); and the 
acquired firm has at least 2 employees and is at least 1 year old in t-1. The subset 
of control firms selected for the analysis reflects these conditions. This initial 
                                                 
2 For small values of 𝛽 and conditional on initial size, 𝛽*100 equals the percentage 
difference between the employment levels of the treated and untreated groups. 
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reduction of the sample can be considered as a pre-selection on observable 
characteristics. 
We implement three treatment effects estimators to check the robustness of 
the results. In line with Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), the 
first estimator compares the performance of takeovers with firms that have 
similar pre-merger characteristics as the combined entity. We apply a propensity-
score matching estimator that matches firms on the estimated probabilities of 
being involved in a takeover. A fixed set of observable covariates is defined at the 
level of the combined entity to estimate the selection into takeover and the 
employment outcome. Given the minimum size and age restrictions we imposed 
for the acquirer and target, firms that are smaller than 10 employees and younger 
than 4 years in a given period t-1 are left out as potential counterfactuals.  
A drawback of the combined-entity approach is that it disregards that 
takeovers are combinations of two firms with different characteristics before the 
merger. A large pharmaceutical company taking over a small high-growth IT firm, 
will reflect a different merger motivation and presumably have a different 
employment impact than when a medium publishing company merges with a 
medium retail bookseller. Yet the combined-entity method treats them as similar 
events. Moreover, if employment growth depends on firm size and previous 
growth, using counterfactual firms of similar size and lagged growth as the 
combined entity, will bias the results. 
The second estimator we apply is a first step towards the integration of 
individual firm characteristics in the estimations, and takes into account the 
features of the acquirer in the takeover decision. We use the inverse-probability-
weighted regression-adjustment estimator and define a different set of covariates 
in the selection and the outcome model. The treatment model is estimated as a 
function of the characteristics of the acquirer, while the outcome model is defined 
as before as a function of the characteristics of the combined entity. Here as well, 
the predefined size and age restrictions imply that counterfactual firms smaller 
than 10 employees and younger than 4 years in t-1 are left out from the 
estimations.   
Our third estimator fully decomposes the combined-entity approach, and 
models how the characteristics of both the target and the acquirer, and the specific 
combination between these two affect the decision to engage in a takeover and 
subsequent employment growth. We use stratified matching to compare the 
performance of takeovers with that of pairs of firms, of which one matches the 
pre-merger characteristics of the acquirer, and the other one the characteristics 
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of the target. The sample is first partitioned into cells corresponding to subclasses 
defined by discrete covariates of the acquirer and the target. For each cell, control 
units are selected from the universe of pairs of firms which exactly match on these 
covariates. The outcome model is then estimated as a function of the 
characteristics of the combined entity and the cell fixed effects. 
Before implementing the estimators, we investigate which firm-level 
observables affect the selection into a takeover by estimating the following 
treatment model: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑝 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
𝑝 +  ∑  𝛾𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝛾𝑐𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
𝑝
 is the lagged growth rate of firm i measured over either one or two 
pre-merger periods 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
𝑝 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−𝑝) ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1⁄  (p={2,3}). 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘  are firm-
specific variables measured at time t-1, 𝐶𝑡−1 is a time-variant measure of 
concentration at the detailed industry level, 𝛾𝑠 are sector fixed effects, and 𝛾𝑡  are 
time dummies. The estimated coefficients provide insights in the firm and sector 
specific variables that affect the probability of being involved in a takeover, and 
how the timing of the takeover depends on previous growth performance. 
Equation (2) is estimated by maximum likelihood using a logistic model. 
4.3.2 Estimated equations 
Based on preliminary estimates of equations (1) and (2), the set of observable 
covariates to be included in the final estimations was selected. The definitions of 
these variables are provided in Appendix Table 4.A.1. As noted before, propensity 
score matching uses only one set of covariates to estimate the probability of 
treatment and the employment outcome. The inverse-probability-weighted 
regression-adjustment estimator defines the treatment and the outcome model 
with different sets of covariates. The stratified matching approach first uses a set 
of discrete covariates to match takeovers with counterfactual pairs of firms, and 
estimates the outcome model using additional covariates. 
Propensity-score matching  
Propensity-score matching chooses counterfactual firms for the takeovers based 
on the estimated predicted probabilities of being involved in a takeover, the so-
called propensity score. This measure indicates the degree of similarity between 
two firms based on observable characteristics that affect takeover activity. The 
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propensity-score estimator we implement is based on the following treatment 
model: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
3 + 𝛾𝑔𝐺𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝑐𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3) 
where  𝐸𝑖𝑡−1, represents the employment level of firm i in t-1 and  𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
3  is the 
growth rate of firm i measured over the two previous periods 𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
3 =
(𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−3) ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1⁄ , with ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−3) 2⁄ . The dummy variable 𝐺𝑖  
indicates whether the firm is part of an enterprise group and the dummy 𝐹𝑖  
whether it is engaged in FDI in the sample period. 𝐶𝑡−1 is the industry 
concentration ratio at time t-1 expressed as the employment share of the four 
largest firms at the Nace 3-digit level3, and 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛾𝑡  are sector and year fixed 
effects. 
In the estimator we apply, we impose that each firm involved in a takeover 
should be matched with at least five similar firms, the so-called ‘nearest 
neighbors’. The maximum difference in propensity scores between matched firms 
we allow is set at 0.05 standard deviation. Within this caliper, our actual 
estimations find between 5 and 20 matches. The effect of takeover activity on 
employment growth is then computed by taking the average of the difference 
between the observed outcomes for each firm involved in a takeover, and the 
potentials outcomes computed as the average of the outcomes of the matched 
firms. 
Inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment 
The inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment estimator fits weighted 
regression models of the outcome for each treatment level, where the weights are 
the estimated inverse propensity scores obtained by the treatment model. The 
regression coefficients are then used to predict two outcomes for each firm 
involved in a takeover, one for each treatment level. The difference between the 
averages of these outcomes estimate the effect of takeover activity on employment 
growth of the merged firms. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) show that this 
estimator has a double-robust property. It yields consistent estimates if either the 
selection model or the outcome model is correctly specified. Exploiting this 
flexibility, we define different sets of covariates to fit the separate models. The 
treatment model is estimated as a function of the characteristics of the acquirer, 
while the outcome model is defined as before as a function of the characteristics 
                                                 
3 In our sample, the Nace 3-digit level corresponds to 166 separate industries. 
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of the combined entity. The coefficient estimates of the treatment model will 
therefore more closely reflect how the decision to takeover depends on 
characteristics of the acquirer than it is the case in treatment model (3), where the 
covariates refer to the combined entity.   
The treatment model that estimates the propensity scores takes the following 
form: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼
2𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑝𝑎𝑃𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝑐𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4) 
Where 𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 represents the logarithm of employment of firm i at time t-1 and 
allows the selection into takeover to be dependent on firm size measured at the 
time before the transaction. Two covariates indicate how the decision to takeover 
is related to other control activities of the firm. The dummy variable 𝑃𝐴𝑖  indicates 
whether firm i is a parent firm, i.e. owns at least 50 percent of the shares of another 
Belgian firm in the sample period, and the dummy 𝐹𝑖  whether it is engaged in FDI. 
As noted above, the covariates for the takeovers represent the values for the 
acquiring firm only. The other variables are defined as above. 
The outcome model has the following form: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
3 + 𝛾𝑔𝐺𝑖 + 𝛾𝑓𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝑐𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (5) 
where the variables are defined as above. The control variable 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1, representing 
the employment level of firm i in t-1, allows growth rates to be dependent of firm 
size and to deviate from Gibrat’s law of proportionate growth (Sutton 1997). As 
noted, equation (5) is estimated as weighted regressions for each treatment level, 
i.e. for 𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  {𝑔𝑖𝑡
0 , 𝑔𝑖𝑡
1 }. 
Stratified matching 
Our third estimator strongly departs from the combined entity approach applied 
in previous papers by taking into account that the characteristics of both the target 
and the acquirer, and the specific combination between these two may affect the 
decision to engage in a takeover and subsequent employment growth. In 
particular, we consider such features as pre-merger size, previous growth, 
detailed industry, and the corporate structure of each of the two firms. As a 
counterfactual for the takeovers, we use pairs of firms with the same combined 
pre-merger characteristics. Our approach further differs from the two other 
treatment effects estimators that use the propensity score of the treated firms to 
select a counterfactual. The propensity score is a linear measure indicating the 
degree of similarity between two firms based on a combination of observable 
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covariates. Our counterfactual pairs of firms, by contrast, will be chosen such that 
they exactly match the takeovers with respect to all chosen covariates. Exact 
matching eliminates all imbalances (i.e., differences between the treated and 
control groups) beyond the level defined by the combined covariates. The 
remaining differences are thus all within small cells of firms with the same values 
for the covariates. In terms of exogeneity, our estimator relies on the assumption 
that employment growth is independent of takeover activity conditional on the 
cell characteristics, which are defined by the full interaction of the individual and 
the combined characteristics of the acquiring and target firm. As the choice of 
counterfactual firms is based on more precisely defined similarities with the 
takeovers than in the two previous estimators, our stratified matching approach 
will yield more reliable and more precise estimates of the takeover effect.4  
Our estimation procedure proceeds in two steps. First, the sample of takeovers 
and the universe of pairs of potential control firms is partitioned into cells defined 
by discrete covariates of the acquirer and the target. Next, the outcome model is 
estimated as a function of the characteristics of the combined entity and the cell 
fixed effects.  
The sample of paired firms includes all combinations of two firms of which one 
fulfills the predefined characteristics of an acquirer (at least 10 employees and at 
least four years old in t-1) and the other those of a target (at least 2 employees and 
at least 1 year old in t-1). The combined sample of takeovers and pairs is 
subdivided into mutually exclusive cells (or ‘strata’) 𝑐𝑙 , using 7 discrete 
stratification variables 𝑥1, … , 𝑥7. The choice of these variables is based on the 
results of our previous analysis, reflecting the characteristics of the acquirer and 
the target that may affect the decision to engage in a takeover and subsequent 
growth. The stratification variables are defined as follows: 
𝑥1 = {2007, … , 2012} is the year at the time before the takeover (t-1),  
𝑥2 =  {011, … , 960} is the Nace 3-digit industry code of the acquirer (166 
industries), 
                                                 
4 Our stratified matching approach is closely related to various exact matching estimators 
described in the literature. It corresponds to nearest neighbor matching when it is enforced 
that all covariates are discrete and match exactly (Imbens 2004). With exact matching on 
discrete covariates, the nearest neighbor matching estimator reduces to an average of 
differences in cell means. The regression adjustment estimator with fully interacted 
discrete covariates reduces to the same average of difference in cell means. Our strategy is 
further related to stratified matching as described by Anderson, Kish and Cornell (1980). 
Exact matching estimators have the property to reduce bias more and gain in precision as 
the number of subclasses is increased.  
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𝑥3 =  {011, … , 960} is the Nace 3-digit industry code of the target (166 
industries), 
𝑥4 =  {1, 2, 3, 4} is the size quartile of the acquirer defined within each year and 
industry cell  (𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2),  
𝑥5 =  {0, 1}  is a dummy indicating whether the acquirer is part of an enterprise 
group in t-2 or t-1,  
𝑥6 =  {1, 2, 3, 4,5} is the lagged growth quartile of the target defined within 
each year and industry cell  (𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3). Lagged growth is defined as the growth rate 
measured over the three periods before t-1, 𝑔𝑖 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−4) ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1⁄ , with 
?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−4) 2⁄ . The fifth subset includes targets that entered in one of 
these periods,  
𝑥7 =  {0, 1} is a dummy indicating whether the employment share of the target 
in the combined entity in t-1 is larger than 25 percent.  
The combination of the 7 stratification variables generates 13 226 880 
possible cells 𝑐𝑙 . Observations in cells that contain at least one takeover and one 
control pair of firms are retained; observations in the remaining cells are removed 
from the sample.5 This leaves us with 1822 cells with at least one takeover and 
one counterfactual pair.6 Of all takeovers, 2 percent for which no counterfactual 
pair exists drop out.  
The outcome model is defined as a function of the characteristics of the 
combined entity and the cell fixed effects. It has the following form: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
3 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (6) 
where 𝛾𝑐  represents the cell fixed effect and the other variables are defined as 
above. The model is estimated using a weighted least squares regression, where 
the weights are equal to the number of takeovers in each cell.7 The coefficient 𝛽 is 
                                                 
5 To restrict the number of counterfactual pairs per cell to a manageable number, we 
randomly select 150 acquirers within each subclass defined by x1, x2 and x4, and 150 
targets within each subclass defined by x1, x3 and x6. This only reduces the number of 
potential counterfactuals in industries with many small firms such as construction, retail 
or restaurants. 
6 The minimum number of takeovers and counterfactual pairs per cell in the final sample 
is 1. The maximum number is 5 takeovers and 21 136 counterfactuals. 
7 This weighting scheme is not fully appropriate for estimating a model that besides the cell 
fixed effects also includes the continuous covariates initial size and previous growth. We 
will look for a more appropriate weighting scheme to be applied in the final version of the 
paper.  
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an estimate of the effect of takeovers on employment growth corresponding to the 
average of the effect within the cells. Note that the cells 𝑐𝑙  correspond to the full 
interaction term between the 7 covariates 𝑥1, … , 𝑥7. The cell fixed effects are thus 
perfectly collinear with the covariates for time, industry, industry concentration 
and enterprise group used in the outcome models of the two previous estimators.8  
4.3.3 Extensions 
In time 
The equations discussed above estimate the impact of takeover activity on firm 
employment immediately after the transaction. As labor adjustments can be slow 
or takeover activity can have a persistent impact on employment growth, we 
extend the regressions to the 3-year period after the takeover. The post-merger 
impact on employment will be estimated both as year-by-year changes, and as 
cumulated changes over the entire post-merger periods. The first provide 
information on the dynamic adjustment paths conditional on surviving, while the 
latter give insight in the long-term employment gains or losses following a 
takeover.  
The regressions estimating employment growth over n-year periods use 
growth rates that take employment at time t-1 as the base year and are calculated 
as 𝑔𝑖𝑡+𝑛
+ = (𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) ?̅?𝑖𝑡+𝑛⁄ , with ?̅?𝑖𝑡+𝑛 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) 2⁄  and n = {1,2,3}. 
The other regression variables do not differ from the ones specified in equation 
(3) to (5). 
The regressions estimating year-by-year employment changes use growth 
rates calculated over the preceding period where 𝑔𝑖𝑡+𝑛 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛−1) ?̅?𝑖𝑡+𝑛⁄ , 
?̅?𝑖𝑡+𝑛 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛−1) 2⁄  and n = {1,2,3}. Here as well, the regression variables 
do not change except for 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 in equation (5), which is replaced by 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑛−1 and 
controls for the size of the firm at the start of the period considered.  
By subset  
The effect of takeover activity on firm employment growth may fundamentally 
differ by the type of the transaction, the characteristics of the acquiring and the 
acquired firm, and by sector. Two major distinctions we focus on is the differential 
impact of takeover activity by small and large acquirers, and the impact by broad 
                                                 
8 In the present version of this paper, the FDI variable has not yet been included in the 
stratified matching model. 
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sector groups. To investigate effect along these dimensions, we estimate separate 
regressions by subset.  
Finally, we use a minimum distance estimator to investigate whether the impact 
on employment differs by a set of other characteristics of the target and the 
acquirer. We again include the distinction between small and large acquirers, and 
additionally distinguish between small and large target shares, high-growth 
versus other targets, and related versus unrelated mergers. The four combined 
characteristics lead to 16 subsets of takeovers. The estimation strategy follows 
Wooldridge (2010) and proceeds in two steps. First, the takeover effect on 
employment is estimated for each of the 16 types of takeovers separately using 
inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment. This provides us with 16 
coefficients of the takeover effect. Next, the minimum distance estimator is 
obtained from an OLS regression of the 16 coefficients on the dummies of the 
characteristics. More specifically, we use a weighted least squares regression, 
where the weights are the squared standard errors of the coefficients obtained in 
the first step. 
4.4 Data  
4.4.1 Sample composition 
We use a sample of 2259 domestic takeovers in 2007 to 2012 which are defined 
as the integration of two previously independent Belgian employer firms into a 
single legal unit.9 This setting allows us to explicitly concentrate on the 
employment effects of merging separate workforces into a larger combined entity. 
The sample consists of all mergers that are observed in the specific period, 
including transactions between both small and large firms. The only size 
restriction we impose is that the acquirer has at least 10 employees and the target 
at least 2 employees at the time before the transaction.  
The identification of takeovers is based on two sources. The first is based on 
employee-flow linkages between firms using a linked employer-employee dataset 
(Geurts 2016). A takeover is defined as an event where an incumbent absorbs the 
                                                 
9 Independency is based on the official firm identification number. Each firm ID number is 
regarded as a separate firm by the Belgian law. Before the merger, each firm pays its own 
social security contributions, corporate taxes, and fills out individual annual accounts. After 
the merger, these obligations are fulfilled by the joint entity. 
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entire workforce of another firm and the latter is dissolved after the transaction. 
Similarly, mergers are identified as two firms that are dissolved and merge their 
workforces into a newly created firm.10 The second source is a dataset compiled 
by Statistics Belgium based on official mergers and acquisition approved by the 
Commercial Court. It includes share deals between companies where the buyer 
becomes the owner of legal entity, and acquires the target’s shares and assets as 
well as all existing liabilities and debts.11 In line with our definition above, we 
include only events when two firms merge into a single legal entity. The vast 
majority of observations in our sample are takeovers, i.e. targets that are absorbed 
by a continuing incumbent. Plain mergers, where both firms are dissolved and a 
new merged company is created after the transaction, represent a small share of 
our sample.12 In line with previous studies, we do not distinguish between 
‘mergers’ and ‘takeovers’ and use the terms interchangeably. When several firms 
are taken over in the same year, the transactions are collapsed into one event. 
Takeovers in different years, however, are included as separate observations.  
Employment information is based on the register of Belgian employers 
maintained by the National Social Security Office (NSSO). It covers all Belgian 
private firms with at least one employee. This dataset is also used to construct the 
control group of firms. The employment files cover the period from 2003 to 2012. 
This leaves us with an unbalanced panel including employment histories of 
unequal length for the takeovers in 2007-2012. Information about the control 
structure of firms is included using a dataset provided by Statistics Belgium.  
The sample of 2259 takeovers is pre-selected on a set of characteristics to 
avoid measurement error and confounding sets of firms with incomparable 
growth patterns. Temporary agencies, which exhibit continuous reshuffling of 
legal entities within enterprise groups, and firms in highly subsidized sectors, 
where employment growth strongly depends on policy measures, are excluded 
                                                 
10 More specifically, a takeover corresponds to an event where at least 50 percent of the 
individual employees of the dissolved firm is transferred to the incumbent. Similarly, a 
merger corresponds to the transfer of at least 50 percent of the individual employees of 
two dissolved firms into a new legal entity. Most takeovers and mergers in the sample 
correspond to transfers of close to 100 percent of the workforces into the combined entity.  
11 Not all takeovers are subject to the Commercial Court procedure. Asset deals, ‘noiseless’ 
mergers between firms of the same corporation, and other buy and sell operations can be 
executed without approval by the Commercial Court. 
12 Plain mergers represent less than 3 percent of the total sample and are not investigated 
separately. In the case of plain mergers, we consider the largest predecessor as the acquirer 
and the other predecessor(s) as the acquired firm(s).   
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from the analysis. We also exclude some exceptional observations where the 
acquiring firm is very young or very small. Young and small firms are known to 
have extremely high growth and exit rates compared to other firms, which would 
lead to outliers in the estimations (Geurts and Van Biesebroeck 2014). Finally, we 
exclude takeovers where the employment share of the target in the combined 
entity is smaller than 1 percent. These takeovers do not correspond to substantial 
workforce integrations, which is the focus of our study.  
Technically, our sample of 2259 takeovers includes all mergers between two 
or more firms that occurred in period t-1 to t where t = {2007,…, 2012} and satisfy 
the following conditions. The acquirer has at least 10 employees and is at least 
4 years old at the time before the transaction (t-1); the target is at least 1 year old 
and has at least 2 employees in t-1 and represents at least 1 percent of 
employment of the combined entity; the merged entity survives in t.  
From all Belgian firms not involved in a takeover in 2007 to 2012, a sample of 
600 000 observations is selected as potential counterfactuals for the target. The 
sample is predefined on the same observable characteristics: the firm has at least 
2 employees in year t-1 and is in existence at least since from year t-2 to t. A firm 
may be included more than once in the sample if it satisfies these conditions for 
different values of t. A subset of 140 000 observations that meet the conditions of 
an acquirer is used as the potential counterfactual group for the acquiring firms. 
The propensity score matching and inverse-probability-weighted regression-
adjustment estimators use only counterfactuals for the combined entity. The 
subset that meets these conditions consists of 128 000 observations. The final 
sample is an unbalanced panel as it does not include employment information 
before 2003 and after 2012.  
We take great care to control for other changes in the firm structure that may 
occur before or after the takeover. Takeovers can be accompanied by divestitures 
of parts of the firm in the year of the transaction and in the post-merger periods. 
Moreover, firms may engage in another merger, split up, or disappear from the 
dataset because they change identification number. Such events are known to be 
a major source of bias in the measurement of firm-level employment growth based 
on micro-level data (Haltiwanger et al. 2013; Geurts 2016). It has been neglected 
in previous studies that these biases are likely to be exacerbated in the population 
of takeovers. We find that firms involved in a takeover have a much higher 
probability to be involved in an additional restructuring than other firms. 
Appendix Table 4.A.2 shows that 34 percent of the takeovers in our sample are 
involved in another event in the three years following the merger, as opposed to 
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only 5 percent of the firms in the control sample. Previous studies, which did not 
control for such events, are likely to report employment growth figures which are 
artificially inflated or deflated.13  
We address this methodological shortcoming in the following way. A set of 
advanced record linking methods is used to control for ID changes and changes in 
the firm structure that occur before or after the takeover period t-1 to t. The 
methods are based on supplementary data sources, probabilistic matching and 
employee-flow record linking as described in Geurts (2016). The linkage methods 
allow us to reconstruct the employment histories of firms involved in a takeover 
three years before and three years after the transaction. Our approach is to impute 
employment growth at the firm level by assuming the same growth rate for each 
firm involved in the event.14 This imputation method treats split-offs and 
absorptions symmetrically and preserves the firm size distribution in the sample. 
It allows a more accurate estimate of the net effect of takeovers on firm 
employment growth. Imputation is only performed until a second event occurs. 
Beyond that, firm observations are excluded from the analysis since correcting for 
multiple events often involves a complex set of interlinked firms and imputation 
becomes unreliable.15  
  
                                                 
13 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) partly address this problem by introducing a dummy for 
divestiture activity. 
14 More specifically, the approach we adopt is to first construct an aggregate event level 
including all firms interlinked in a given period from t to t+1. Firm-level employment in t+n 
with n = {1,…} is then imputed by assuming the same growth rate for each firm involved in 
the event. The imputation is carried out for the three post-merger periods. Similarly, 
backward employment imputation is applied in a given period from t to t-1 for the three 
pre-merger periods. More detail on the methods for identifying events and imputing 
employment histories is provided in Geurts (2016). 
15 In the present draft of this paper, employment imputation is only carried out for firms 
involved in a takeover. Firms in the control sample, were events are exceptional, are simply 
excluded from the analysis in the periods they are involved in an event. We hereby avoid 
artificially inflated or deflated growth rates for this subset as well. 
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4.4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the composition of the sample of takeovers by subsets. The 
middle three columns report the average size of the acquirer, the target and the 
combined entity at the time before the merger (t-1).16 The last column shows the 
percentage share of the target in the combined entity. The first row shows that, on 
average, acquirers employ 191 employees at the time before the merger. They are 
almost 5 times larger than the firms they take over. The joint entity has an average 
size of 231 employees. This combined size will be the starting point for the 
estimations of post-merger employment growth. The rest of the table shows these 
summary statistics by subsets of takeovers. The definitions of the subsets are 
provided in Appendix Table 4.A.1.  
The distinction between small and large acquirers indicates why it is 
interesting not to focus on takeovers by large firms only. First, smaller firms, here 
defined as firms with less than 100 employees, do exhibit considerable merger 
activity and constitute 70 percent of the sample. We select a cut-off value of 
100 employees because this is a threshold for more stringent legal obligations in 
Belgium.17 Second, the weight of the target firm in the transaction differs greatly 
between small and large acquirers. Small acquirers takeover targets that, on 
average, represent 30 percent of the merged entity, while in the case of large 
acquirers, the target share is only 15 percent. The statistics of the next subsets, by 
the share of the target in total employment of the combined entity, confirm this 
pattern. Takeovers are divided into two approximately equal by subsets by using 
a cutoff value of 25 percent to distinguish small and large target shares. Small 
target shares are associated with large acquirers and vice versa. It has been 
suggested that smaller acquirers show greater post-merger efficiency gains than 
their larger counterparts (Conyon et al. 2002). This differential impact may be 
related to the relative sizes of the merged firms, and we will control for both 
effects in the estimations. 
Growth related merger theories have put forward that one motivation for 
acquiring another firm is to gain access to new technologies and highly specialized 
personnel. Moreover, high-growth firms with low liquidity and high leverage have 
                                                 
16 In the case of multiple targets, the average target size is based on the sum of employment 
of the different targets. In the case of mergers, the largest firm in t-1 is defined as the 
acquirer. 
17 In Belgium, small firms do not need to file full annual accounts or install a work council 
(with fewer than 100 employees, turnover below 7.3 m EUR, and balance sheet total below 
3.65 m EUR). 
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been found to be likely targets (Palepu 1986). As the merger generates substantial 
synergy gains for both the target and the acquirer, the employment impact can be 
expected to be more positive than when labor cost savings are the dominant 
motivation. We will examine this hypothesis by distinguishing takeovers 
according to the previous growth performance of the target. High-growth targets 
are defined as firms with an average annual growth rate of at least 8 percent in the 
three years before the merger. They represent 25 percent of the sample.  
Table 4.1  Sample composition of takeovers in 2007-2012 
    
Number  
of obs. 
Average size in t-1  
(number of employees) Percentage 
share of 
target 
    Acquirer Target* Combined 
         entity 
Total 2259 191 40 231 17.3 
By size of acquirer: less versus more than 100 employees 
  Small 1582 36 16 52 30.8 
  Large  677 554 96 650 14.8 
By employment share of target: less versus more than 25% of combined entity 
  Small 1171 295 27 322 8.4 
  Large 1088 79 54 134 40.3 
By previous growth performance of target:  
average annual growth rate in the 3 years before the takeover less versus more than 8% 
  High growth target  568 148 29 177 16.4 
  Other 1691 206 44 250 17.6 
By type of integration: target and acquirer in same versus different Nace3-digit industry 
  Related 1313 192 47 239 19.7 
  Unrelated 946 190 30 220 13.6 
By data source 
  Commercial Court 1312 217 52 269 19.3 
  Employee-flow method 1925 208 45 253 17.8 
By type of merger 
  Takeover of 1 target 2058 146 29 175 16.6 
  Takeover of more targets 138 919 211 1131 18.7 
  Merger 63 71 23 94 24.5 
* In the case of multiple targets, the average size of the sum of employment of the targets is 
reported. 
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In line with previous studies, we also distinguish between ‘related’ and 
‘unrelated’ mergers. Takeovers are classified into related and unrelated 
depending on whether the target and the acquirer belonged to the same Nace 
3-digit industry.18 Here as well, predictions from merger theory and empirical 
evidence on the employment consequences are ambiguous. Employment losses 
have been hypothesized to be more likely in related than in unrelated mergers, 
particularly when the industry exhibits substantial economies of scale (Dutz 
1989). Atalay, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2014), however, argue that vertical and 
horizontal expansion do not fundamentally differ as they both aim at facilitating 
efficient transfers of intangible inputs. Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004) have found contrasting empirical results on this issue. Table 4.1 
shows that related takeovers represent half of the sample. With respect to the 
average absolute and relative sizes of the firms involved, they do not differ greatly 
from unrelated mergers. 
The bottom part of the table gives more information about the construction of 
the sample. The Commercial Court data file identifies 58 percent of the merger 
activity. Most of these officially registered mergers and acquisitions are picked up 
by the employee-flow method as well, which identifies 85 percent of the takeovers 
in the sample. Finally, the last subsets show that the majority of observations in 
the sample are simple takeovers of one target by one acquirer (91%). Takeovers 
of multiple targets in the same period (6%) and ‘plain’ mergers of firms that 
dissolve and merge into a newly created company (3%) are rather exceptional. 
Table 4.2 presents further information on the sectors that will be investigated 
and on the control sample. In all sectors, defined by the industry of the acquirer, 
firms involved in a takeover are only a small fraction of active firms but they 
represent a considerable share of employment. The first row shows that every 
year, not less than 6 percent of all employees in the Belgian private sector are 
working in a company that is involved in a takeover. If takeovers do significantly 
affect the firm’s use of labor, the consequences for aggregate labor demand may 
be considerable. Business and household services exhibit the most intense 
takeover activity, both in terms of the absolute number of takeovers and their 
share in sector employment (7.8%). Manufacturing shows the highest share of 
firms involved in a takeover (1.1%) and the largest average sizes of acquirers and 
targets. Wholesale and retail show average takeover activity, while Construction 
is dominated by merger activity between smaller firms.  
                                                 
18 In our sample, the Nace 3-digit level corresponds to 166 separate industries. 
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Table 4.2  Summary statistics by sector 
  Share in 
sector 
population 
(%) 
Share in 
sector 
employment 
(%) 
 Average size in t-1 
 
Number 
of obs. 
 Acquirer Target 
Combined 
entity 
Total      
  Takeovers 2259 0.5 6.1  191 40 231 
  Potential counterfactuals    38 12 41 
Manufacturing      
  Takeovers  526 1.1 7.4  263 49 311 
  Potential counterfactuals    56 25 59 
Construction      
  Takeovers  225 0.3 3.1  123 24 147 
  Potential counterfactuals    29 10 31 
Wholesale and retail      
  Takeovers  611 0.5 5.5  163 28 192 
  Potential counterfactuals    32 10 33 
Business and household services     
  Takeovers  833 0.6 7.8  185 48 233 
  Potential counterfactuals    41 11 44 
Other (Agriculture, Accommodation)     
  Takeovers   64 0.1 2.0  197 37 233 
  Potential counterfactuals    22 8 23 
Note: Annual averages in the period of observation (2007-2012). 
The last three columns also include information on the sample of other firms 
that are used to construct the counterfactuals for takeovers. They show the 
average sizes of other firms from which the potential counterfactual targets and 
acquirers for the stratified matching estimations are selected; and, in the last 
column, the average sizes of the firms that are used as potential counterfactuals 
for the combined entity in the propensity score matching and inverse-probability-
weighted regression-adjustment estimations. Even if we pre-selected on initial 
size, survival, and age as described above, the average sizes of the potential 
counterfactuals are much smaller than those of the firms involved in actual 
takeovers. In each sector, actual acquirers and combined entities are more than 
four times larger than their potential counterfactuals, and actual targets are more 
than two times larger. Figure 4.A.1 in the Appendix provides a more detailed 
picture of the size distributions of targets, acquirers, and their potential 
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counterfactuals. The figure shows the distributions at the time before the 
transaction (t-1) based on the number of employees on a logarithmic scale. Actual 
targets and acquirers show moderately right-skewed distributions with the 
highest share of firms in size classes 8 to 15 employees and 16 to 63 employees 
respectively. An important share of actual acquirers is located in the right tale of 
the distribution. Firms in the potential counterfactual groups, by contrast, show 
extreme right-skewed distributions with more than 75 percent of the firms 
concentrated in the first two size classes and almost no tale. From these statistics, 
one can presume that the treated and control group differ strongly with respect to 
other characteristics as well. A further selection-on-observables and an 
appropriate weighting scheme is thus necessary to obtain more reliable estimates 
of the effect of takeover activity on firm employment. 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 present the evolution of takeover activity by sector in the 
period of observation 2007-2012. In most sectors, the share of firms involved in a 
takeover has been relatively stable over time. Only Manufacturing, where Belgian 
firms suffered greatly from the decline in export during the global recession of 
2008-2009, showed a temporary increase of takeover activity following the 
recession. Takeover activity shows much more variation in terms of employment 
shares (Figure 4.2), as the size of the firms involved differs strongly between 
takeovers. The peak in Business and household services in 2010, for example, is 
explained by a few very large firms engaging in a takeover in Publishing, ICT and 
the Financial sector. 
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Figure 4.1  Share of firms involved in a takeover by sector 
 
Figure 4.2  Employment share of firms involved in a takeover by sector  
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Selection into takeover 
To investigate which firms engage in the acquisition of another firm, we first show 
results for the treatment model (4) with the takeover dummy as the dependent 
variable. The equation is estimated by maximum likelihood using a logistic model. 
Empirical studies have suggested numerous firm-level variables that explain 
takeover activity and which are related to different hypotheses about the 
motivations for takeovers such as shareholder premiums, management 
competence, free cash flows, growth-resource imbalances, firm size, and so on 
(e.g. Jarell et al. 1998; Roll 1986; Palepu 1986). Other studies have found also 
industry level variables to be significant including industry shocks, growth, 
concentration, asset liquidity (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996), deregulation and 
antitrust relaxation (Jensen 1988). 
Given the limitations of our dataset, we are able to include the following 
explanatory variables that have previously been found to predict takeover 
activity. At the firm level we include firm size and previous growth performance 
measured in terms of employment; and firm dummies which are informative 
about FDI flows and the corporate structure of the firm. Industry characteristics 
are picked up by fixed effects that are tested at various levels of the industry 
classification. Finally, we examine the significance of different measures of 
industry concentration at the detailed Nace 3-digit level.  
The results for the treatment model are presented in Table 4.3. In the first two 
columns, we examine how takeover decisions depend on the size and previous 
growth of the acquirer. The regressions also include sector and year fixed effects. 
The probability of takeover increases nonlinearly with firm size. Lagged growth is 
positively correlated with the takeover decision, with a larger coefficient if 
measured over a 2-year than 1-year period. But given the large variation in pre-
merger growth, the effect is not significant. The sector fixed effects (detail not 
provided in table) reveal that after controlling for firm size and growth, 
manufacturing companies are less likely to engage in a takeover than it appeared 
from the summary statistics in Table 4.2. Firms in Information and 
communication services and in Financial services exhibited the highest takeover 
activity. The year dummies confirm an increase in takeover activity in 2009-2010, 
and a decline thereafter. 
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Table 4.3  Which firms select into takeover 
Dependent variable: dummy for takeover in period t-1 to t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm-level variables      
 Employment i t-1 (log) 1.617*** 1.617*** 1.452*** 1.471*** 1.401*** 
  (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) 
 Employment2 i t-1 (log) -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.082*** -0.077*** -0.076*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 1-year lagged growth i (t-2 to t-1) 0.012     
  (0.147)     
 2-year lagged growth i (t-3 to t-1)  0.051   0.077 
   (0.100)   (0.102) 
 Parent firm i (dummy)   1.007***    0.982*** 
    (0.051)  (0.051) 
 Enterprise group i (dummy)     0.484***  
     (0.045)  
 FDI i (dummy)   0.279***   0.250*** 
    (0.069)  (0.070) 
Industry variables      
 Concentration ratio t-1 (Nace 3-digit level)  -0.726***  -0.744*** 
    (0.140)  (0.162) 
 Herfindahl Index t-1 (Nace 3-digit level)   -0.987**  
     (0.389)  
       
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Nace 2-digit FE No No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.117 0.102 0.123 
No. of observations 130 284 130 284 130 284 130 284 130 284 
Regression coefficients show results of logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
In the next two columns we add various variables on the control structure of 
the acquiring firm and the level of industry concentration. Column (3) shows that 
being a parent firm, i.e. owning at least 50 percent of the shares of another Belgian 
firm, significantly increases the probability of takeover. Involvement in FDI flows 
has positive impact as well. By contrast, a high level of industry concentration at 
the time before the takeover, measured as the employment share of the four 
largest firms at the detailed 3-digit industry level, is a negative predictor for 
takeover activity. Column (4) tests alternative versions of these explanatory 
variables. We include an enterprise group dummy, indicating whether the firm is 
controlling or controlled by another company, and the Herfindahl index as a 
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measure of industry concentration. Using these alternatives does not 
fundamentally change the results but the pseudo-R2 indicates that the predictive 
power of the model decreases. We therefore use the covariates in column (3) in 
our final estimations.  
So far, industry fixed effects have been added with dummies for eight broad 
sector groups. When estimating the outcome model for different subsets of 
takeovers, the limited number of observations does not allow us to go beyond this 
level. When, however, the overall impact of takeover activity is estimated, fixed 
effects of more detailed industries can be included to more accurately capture the 
specific industry characteristics that affect the takeover probability. The last 
column reports the coefficients of the model when the industry fixed effects are 
added at the Nace 2-digit level, with separate dummies for 34 industries. 
Compared to column (3), the sizes of the coefficient estimates slightly decrease, 
indicating that the detailed industry level accounts for part of the variation in the 
explanatory variables. All coefficients except the one of lagged growth remain, 
however, highly significant and the explanatory power of the model increases. 
4.5.2 Effect of takeovers on firm employment growth 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present our estimation results for the impact of takeovers on 
firm-level employment growth until the third year after the transaction. Table 4.4 
reports the effect on year-by-year employment growth rates and Table 4.5 shows 
the results when growth rates are calculated over the n-year post-merger period 
using employment at time t-1 as the base year. The coefficient estimates in panel a. 
of each table correspond to the average treatment effects on the treated obtained 
by either propensity score matching or inverse-probability-weighted regression-
adjustment. The propensity score matching estimations are based on treatment 
model (3), including firm-level covariates at the level of the combined entity only. 
Inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment is based on treatment 
model (4), which specifies control variables in terms of the characteristics of the 
acquirer, and on outcome model (5). The regressions for both estimators only 
included takeovers for which the treatment models showed that at least five 
matches could be found that are sufficiently similar to the takeover. We set this 
threshold for similarity at 0.05 standard deviation of the propensity score. Panel b. 
reports the coefficient estimates based on stratified matching and outcome 
model (6). As discussed above, this estimator uses pairs of firms as a comparison 
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group of which both the counterfactual target and acquirer match each of the two 
firms involved in a takeover on a set of individual characteristics.19  
Table 4.4  Effect of takeovers on year-by-year employment growth  
Dependent variable: employment growth rate (in percent) 
  Takeover  
period 
nth post-merger period 
  1st 2nd 3rd 
  (t-1 to t) (t to t+1) (t+1 to t+2) (t+2 to t+3) 
Panel a.    
Propensity score matching 
  -1.86*** -2.18*** -1.88** 0.14 
  (0.32) (0.64) (0.81) (0.83) 
Inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment 
  -2.16*** -2.77*** -3.03*** -1.51** 
  (0.29) (0.59) (0.76) (0.72) 
      
No. of observations 130 274 107 789 84 760 62 226 
No. of takeovers 2 249 1 929 1 503 1 034 
     
Panel b.     
Stratified matching on acquirer and target characteristics 
 -2.43*** -2.22*** -2.78*** -2.25*** 
 (0.25) (0.45) (0.54) (0.67) 
     
No. of observations 5 555 003 4 439 591 3 492 217 2 573 014 
No. of takeovers 1 948 1 670 1 316   916 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated. Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
Takeovers in 2007-2012. Observations drop out from the estimations when employment is 
outside period of observation (after 2012). Regressions include all firms that survive or exit 
in a given period. Regressions do not include firms that have exited from the year after exit 
onwards, counterfactuals in event from the event onwards, and takeovers in second event 
from the second event onwards. 
Panel a. Takeovers with less than 5 counterfactual observations with a propensity score 
<0.05 standard deviation are excluded. Panel b. Counterfactuals consists of pairs of firms 
that match the target and acquirer characteristics. Takeovers without consistent 
employment information in each of the three years before the merger, and takeovers with 
an acquirer or target for which no valid matches could be found are excluded.  
                                                 
19 The number of takeovers in these estimations is somewhat smaller than for the first two 
estimators because we require that consistent employment information is available on 
both the acquirer and the target in each of the three years before the merger, and because 
takeovers with an acquirer or target for which no valid matches could be found drop out 
from the estimations. 
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The first column of Table 4.4 shows that takeovers have a small but significant 
negative impact on employment of the combined entity immediately after the 
merger. Employment growth in the period of the transaction is 1.86 to 2.43 
percentage points lower than it would have been in the absence of a merger. The 
next columns reveal that the adverse effect persists for a substantial period of 
time. In particular, the coefficients obtained by stratified matching show that 
growth reductions continue to be larger than 2 percentage points in the three 
years after the transaction, and remain highly significant.  
The coefficients of the two other estimators, which less accurately reflect how 
the decision to engage in a takeover depends on characteristics of both the 
acquirer and the target, show similar but less pronounced effects. The results 
based on propensity score matching, which only control for characteristics at the 
level of the combined entity, suggest that the negative employment effect 
disappears in the third year after the transaction. The coefficients based on 
inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment, which take into account 
that the individual characteristics of the acquirer affect the takeover decision, are 
more in line with the ones obtained by stratified matching. Yet, even if the 
stratified matching results are based on a smaller set of takeovers, the coefficient 
estimates are more precise than the ones based on the two other estimation 
approaches. This gain in precision is in line with what could be expected based on 
our discussion of the estimator in Section 4.3.2. 
How do these workforce reductions relate to total labor force dynamics? 
Elsewhere we have shown that the annual gross job destruction rate in the Belgian 
private sector in the period of observation is 6.03 percent, compared to a job 
creation rate of 7.06 percent (Geurts 2016). Since takeovers represent about 
6 percent of total private employment, this means that annual job loss due to 
takeovers in the post-merger period represents a mere 2 to 3 percent of total gross 
job destruction.20 Even without taking into account the positive consequence that 
the workforce reductions may be partly the result of increases in labor 
productivity, fear of substantial job loss following takeovers seems to be largely 
unfounded, at least for takeover activity between domestic firms. 
                                                 
20 For small growth rates, the percentage point differences in the growth rates correspond 
to the percentage differences between the actual and potential employment levels in the 
absence of a takeover. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that, as takeovers 
represent 6.1% of total private employment in a given year, annual work-force reductions 
in the post-merger periods as shown in Table 4.4 represent about 0.14% of total 
employment, corresponding to 2.4% of total gross job destruction in a given year.  
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Table 4.5  Effect of takeovers on employment growth measured over n-year periods  
Dependent variable: employment growth rate (in percent) 
  
Takeover 
period 
2-year 
period 
3-year 
period 
4-year  
period 
  (t-1 to t) (t-1 to t+1) (t-1 to t+2) (t-1 to t+3) 
Panel a. 
Propensity score matching 
  -1.86*** -3.98*** -7.26*** -6.73*** 
  (0.32) (0.74) (1.34) (1.59) 
Inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment 
  -2.16*** -4.83*** -7.16*** -9.11*** 
  (0.29) (0.68) (1.15) (1.45) 
      
No. of observations 130 274 107 789 85 642 63 767 
No. of takeovers 2 249 1 929 1 517 1 063 
     
Panel b. 
Stratified matching on acquirer and target characteristics 
 -2.43*** -4.15*** -6.22*** -6.74*** 
 (0.25) (0.54) (0.80) (1.17) 
     
No. of observations 5 555 003 4 439 591 3 493 527 2 577 358 
No. of takeovers 1 948 1 670 1 323 932 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated. Standard errors 
in parentheses 
Takeovers in 2007-2012. Observations drop out from the estimations when employment is 
outside period of observation (after 2012). Regressions include all firms that survive or exit 
after year t. Regressions do not include counterfactuals in event from event onwards, and 
takeovers in second event from second event onwards. 
Panel a. Takeovers with less than 5 counterfactual observations with a propensity score 
<0.05 standard deviation are excluded. 
Panel b. Counterfactuals consists of pairs of firms that match the target and acquirer 
characteristics. Takeovers without consistent employment information in each of the three 
years before the merger, and takeovers with an acquirer or target for which no valid 
matches could be found are excluded 
The year-by-year growth estimates presented in Table 4.4 are conditional on 
surviving in the preceding period. Table 4.5 shows the impact on employment 
over a longer period, i.e. from the pre-merger employment level in t-1 to the nth 
year after the transaction. The results confirm a persistent and strongly negative 
impact of takeover activity on firm employment growth. In the first year after the 
merger, employment relative to the pre-merger level is reduced by about 
4 percent. Measured over the 3-year post-merger period, the adverse effect on 
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employment growth amounts to about -7 percentage points. The results for the 
three estimators are broadly comparable, with the stratified matching 
specifications again producing more precise coefficient estimates.  
Estimations of the difference in performance before and after the merger 
confirm the adverse effect of takeovers on employment growth. Table 4.A.3 in the 
Appendix presents coefficient estimates of the impact of takeovers on the 
difference between firm-level employment growth before and after the merger. 
The first column compares employment growth in the year of the takeover with 
that in the year before the merger. The second and third columns present results 
based on a comparison of two- and three-year growth rates, respectively. The 
negative coefficients indicate that growth of firms involved in a takeover 
significantly slows down after the merger and that this adverse effect persists for 
several periods. In the merger period, average growth rates are 0.89 percentage 
points lower than if the firms would not have engaged in a takeover. The negative 
effect amounts to -4.11 percentage points if three-year growth rates before and 
after the merger are compared.  
We have discussed before that our estimates take into account additional 
changes in the firm structure that occur in the post-merger periods. Such changes 
have largely been neglected in previous studies. We noted that 34 percent of the 
merged companies are involved in another restructuring event in the 3-year 
period after the takeover. Misinterpreting additional acquisitions and split-offs as 
internal job creation and destruction, and misreading changes in the firm ID code 
as exits, would artificially inflate or deflate the employment growth figures. 
Appendix Tables 4.A.4 and 4.A.5 show coefficient estimates based on a 
straightforward reading of the firm employment figures in the raw data. They 
reveal that disregarding additional restructuring leads to a substantial 
underestimation of the post-merger growth performance. Year-by-year estimates 
in this naive approach would suggest employment growth reductions in the post-
merger periods that are about twice as large as the ones presented in Table 4.4. 
Accumulated over the entire 3-year post-merger period, they would suggest an 
average employment growth reduction of 13 percentages points, instead of 
the -9 percentage points we find in our sample.  
The estimated coefficients discussed so far represent the difference in 
employment growth between takeovers and their predicted outcomes in the 
absence of a merger. Constructing counterfactual growth rates over a relatively 
long period is obviously a hypothetical exercise. Moreover, the limited 
information in our dataset does not allow us to take into account intermediate 
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changes in output, wages, prices, and the financial performance of the firm which 
affect the firm-level labor demand in a given period. The reasons behind the 
negative effect of takeovers on employment growth thus remain unclear. It may 
be the result of more efficient labor usage for the production of a constant output 
level, or of a reduction in output growth. Conyon et al. (2002) have shown 
evidence for the UK that mergers between large companies are followed by both 
output falls and increased labor efficiency in the merged entity. What our results 
do suggest, however, is that workforce reductions following takeovers are not 
restricted to the period of the transaction only. If the negative employment impact 
reflects the hypothesis that restructurings provide an opportunity for managers 
to shed excess labor, cut overlapping functions, and adjust the use of labor to a 
new optimal employment level, our results suggest that these workforce 
adjustments are made slowly. Similarly, if employment reductions reflect output 
falls, they extend over a substantial period of time. 
4.5.3 Differential effect by type of takeover 
To further analyze the impact of takeovers on employment, we disaggregate the 
sample into takeovers by small and large acquirers at the time before the 
transaction (t-1). We show results of the stratified matching estimator because of 
its properties of robustness and flexibility. 
The estimates in Table 4.6 reveal that the negative impact of takeovers on 
employment growth we observed previously is for a large part attributable to 
workforce reductions following takeovers by small acquirers (less than 
100 employees). The coefficients indicate substantial employment growth 
declines for this subset ranging from 2.7 to 3.6 percentage points in the year of 
takeover and the three post-merger periods. By contrast, takeovers by large 
acquirers lead to much smaller employment declines in the period of the takeover, 
and an unclear employment growth path in the next three periods, which suggests 
considerable variation in the growth performance of takeovers by large acquirers. 
This finding confirms Gugler at al. (2003), who showed considerable variation in 
post-merger performance among mergers by large companies. They found that 
many mergers reduce output (measured as sales) and increase efficiency, but that 
a large proportion of firms also increase output combined with either increases or 
decreases in efficiency. The size-related differences in employment growth we 
observe is also in line with the results for listed companies reported by Conyon 
et al. (2002). They found that smaller acquirers tend to exhibit greater labor 
demand falls and increases in labor efficiency than their larger counterparts.  
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Table 4.6  Effect of takeovers on employment growth by size of the acquirer in t-1  
Dependent variable: employment growth rate (in percent) 
 Takeover  
period 
nth post-merger period 
 1st 2nd 3rd 
 (t-1 to t) (t to t+1) (t+1 to t+2) (t+2 to t+3) 
Small acquirer (<100 employees) -2.78*** -2.69*** -3.13*** -3.64*** 
 (0.30) (0.55) (0.65) (0.80) 
Large acquirer (≥ 100 employees) -1.33*** -0.61 -1.89*** 1.84** 
 (0.35) (0.55) (0.64) (0.74) 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated using stratified 
matching on acquirer and target characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Takeovers in 2007-2012. Observations drop out from the estimations when employment is 
outside period of observation (after 2012). Regressions include all firms that survive or exit 
in a given period. Regressions do not include firms that have exited from the year after exit 
onwards, counterfactuals in event from the event onwards, and takeovers in second event 
from the second event onwards. 
Counterfactuals consists of pairs of firms that match the target and acquirer characteristics. 
Takeovers without consistent employment information in each of the three years before 
the merger, and takeovers with an acquirer or target for which no valid matches could be 
found are excluded.  
In our previous stratified matching estimations, we controlled for the different 
impact of takeovers by industry by matching targets and acquirers with 
counterfactual firms in the same Nace 3-digit industry. To throw more light on the 
industry differences, Table 4.7 shows the impact of takeover activity for 
Manufacturing, Construction, Wholesale and retail, and Business and household 
services separately. The table present results of stratified matching estimations 
and distinguishes takeovers according to the industry of the acquiring firm. The 
first column of the table shows that Business and household services exhibit the 
strongest employment growth declines brought about by takeovers, followed by 
Construction and Wholesale and retail. The negative impact of takeover activity in 
Manufacturing is much smaller. Manufacturing, however, is dominated by larger 
firms, while the average firm size in other sectors, in particular in Construction 
and Wholesale and retail, is much smaller. Given the critical importance of the 
acquirer’s size discussed above, we estimate the differential impact by small and 
large acquirers for each industry group (column 2 and 3). Two patterns emerge. 
On the one hand, in each industry, small acquirers lead to more substantial 
workforce reductions than large acquirers. This means that the firm size 
composition does provide some explanation for the observed industry 
differences. On the other hand, part of the main industry effect remains present 
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for both small and large acquirers, with Construction and Business and household 
services exhibiting the strongest decreases in employment growth following a 
merger.  
Table 4.7  Effect of takeovers on employment growth by industry and size of acquirer 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate in takeover period (t-1 to t) (in percent) 
 Total Small acquirer Large acquirer 
Manufacturing -1.45*** -1.46** -1.38** 
 (0.47) (0.63) (0.54) 
Construction -2.78*** -3.55*** -1.71 
 (0.87) (1.03) (1.11) 
Wholesale and retail -1.89*** -2.35*** 0.20 
 (0.43) (0.50) (0.65) 
Business and household services -3.29*** -3.52*** -2.41*** 
 (0.44) (0.51) (0.68) 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated using stratified 
matching on acquirer and target characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Takeovers in 2007-2012. Counterfactuals consists of pairs of firms that match the target 
and acquirer characteristics. 
While the size of the acquirer is found to be a major discriminating feature, the 
effect of takeovers on employment may also differ by other characteristics of the 
target and the acquirer. To further analyze these firm-level determinants, we 
additionally distinguish between small and large target shares, high-growth 
versus other targets, and related versus unrelated mergers. As explained in 
section 4.3.3, we use a minimum distance estimator to investigate the impact of 
these features.21 Table 4.8 reports the results. 
The reference class in these estimations consists of takeovers by small 
acquirers, where the target represents a large target share, exhibits low growth 
before the merger, and is in a related industry. These subsets are defined as before. 
The constant term in panel b. shows that the employment growth impact for this 
reference class is -4.1 percent in the takeover period, and amounts to -14 percent 
when growth is measured over the 4-year period after the transaction. The results 
in the first row of each panel a. and b. confirm our previous finding that the size of 
the acquirer is a strong determinant of post-merger employment growth. 
                                                 
21 In order to have sufficient observations in each subset of takeovers, the distinction 
between small and large acquirers is redefined using a threshold of 50 employees. 
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Controlling for all other features, takeovers by large acquirers have a more 
positive impact on employment growth than those by small acquirers. The effect 
is significant up till the 3rd post-merger period. In the period of the takeover, 
however, the significance of the size effect disappears, and is captured by two 
other characteristics. 
Table 4.1 showed that small acquirers tend to merge with relatively large 
targets, while large acquirers take over relatively smaller firms. When two firms 
of similar size are merged, the potential for workforce rationalizations may be 
greater than in the case a relatively large firm absorbs a much smaller target. The 
results in the second row of Table 4.8 show that the relative size of the target 
indeed provides some explanation for the differential effect of takeovers by small 
and large acquirers. As expected, the employment decline in the period of the 
transaction is less pronounced when relatively small targets are acquired. The 
effect of the target share is, however, restricted in time and disappears from the 
first post-merger period onwards. After that, the size of the acquirer remains the 
dominant explanation for differential employment growth rates following a 
takeover. 
Takeovers targeted at incorporating new technologies of high-growth firms 
are expected to have a more positive impact on employment growth of the merged 
entity than other takeovers. Our results suggest some evidence for this. The third 
row of Table 4.8 shows that takeovers of targets that exhibited an average annual 
growth rate of at least 8 percent in the 3 years before the transaction have a more 
positive effect on employment growth. Panel a. indicates a significant positive 
effect in the period of the transaction only, but when measured over a longer 
period (panel b.), the accumulated effect of high growth targets remains 
significantly positive over a 3-year period.  
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Table 4.8  Effect of takeovers on employment growth by characteristics of target and 
acquirer 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate (in percent) 
Panel a. 
Takeover 
period 
nth post-merger period 
1st 2nd 3rd 
 (t-1 to t) (t to t+1) (t+1 to t+2) (t+2 to t+3) 
Large acquirer 0.73 2.67** 2.15* 2.49** 
 (0.56) (1.08) (1.05) (0.89) 
Small target share 1.76*** 0.93 0.17 -0.86 
 (0.54) (0.89) (0.92) (0.79) 
High growth target 1.38** 1.14 0.90 0.33 
 (0.62) (0.90) (1.04) (0.85) 
Unrelated merger 0.13 0.63 0.27 0.22 
 (0.50) (0.86) (0.94) (0.75) 
     
Constant -4.14*** -5.21*** -4.96*** -3.44*** 
 (0.53) (1.06) (1.04) (0.95) 
Panel b. 
Takeover 
period 
2-year  
period 
3-year  
period 
4-year  
period 
 (t-1 to t) (t-1 to t+1) (t-1 to t+2) (t-1 to t+3) 
Large acquirer 0.73 3.38** 5.26** 5.90*** 
 (0.56) (1.23) (1.72) (1.85) 
Small target share 1.76*** 2.82** 1.69 0.83 
 (0.54) (1.12) (1.59) (1.74) 
High growth target 1.38** 2.90** 3.70* 2.33 
 (0.62) (1.16) (1.80) (1.97) 
Unrelated merger 0.13 0.75 0.18 1.25 
 (0.50) (1.04) (1.53) (1.69) 
     
Constant -4.14*** -9.44*** -12.52*** -14.07*** 
 (0.53) (1.23) (1.67) (1.86) 
Regression coefficients show results of minimum distance estimations. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
The dummy for large acquirer' indicates takeovers by acquirers with more than 50 
employees in the year before the takeover (t-1). The dummy for 'small target share' 
indicates takeovers where the target represents less than 25% of employment of the 
combined entity in t-1. The dummy for 'high growth target' indicates takeovers of targets 
with an average annual growth rate of more than 8% in the three years before the takeover. 
The dummy for 'unrelated merger' indicates mergers between firms in different industries 
at Nace 4-digit level (513 sectors). 
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The last row of Table 4.8 shows the differential effect of takeover activity by 
the relatedness of the acquirer and the target, as measured by their industrial 
classification. Conyon et al. (2002) find larger reductions in the use of labor post-
merger in related mergers than in unrelated mergers and suggest that this might 
reflect the differing scope for rationalizations. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), 
however, find contrasting results for different countries. Our results seem to 
support the argument of Atalay, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2014) that vertical and 
horizontal expansion do not fundamentally differ. Above we showed that related 
and unrelated takeovers do not substantially differ with respect to the average 
absolute and relative sizes of the firms involved. Table 4.8 further suggests no 
evidence to distinguish between the employment effects of both types of 
takeovers. Conditional on all other characteristics, takeover activity leads to 
similar employment outcomes for both unrelated and related mergers. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper has provided an empirical analysis of the impact of domestic mergers 
and takeovers on firm employment growth across a comprehensive sample of 
Belgian takeovers in 2007-2012. We show how the individual characteristics of 
the acquiring and the acquired firm affect the selection into a takeover and 
subsequent employment growth. We find the size of the acquirer to be a major 
determinant of differential post-merger employment performance. In contrast to 
results that have been reported for acquisitions by listed firms in Europe, we find 
that takeovers by large companies (more than 100 employees) do not lead to 
systematic decreases in employment growth following in the merger. Instead, the 
merged entities exhibit substantial variation in post-merger employment growth, 
which is present across various industries and subsets of mergers. This suggests 
that workforce rationalizations are not the dominant motivation for takeover 
activity by larger firms. A wide range of other motivations, as suggested in the 
merger literature, may drive the decision to takeover, and lead to either increases 
or decreases in employment. Takeovers targeted at acquiring new technologies 
are one example of proposed synergy gains that may drive takeover activity. Our 
results suggest some evidence for this as takeovers of high-growth targets have a 
more positive impact on employment growth than other takeovers.  
By contrast, our results suggest strong evidence for significant employment 
decreases following takeovers by small acquirers (less than 100 employees). In 
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the period of the transaction, employment growth is about 3 percentage points 
lower than it would have been in the absence of a merger, and this adverse effect 
persists for three post-merger years. The negative employment impact is 
significant after controlling for various characteristics of the target firm, and is 
observed in different industries. If the employment declines reflect important 
workforce rationalizations, our results suggest that these adjustments are made 
slowly and extend over a substantial period of time. 
In the present version of the paper, we have provided a general picture of how 
different types of acquirers and targets lead to differential employment outcomes. 
Our setting, which relies on large subsets of counterfactual observations, however, 
enables us to further investigate detailed subsets of the sample which can be more 
explicitly linked to different motivations for takeover activity. Mergers in 
industries with declining demand, for example, are likely to be motivated by 
rationalizations of capacity; acquisitions in industries that exhibited an important 
wave of consolidation can be linked to oligopolistic behavior; mergers in 
industries with high levels of unionization are likely to aim at productivity gains 
by shedding excess labor; takeovers targeted at young high-growth companies in 
innovative industries can be linked to technology acquisitions; or takeovers by 
large companies targeted at suppliers in related industries can be linked to 
vertical integration along the value chain. In this sense, the research presented in 
this doctoral thesis is not finished. In fact, it has only begun. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.A. 1  Description of the variables 
Variables Description 
𝐸𝑖𝑡 Employment of firm i at 
time t 
The number of employees firm i employs at June 30 of 
year t.  
𝑔𝑖𝑡  Employment growth 
rate of firm i in period 
t-1 to t 
The growth rate equals 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) ?̅?𝑖𝑡⁄ , with 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) 2⁄ .  
𝑀𝑖𝑡 Dummy variable for 
takeover in period t-1 
to t 
Takes a value of one if firm i is involved in a takeover in 
period t-1 to t. 
𝐶𝑡 Industry concentration 
ratio at time t 
Employment share of the four largest firms at the Nace 3-
digit industry level (166 industries) at time t 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 Industry concentration 
index at time t 
Herfindahl index at the Nace 3-digit industry level 
measured as the sum of the squares of the employment 
shares of the firms within the industry at time t 
𝑃𝐴𝑖 Parent firm dummy Takes a value of one if firm i owns at least 50 percent of 
the shares of another Belgian firm in the sample period 
(2004-2012) 
𝐺𝑖  Enterprise group 
dummy 
Takes a value of one if firm i either controls or is 
controlled by another Belgian firm in the sample period 
(2004-2012) 
𝐹𝑖  FDI dummy Takes a value of one if firm i is either receiver of sender 
of FDI in the sample period (2004-2012) 
Subsets  
Small versus large acquirer A small acquirer has less than 100 employees at the time 
before the takeover (t-1). Otherwise the acquirer is 
denoted as large. 
Table 4.8: a small acquirer has less than 50 employees at 
the time before the takeover (t-1). 
Small versus large target 
share 
A small target share denotes takeovers where the 
employment of the acquired firm represents less than 25 
percent of the employment of the combined entity at the 
time before the takeover (t-1). Otherwise the target share 
is denoted as large. 
High growth target A high-growth target is an acquired firms with an average 
annual growth rate of at least 8 percent in the three 
periods before the merger (t-3, t-2 and t-1).  
Related versus unrelated 
takeovers 
Takeovers are classified into related and unrelated 
depending on whether the target(s) and the acquirer 
belonged to the same Nace 3-digit industry (166 
industries).  
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Table 4.A. 2  Share of firms involved in a restructuring event 
 Obs. Share in event 
 (t) (t to t+1) (t to t+2) (t to t+3) 
Takeovers     2 259 0.14 0.25 0.34 
Firms in control sample 128 025 0.02 0.03 0.05 
 
 
Table 4.A. 3  Effect of takeovers on growth acceleration 
Dependent variable: difference in employment growth rate pre- and post-merger (in ppt) 
  
1-period growth 
difference 
2-period growth 
difference 
3-period growth 
difference 
 
 (t-1 to t) - 
(t-2 to t-1) 
(t-1 to t+1) - 
 (t-3 to t-1) 
(t-1 to t+2) - 
(t-4 to t-1) 
  -0.89**  -1.82***  -4.11*** 
  (0.37)  (0.68)  (0.98) 
       
No. of observations 5 555 003  4 439 591  3 464 952 
No. of takeovers 1 948  1 670  1 323 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated using stratified 
matching on acquirer and target characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Takeovers in 2007-2012. Regressions include all firms that survive or exit in a given period. 
Regressions do not include counterfactuals in event from the event onwards, and takeovers 
in second event from the second event onwards. 
Counterfactuals consists of pairs of firms that match the target and acquirer characteristics. 
Takeovers without consistent employment information in each of the three years before 
the merger, and takeovers with an acquirer or target for which no valid matches could be 
found are excluded. 
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Table 4.A. 4  Effect of takeovers on year-by-year employment growth when additional 
restructuring events post-merger are neglected 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate (in percent) 
  Takeover 
period 
nth post-merger period 
  1st 2nd 3rd 
  (t-1 to t) (t to t+1) (t+1 to t+2) (t+2 to t+3) 
Propensity score matching    
  -2.99*** -3.45*** -3.60*** -4.78*** 
  (0.33) (0.93) (1.00) (1.18) 
Inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment  
  -2.79*** -3.52*** -4.04*** -5.24*** 
  (0.30) (0.88) (0.94) (1.11) 
      
No. of observations 134 755 134 755 132 100 108 315 
No. of takeovers 2 151 2 148 2 086 1 642 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated. Standard errors 
in parentheses. Takeovers with less than 5 counterfactual observations with a propensity 
score <0.05 standard deviation are excluded. Regressions include all firms that survive or 
exit in a given period. Regressions do not include firms that have exited from the year after 
exit onwards.  
 
Table 4.A. 5  Effect of takeovers on n-year period employment growth when additional 
restructuring events post-merger are neglected 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate (in percent) 
  
Takeover 
period 
2-year 
period 
3-year 
period 
4-year 
period 
  (t-1 to t) (t-1 to t+1) (t-1 to t+2) (t-1 to t+3) 
Propensity score matching 
  -2.99*** -6.15*** -9.55*** -12.42*** 
  (0.33) (0.97) (1.34)   (1.80) 
Inverse-probability-weighted regression-adjustment 
  -2.79*** -6.21*** -9.80*** -13.45*** 
  (0.30) (0.93) (1.26)   (1.68) 
      
No. of observations 134 755 134 755 134 755 113 091 
No. of takeovers 2 151 2 151 2 151 1 750 
Regression coefficients show the average treatment effects on the treated. Standard errors 
in parentheses. Takeovers with less than 5 counterfactual observations with a propensity 
score <0.05 standard deviation are excluded. Regressions include firms that exit after 
year t. Regressions do not include observations outside period 2003-2012. 
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Figure 4.A. 1  Size distribution of targets and acquirers and their potential 
counterfactuals at the time before the takeover (t-1) 
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